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Abstract 
Power and Coordination in the Multinational Company:  
a Post-Heterarchical Perspective 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor 
of Philosophy 
May, 2019 
Andrew Guy Jarvis MA MRes 
 
Multinational Companies (MNCs) are not only among the most important institutions in our 
globalising world, but are fascinating organisations given their complexity and the daily 
challenge they face of operating across different countries and cultures.  However, MNC’s 
have mainly been theorised as a structure of units, with relatively little focus upon how they 
operate at the level of the individual (Piekkari & Welch, 2010).  This thesis seeks to understand 
how individuals navigate the structures of the MNC and, using concepts of power, examines 
how different perspectives and interests are reconciled to enable coordination.   
In particular, this thesis explores the dynamics of individuals’ power relations in GlobeCo, a 
major European MNC that has evolved from a polycentric to an interdependent, heterarchical 
organisation (Hedlund, 1986).  The analysis highlights the heterarchy as a context of ambiguity 
and contestation, reflected in continuous organisational fluidity, in which the formal units of 
the MNC are neither stable nor well defined.  This suggests that GlobeCo needs to be 
considered as a post-heterarchical MNC in which interdependence, cultural and institutional 
pressures, and diverse interests are experienced, and resolved, at the individual level.  The 
implications of the post-heterarchical form for our understanding of the MNC are considered. 
The thesis further shows how individuals rely upon the temporary acceptance of multiple 
forms of episodic power-in-use.  Through examining a particular change initiative in depth, the 
thesis shows both how individuals leverage the different forms of power-in-use, but also use 
apparently everyday practices to build shared understanding, legitimacy and commitment – 
and through this achieve sufficient compatibility of understanding and actions, a transient 
intersubjective alignment, to allow coordination. 
As such, the thesis not only provides a better understanding of the heterarchical multinational, 
but highlights the role of the individual in shaping power relations to achieve coordinated 
action.  In doing so, it gives insight into how individuals’ episodic action can shape systemic 
power relations that, in turn, provide the basis for episodic power-in-use.   
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1. Introduction 
Fran sat at her desk and sighed.  This was the trouble with trying to serve so many masters.  
As HR Director for the small UK Institutional Business (IB-UK) unit she seemed to be stuck 
between the irreconcilable demands of her different bosses. 
The wider UK business were introducing a new training programme that had been 
developed globally in GlobeCo.  It seemed so sensible that IB-UK should be part of this – 
those in IB-UK would benefit from the training and it would build much needed bridges 
between the Institutional Business and the rest of the larger UK retail business.  Encouraged 
by her line-manager – the VP HR for UK and Ireland – she announced that the training would 
be extended to IB-UK managers, a decision enthusiastically welcomed within IB-UK. 
But that was a week ago – now her other bosses were objecting.  The VP HR for the Global 
Institutional Business had apparently decided that their global businesses would not 
participate in this training – not that he had cascaded that information!  Now he is insisting 
that IB-UK pull out.  What seemed almost worse is that the CEO of IB-UK – with whom Fran 
had built a close working and personal relationship – was now upset about criticism that IB-
UK are not following the Global Institutional Business line. 
Fran held her head in her hands.  She didn’t want to upset her line manager – her career 
and bonus depended on him.  But she needed to keep good relationships with the people 
she worked daily within IB-UK and the Global Institutional Business.  How could she unblock 
this?   
 
1.1 Background and Motivations of this Study  
This vignette, based upon an account given during my research1, highlights the complexities 
and multidimensionality of the contemporary multinational.  Yet while such a conflict may 
appear mundane, it is difficult to explain within much of the contemporary theorising of the 
multinational company (MNC).  This is not simply about a struggle between Headquarters and 
Subsidiary.  It is not about clearly defined units speaking with one voice.  It seems not to be 
driven by contrasting institutional contexts.  This is not just an issue of hierarchy or legitimate 
authority. 
                                                          
1 For the relevant quotes see Chapter 6. 
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Rather this vignette illustrates the broader theme of this thesis that focuses upon the 
disaggregation of the multinational organisation to the level of individual.  Within such a 
perspective collective ‘units’, both formal and informal, are ‘fuzzy’ – with ambiguous and 
changing boundaries – and speak with multiple voices.  Instead of assuming that 
responsibilities within the interdependent MNC are well-defined, it recognises that they are 
uncertain and contested.  As such, rather than focusing upon outcomes as the consequence 
of faceless units, it considers them as the consequence of the unfolding of the multiple 
relationships that individual managers have within the multinational company.  In doing so, it 
starts to consider the ‘lived experience’ (Piekkari & Welch, 2010) of working and managing in 
a multinational company. 
While such themes are rare in the literature on the MNC, they have become prominent within 
the wider organisational studies literature.  These sees organisations as socially constructed 
(Morgan, 2006); boundaries as multi-dimensional, constructed and ambiguous (Vakkayil, 
2012; Heracleous, 2004); and order as negotiated (Strauss et al, 1963).  These all highlight the 
role of the individual, and their own agency, in contributing to the shaping of the organisation 
and its strategy. 
In order to understand the way in which individuals interact within the MNC, this thesis uses 
the theoretical lens of the literature on power.  With a focus upon the relational aspect of 
power between individuals, this follows Lawrence et al’s (2012, p. 15) definition of power as 
“the dimension of relationships through which the behaviours, attitudes, or opportunities of 
an actor are affected by another actor, system or technology”.  Moreover, this thesis adopts a 
specifically positive perspective that considers power as a “force that affects outcomes” 
(Hardy, 1996, p. S3).   Such ‘power-to’ emphasises those aspects of power that are productive 
and transformative (Edwards, 2006).   
Power is a key feature of all organisations with Clegg et al (2006, p. 3) arguing that “power is 
to organization as oxygen is to breathing”.  However, MNCs provide a particular context.  They 
are inherently complex organisations with units and individuals operating across geographic, 
cultural and political/legal space.  Embeddedness in diverse institutional environments creates 
distinctive challenges to operating an MNC.  Consequently, the MNC provides the opportunity 
to see how power plays out in these different contexts, as well as how these contexts are used 
in the enactment of power.  In particular, this thesis focuses upon a specific form of 
multinational – the heterarchical MNC.  Hedlund (1986) envisaged the heterarchy as a network 
of differentiated and interdependent units – which may have supranational as well as national 
roles.  He suggested that in such an organisation horizontal ties may be more important than 
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vertical ties, and that hierarchy may be replaced with multiple forms of organisation as the 
distinction between what is headquarters and what is subsidiary becomes blurred.  This form 
of organisation seems to reflect many of the characteristics seen in the opening vignette. 
Consequently, through the process of my research, including reviewing different bodies of 
literature and the early stages of my fieldwork, my research aims crystallised to put the 
individual at the forefront of understanding the heterarchical multinational.  Firstly, in 
considering how individuals interact with the organisational structures of the MNC, and then 
in using theorisation of power to understand how activity is coordinated.  Initially this focused 
upon power relations as the explanans – that which explains.  However, increasingly the focus 
has shifted to power relations as the explanandum – the phenomenon to be explained.  That 
is, the need to understand the power relations and their dynamics that make possible the 
coordination of activity across heterogeneous individuals with different interests and 
perspectives located across diverse geographic and cultural contexts.  
Through this iterative process my research questions were developed: 
How do actors navigate the organisational structure of the heterarchical MNC, and 
what are the implications for our conceptualisation of the MNC? 
How should we theorise the dynamic power relations that affect the coordination of 
individuals in the heterarchical MNC. 
Yet while these research questions emerged from a review of the literature, it is also necessary 
to stress the importance of my personal interest in this area.  This follows working for 27 years 
in senior finance and strategy roles within a major European consumer goods multinational.  
On returning to academia I initially intended to research into the issues facing MNCs when 
outsourcing services operations.  Yet as I spent time reflecting on both my time within the 
MNC and the academic literature, I realised that the dominant ‘rational actor’ and unit-
focused models of the working of the MNC were compromised and did not fit with my 
experiences.  I had lived in a world of with many ambiguities and disagreements, where 
multiple actors’ voices were heard – but also where there were taken-for-granted 
understandings that shaped how we all acted.   The challenge was to consider how I could 
make sense of and theorise this world in which I had spent so much of my life. 
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1.2 Framework of the Thesis 
The research topic that I identified sits at the intersection of three rather different literatures: 
firstly, the largely ‘international business’ driven literature on the multinational company; 
secondly, the largely sociological literature on organising and the social construction of 
organisations; and, thirdly the literature on power in the broader social sciences which finds 
roots in sociology, philosophy and organisational studies.  Consequently, the literature review 
is split accordingly. 
Chapter 2 focuses upon the understanding of the MNC in the academic literature.  This 
highlights the rationales of studying the MNC both due to the specific characteristics of an 
organisation working across multiple national and institutional cultures as well as more 
general exemplars of complex organisational settings (Roth & Kostova, 2003).  While the 
orthodox view saw the MNC as a hierarchical organisation dominated by the home-country 
headquarters (e.g. Perlmutter, 1969), the chapter explores how conceptualisations developed 
with the focus upon the subsidiary as a ‘semiautonomous actor’ (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 
2008a) and with the introduction of network perspectives of the multinational (including 
Hedlund’s, 1986, ‘heterarchy’).  Within this ‘mainstream’ perspective (Dörrenbächer & 
Geppert, 2006) the MNC is largely problematised in terms of the relationship between units – 
and how the headquarters as ‘commander-in-chief’ (Forsgren et al, 2005) can coordinate 
subsidiaries through a combination of bureaucratic and social controls.   Yet, by being 
‘rationalistic’ and HQ-subsidiary focused, the orthodox perspective presents an impersonal 
view of the MNC, where the role of the individual manager as actor and agent is largely lost, 
becoming equated – explicitly or implicitly – with the unit within which they work.  
Consequently, Chapter 3 focuses upon the individual and the MNC.  It starts by highlighting 
the key role of the individual in wider perspective of organising.  This emphasises, in particular, 
the importance of informal aspects of organising and the role of ‘negotiated orders’ (Strauss 
et al, 1963) and the ambiguous and constructed nature of organisational boundaries.  This 
provides a base for considering upon the literatures that specifically deal with the individual 
as actor within the MNC, including critiquing the assumptions made in orthodox perspectives 
of the MNC and reviewing the literature that considers actors within the MNC using Scott’s 
(1983) perspective of the individual as ‘carrier’ of institutions.  The chapter then turns to the 
two literatures that explicitly see relations within the MNC “as processual, political, and actor-
centred” (Clark & Geppert, 2011, p. 397).  Firstly, this considers the MNC as ‘transnational 
space’ in which actors, driven by their own interests and goals engage in micro-political games.  
Secondly, this considers the body of literature focusing upon discursive views of the MNC and 
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how actors can contribute to sensemaking and sensegiving (Weick, 1995; Gioia & Chittipeddi, 
1991).  Yet the feeling remains that in much of the work on the MNC the role of the individual 
manager as actor and agent is largely secondary to issues of structure.  The micro-political and 
discursive perspectives are largely considered within the context of dyadic struggle between 
units, while there is little consideration of how actors contribute to either fundamental change 
or to achieving day-to-day coordination. 
Consequently, Chapter 4 introduces concepts of power as a potential way of theorising the 
role of the individual actor within the MNC.  Power is at the heart of organising and 
organisations (Clegg et al, 2006) as “the ability of different parties to achieve something 
together they could not accomplish individually” (Baum, 1989, p. 193).  Power is shown as a 
complex and multifaceted concept (e.g. Haugaard & Clegg, 2009), reflected in multi-
dimensional perspectives of power (Hardy 1996, Fleming & Spicer, 2014).  However, the 
chapter goes on to show that the use of concepts of power in the MNC literature have been 
rather limited, focusing largely on power between units (Geppert & Williams, 2016) and the 
resources they control (Vaara et al, 2005).  The new literatures that have started to develop 
around the micro-political games and the use of language and discourse as an episodic tool 
within the MNC are limited by their focus upon specific dimensions of episodic power.  Yet the 
wider literature on power suggests that this restriction is inappropriate – for example, Clegg’s 
(1989) concept of the ‘circuits of power’ highlight the necessity to consider both how episodic 
power is both rooted in systemic relationships, and how episodic action is used to reinforce or 
reconstruct systemic power relations.   
Based upon this literature and the identified research questions, Chapter 5 sets out my 
research approach.  This examines my motivations and developing philosophical position, and 
then outlines the choice and implications of using a case study of GlobeCo.  Issues confronted 
during the research and the approach to data collection and analysis based upon the ‘Gioia’ 
method (Gioia et al, 2013) are highlighted.   
Chapter 6 introduces GlobeCo as the focal firm in the case study and moves on to address the 
context of the heterarchical MNC that lies at the heart of the first research question.  This 
highlights the instability of organisational relationships within the heterarchy, which can be 
characterised by organisational ambiguity, organisational contestation and ongoing 
organisational flux.  The coherence of units is challenged by ambiguity around their 
boundaries, responsibilities and membership.  Teams or units – both formal and informal – 
are unstable and contested, coalescing and dissolving in a dynamic manner.  Individual 
managers find themselves with multiple reporting lines and members of multiple teams, 
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struggling with multiple ‘authorities’ each claiming some form of legitimacy and without an 
ability to rely on hierarchy to resolve disputes. 
Chapter 7 moves on to investigating the ways in which episodic power is seen in the daily 
workings of GlobeCo.  This highlights three main ways in which power-in-use (Pettigrew & 
McNulty, 1998) is revealed to achieve coordination or ‘alignment’:  bounded autonomy where 
an actor has effective freedom to determine actions, within certain limits; solution filtering 
where an actor has an effective veto over all or parts of a possible solution; and solution co-
creation mutually developed by a range of actors, with different responsibilities, working 
together to deliver an outcome.  Consequently, this chapter gives insight into the way in which 
individuals use episodic power in navigating the organisational structure of the heterarchy  
In order to obtain a richer understanding of the dynamics of power relations, Chapter 8 
explores one particular initiative within GlobeCo, that of the Facilities Management 
Transformation programme undertaken in the Europe.  Tracing this from the origin of the idea, 
through to implementation, the chapter reveals the temporal unfolding of the case in which 
the different modes of power-in-use interact along with practices used by key actors to 
achieve alignment.  Highlighting the micro-level practices of building shared understanding, 
constructing diagnostic and prognostic legitimacy, and building and embedding commitment, 
it addresses the second research question by emphasising the dynamic practices by which 
power relations are reinforced or reconstituted in the heterarchical multinational. 
Chapter 9 brings these together the constructs from the earlier chapters into an inductively 
derived model of how we can understand coordination as the outcome of unfolding power 
relations to achieve a temporary equilibrium within this heterarchical MNC – what could be 
considered a transient intersubjective alignment.  This reveals how power relations can be 
understood both in terms of their episodic manifestation of their power-in-use, but also as the 
systemic understanding of where the boundaries of individuals involvement lie.  However, 
these boundaries tend to become contested due to the inherent ambiguity within the 
heterarchy – leading to the dissolution of power relations.  Yet, through the interplay of both 
the modes of power-in-use as well as the different practices to enact alignment reducing 
ambiguity and contestation, power relations are reconstructed.  The chapter proceeds to 
examine the key implications of this model, and the contributions of this thesis.  Firstly, this 
focuses upon the implication for our understanding of the MNC, suggesting that what is 
revealed is a ‘post-heterarchical’ form, that moves our attention to the individual rather than 
focusing upon geographically bounded units.  Secondly, this considers the implications for our 
understanding of power within the heterarchical MNC, stressing the need to consider power’s 
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multiple dimensions and particularly the interaction between systemic and episodic aspects 
of power. 
Chapter 10 concludes the thesis with a summary of the key findings, before noting the 
limitations of the thesis and suggesting areas for future research. 
 
1.3 Summary of Main Contributions 
This thesis responds to calls for a better understanding of the both the role of the individual 
within the MNC (Piekkari & Welch, 2010) as well as around the dynamics of power relations 
within the MNC (Geppert et al, 2013; Geppert & Dörrenbächer, 2014; Clegg et al, 2015).  Sitting 
at the intersection of broad areas of theoretical interest, this thesis makes contributions to 
both the literature on the MNC and that on organisational power. 
The main contribution of the thesis to the MNC literature is in its challenge of the taken-for-
granted assumption of the organisational unit (HQ and subsidiary) as the primary building 
block of the MNC.  By showing that units are ambiguous, constested and unstable this requires 
a refocusing upon the actions of individuals and (informal) groups within and across formal 
organisational boundaries in the MNC.  Consequently, the thesis suggests that the 
interdependent MNC needs to be regarded as a post-heterarchical organisation in which the 
principles of Hedlund’s heterarchy operates at the level of the individual.  It is the individual 
manager that can simultaneously belong to multiple units or teams (including, potentially, 
being considered part of HQ and the periphery).   It is the individual that needs to work with 
multiple organising principles with a series of non-transitive relationships.  It is the individual 
that plays a role in (temporarily) negotiating responsibilities. 
This perspective of the post-heterarchy consequently pushes us beyond the dominant dyadic 
and static perspective of the MNC comprising homogeneous units, particularly that of 
geographically/culturally bounded HQ and subsidiary.  Rather it is the individuals within 
heterogeneous units that differ due to the cultures and institutions that they ‘carry’, as well a 
myriad of other differences, that can cause them to have a different perception or 
understanding of any particular situation.  Consequently, it is at the level of the individual that 
issues of geographic and cultural heterogeneity, and institutional duality, need to be tackled.  
Yet it is clear that in order to navigate this challenge individuals seem to accept and understand 
that the MNC is heterogeneous, and so consequently a key task is to identify and resolve such 
differences both within and across organisational boundaries.  
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Given the limitations of hierarchy within the post-heterarchical MNC, it is necessary to 
consider take a broad perspective of power and individual action to understand how 
coordination is achieved.  In terms of the literature on organisational power, this thesis 
contributes in highlighting the inadequacy of focusing upon specific, narrow aspects of power 
within the MNC (be that of ‘legitimate authority’, micro-politics or discourse, or specific 
dimensions of power).  Rather, it shows that power relations within the heterarchical MNC are 
complex and multifaceted, embracing multiple dimensions of power, and embracing both 
individual and collective actors.  Furthermore, this thesis contributes to understanding the 
dynamics of coordination and power relations within the heterarchical MNC, highlighting both 
how the inherent characteristics of the heterarchy lead to the dissolution of power relations, 
and the work that is done by actors to temporarily reconstruct power relations.  As a 
consequence, coordination is achieved through a transitory intersubjective alignment in which 
there is sufficient compatibility of understanding and actions to enable coordination.   In so 
doing, this contributes empirical and theoretical richness in understanding the linkages 
between systemic and episodic aspects of power relations. 
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2. The Multinational Company as a Structure Units 
During the last 50 years, the multinational company (MNC) has become a major topic of 
academic focus.  Apart from their importance within the global economy, MNCs face specific 
challenges of operating across countries and cultures (Kostova & Roth, 2002), and provide 
examples of particularly complex organisations (Ghoshal & Westney, 1993). 
However, the review in this chapter shows that the overwhelming attention of the MNC 
literature has taken a structural approach with the organisational unit as the focal ‘units of 
analysis’– largely considering a home-country HQ and foreign subsidiaries.  Although it is 
widely recognised that the form of the MNC has been changing to become a more networked 
and interdependent organisation (Birkinshaw & Pedersen, 2009; Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1998; 
Hedlund 1986), theorising remains focused upon the MNC as a structure of discrete units.  In 
particular, the literature problematises the MNC in terms of the relationships between the HQ 
and subsidiary units – be that how subsidiaries can be controlled by HQ, the different roles 
that subsidiaries can have, or how they can contribute to the wider MNC.  Within this, the HQ 
largely stands supreme being “vested with the role, power and ability to maintain overall 
organizational rationality” (Becker-Ritterspach & Gammelgaard, 2016, p. 124) coordinating 
the MNC through a combination of bureaucratic and social controls. 
Furthermore, despite recognising a shift in the organisational form of the MNC, there remains 
little focus within the literature upon the agencies that underlie change.  Rather, changes in 
the organisational structure of the MNC are largely assumed to reflect the rational selection 
of top management (the ‘HQ’) in response to changing technology, globalisation and the 
forces of environment within which they operate.  While there is a lively literature that 
considers the dialectic struggle between HQ and subsidiaries (e.g. Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998; 
Kristensen & Zeitlin, 2005; Ciabuschi et al, 2011) this tends to regard both HQ and subsidiary 
as homogeneous entities, and remains rather narrowly focused upon subsidiary role and 
initiatives while rarely addressing the mechanisms leading to fundamental restructuring of the 
relationships between units within the MNC.  
This ‘rationalistic’ (Morgan & Kristensen, 2006) perspective of the MNC reflects the dominance 
of mainstream theoretical perspectives (neo-classical economics, agency theory, contingency 
theory, institutional theory) that are largely impersonal and that focus upon structures and 
mechanisms.  The existence, scope, structure, strategy and actions of the MNC are largely seen 
as reflecting the solutions to a series of optimising problems.  The role of (top) management 
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is to find and implement the best solution – strategy, structure and controls – given the 
differing environments (or ‘contingencies’) faced by the firm.  
As such the dominant, orthodox view of the MNC largely neglects the role of the individual 
within the MNC, subsuming them within organisational entities as the appropriate unit-of-
analysis.  Consequently, the next chapter will turn to consider the way that the individual has 
been conceptualised within study of the MNC. 
 
2.1 The MNC as an Object of Study 
During the last 50 years, the multinational company (MNC) has become a major topic of 
academic study.  This reflects not only their importance to the world economy but their 
fundamental nature as highly complex organisations that must find ways to handle the 
challenges of working across national and cultural boundaries and geographic space. 
 
2.1.1 What is the MNC? 
At its simplest, the Multinational Company (or Corporation or Enterprise) refers to a firm that 
“owns and controls activities” in two or more countries (Buckley & Casson, 1976, p. 1).  There 
is a long history of organisations with such multinational activity – dating back, at least, to the 
seventeenth century with the British East India Company and the Dutch VOC (see Robins, 
2012).  However, it is only since the late nineteenth and early twentieth century that we have 
seen the emergence of the modern form of the multinational (Wilkins, 2009), as the advent of 
new technologies, scale economies, and modern marketing techniques led to the growth of 
firms dominating specific markets both within their countries and, increasingly, abroad.  The 
US company Standard Oil opened its first foreign affiliate, in the UK, in 1888 (ExxonMobil, 
2018); by 1906 Lever Brothers from the UK had factories in six overseas countries, including 
Australia (Unilever, 2018); and by 1919 the Dutch firm Philips had sales organisations in 17 
foreign markets (Bartlett, 2009).   
By 1960, the term ‘multinational corporation’ had been coined by David Lilienthal when he 
highlighted that many American companies were already operating abroad and having to 
“operate and live under the laws and customs of other countries” (Lilienthal, 1960, p. 119, 
quoted in Westney, 2014).  
Other terms have also been used for the same phenomena.  Some authors, including Buckley 
and Casson (1976), prefer to use the term ‘Multinational Enterprise’, while both the United 
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Nations and Pitelis & Sugden (2000) embrace the term ‘Transnational’2.  Accepting that 
individuals might stress subtle differences, these terms are treated as effectively synonymous 
with MNC. 
 
2.1.2 Understanding the Existence of MNCs 
With the emerging importance of MNCs, during the mid-twentieth century the principle 
academic debate was focused upon why the multinational existed.   This became a crucial 
issue within the economics-dominated International Business literature.  Given the obvious 
additional costs of operating abroad (Hymer, 1960) – the ‘liability of foreignness’ (Zaheer, 
1995) – why would firms establish operations abroad rather than exporting or licensing to 
domestic firms within the target market?  Early theories saw the MNC as conduits for 
exploiting differences in rates of return: moving capital from where the cost was low and 
reinvesting where returns were higher in the form of ‘Foreign Direct Investment’ (FDI) (see 
Hennart, 2009).  Yet it is not obvious that this requires MNCs given the presence of appropriate 
financial institutions (Hymer, 1960). 
Hymer highlighted that a firm would only operate internationally if there was some other 
significant benefit from such expansion.  Although suggesting that the primary motivation for 
this came from the opportunity of extending monopolistic power, he also suggested that FDI 
would result if “some firms have advantages in a particular activity and they might find it 
profitable to exploit these advantages by establishing foreign operations” (Hymer, 1960, p. 
38).  Similarly, there may be location advantages in a foreign location that a firm can exploit 
by establishing a base in another geography.  
Yet the existence of benefits from multiple locations does not in itself require the activities to 
be carried out within the firm, rather than two firms trading at arms’ length.  So, the relevant 
question became when these two sets of activities should be internalised within one 
organisation.  Taking an approach inspired by transaction cost economics (Coase, 1937; 
Williamson, 1971, 1975, 1985), Dunning developed his ‘eclectic paradigm’ (Dunning 
1977/2002, 1980, 1988) which developed to become the leading conceptual framework for 
analysing firms’ international expansion (Rugman & Verbeke, 2001).  Dunning suggested that 
firms would only engage in foreign activities where there were benefits of ownership of the 
                                                          
2 Which runs the risk of confusion as Bartlett & Ghoshal (1998) use the term for a specific strategy of 
the MNC. 
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activity, there were location advantages, and advantages from internalising the activity within 
one organisation.  In parallel, Buckley & Casson (1976) developed ‘internalisation theory’ 
which saw the main reason for internalising activity as the market imperfection, particularly 
regarding the management of knowledge.3  Internalising activity avoids issues associated with 
contracting with third parties and potentially provides a lower-cost way of coordinating 
activity than relying on the market (Teece, 2014). 
While the internalisation/transaction cost approach to explaining the existence of MNCs 
quickly “attained dominance” (Pitelis & Sugden, 2000, p. 2), others challenged whether market 
imperfections are sufficient as an explanation of the MNC, particularly given the costs 
associated with the liabilities of foreignness.  Kogut & Zander (1993, p. 625) argued that the 
MNC exists less due to market failure than “out of its superior efficiency as an organizational 
vehicle by which to transfer this knowledge across borders”.  Others have rather looked 
towards the benefits of internationalisation itself, with Contractor (2012) providing a 
comprehensive list of the advantages that a firm may gain from being internationalised (for 
example ranging from the additional opportunities to exploit scale economies in production 
and/or R&D, through to risk management/diversification).   
However, as will be argued later, this ‘rationalistic’ explanation of the MNC – based upon the 
world-view of neo-classical economics – provides only one possible interpretation of the MNC.  
Other perspectives stress the political and cultural aspects (see Forsgren, 2008; Morgen, 
2006), suggesting that MNCs may also have developed, at least in part, due to the interests of 
managers – for example, as seen in managerial preference for acquisitions over joint-ventures 
(Datta et al, 2009).  Similarly, the success of some internationalising firms may be sufficient to 
create isomorphic pressure (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) as the process and goal of globalisation 
becomes institutionalised (du Gay, 2000) with the need for international expansion achieving 
an aura of inevitability (Spicer & Fleming, 2007).   
Consequently, while the international business perspectives of exploiting and internalising 
location advantages may go a long way to explain the presence of MNCs, these should only be 
seen as providing a partial picture of these complex organisational forms.  We also need to 
recognise that there is potentially a key role of culture, personal interests and shared and 
taken-for-granted assumptions in understanding MNCs. 
 
                                                          
3 Trade in knowledge is difficult due to its nature as a public good. 
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2.1.3 The Rationale for Studying the MNC 
While there is an undeniably large literature on the MNC, it is worth briefly pondering upon 
why the MNC can, and should, be regarded as a specific context for academic research and 
how this is distinctive for theory building and research as opposed to the purely national 
company (Roth & Kostova, 2003). 
In part, this can be justified for the importance of the MNC in today’s world.  The United 
Nations estimated that by 2009 that there were around 82,000 multinationals, employing 77 
million people, (UNCTAD, 2010) and together the ‘global value-chains’ run by these MNCs 
account for about 80% of global trade (UNCTAD, 2013). The largest MNCs – companies such 
as Toyota Motor, Volkswagen, Royal Dutch Shell and Apple – have annual revenues well above 
$200 billion, while the combined profits of the Fortune Global 500 amounted to $1.5 trillion 
(Fortune, 2017).  Furthermore, these companies are not just the response to globalisation, but 
are key drivers of the way that the world has changed – be that in the emergence of consumer 
products (Unilever, Proctor & Gamble), modern transportation (Ford or Boeing), micro-
electronics and the IT age (Apple, Microsoft), or in the revolution of the internet (Google, 
Amazon). 
Yet, from a theoretical perspective, the sheer scale of MNCs is perhaps the most trivial reason 
for studying them.  Rather, Roth & Kostova (2003) stress that it is the specific characteristics 
of the MNC that make them particularly relevant – both in order to understand phenomena 
that are unique to the MNCs, and as a particular context for theory development.  
The Multinationality of the MNC – Operating Across Multiple Institutional Contexts 
Primary among these unique aspects of the MNC is the internationality of the organisation in 
which the MNC is constituted of units “rooted in specific cultural and political settings with 
their own history and tradition” (Piekkari & Tietze, 2014, p. 261).  The pressures of geography 
are most frequently expressed in the form of institutional pressures for isomorphism – 
expressed in DiMaggio & Powell’s (1983) three forces of coercive isomorphism, normative 
isomorphism and mimetic isomorphism, which Scott (2014, p. 59) sees as reflective of the 
regulatory, normative and socio-cultural systems that are the ‘pillars’ of institutions (see also 
Kostova & Roth, 2002).  The definition of ‘institution’ within this approach is broad, as it covers 
both formal structures and rules (governmental bodies, rules and regulations) as well as the 
informal constraints of convention and norms of behaviour.  Such institutions are seen as 
relatively durable, normally showing resistance to change (Scott, 2014).   
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The impact of operating across multiple institutional ‘fields’ is multifaceted.  For local 
subsidiaries sitting within a particular national institutional context, there is a requirement to 
gain institutional legitimacy within the host environment – that is the extent to which an 
organisation meets the expectation of the social norms, values and rules of a social system, 
leading to becoming accepted or ‘taken for granted’ (Deephouse & Carter, 2005).  In the 
absence of such legitimacy, it may be difficult for an organisation to survive (Dowling & Pfeffer, 
1975). Furthermore, these different contexts may have a lasting impact as their 
characteristics, over a long period of time, become imprinted on both particular units within 
the MNC, and the individuals that inhabit them (Kogut, 2005).   
Yet at the same time, the MNC itself may also be considered a distinct organisational field with 
its own culture and taken-for-granted assumptions.  That is, “there is a within-organization 
domain that defines a set of pressures to which all units within the organization must conform” 
(Kostova & Roth, 2002, p. 216).  By restricting specific courses of actions through limiting the 
manager’s cognition of what is acceptable or possible (Dunning & Lundan, 2009) this MNC 
specific culture or ‘frame’ (Goffman, 1975) may provide the centripetal force that prevents 
subsidiaries from culturally and institutionally heterogeneous settings moving apart (Regnér 
& Zander, 2011).    Consequently, there may be conflicting pressures within the MNC to 
simultaneously achieve legitimacy within different host and MNC fields – a situation referred 
to as ‘institutional duality’ by Kostova & Roth (2002).  Key managers need to ensure that the 
subsidiary retains legitimacy with the parent company, for example through complying with 
financial, policy or strategy requirements (otherwise they risk being replaced).  At the same 
time legitimacy is required within the national environment where the subsidiary has everyday 
relations with government, suppliers, customers and employees. 
The Distinctive Processes of Managing Multinationally 
More generally, the internationality of the MNC adds features and context that results in 
distinctive organisational processes (Peterson & Thomas, 2007).  Central with this is the large 
literature on the relationships between the global HQ and subsidiaries, including the role of 
HQ (e.g. Egelhof, 2010), of different subsidiaries (e.g. Rugman et al, 2011) and the nature of 
the organisational structure of the MNC itself (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1998).  In contrast, at a 
more micro level, there is significant work on specific aspects of differentiation across the 
organisation and how MNCs try to manage this.  This covers a vast range of subjects including 
topics such as the choice and use of the primary language within the organisation (e.g. Vaara 
et al, 2005), the use of ‘boundary spanners’ to facilitate knowledge and expertise sharing by 
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linking groups across hierarchy and distance (Schotter & Beamish, 2011), or the role of 
expatriates (e.g. Harzing, 2001). 
The Complexity of the MNC 
While the multinationality of the MNC highlights differences ‘in kind’ from the domestic 
company (Roth & Kostova, 2003), the MNC can also be justified as a research setting because 
“multinational organizations provide a context characterized by substantial heterogeneity and 
complexity” (ibid., p. 888).  The MNC has multiple possible organising dimensions (such as 
product, geography, and function), while needing to embrace the complexity of different 
operating contexts, and working with managers and employees from multiple backgrounds 
with different identities and perspectives.   Consequently, the internal heterogeneity of the 
MNC can be provide a research context that includes or requires variety.  For example, the 
implication and consequences of a single strategy, policy or tool can be studied across multiple 
instances in heterogenous units within a single organisation (e.g. Nohria & Gulati, 1996).   
Yet the very complexity of the MNC can itself be the object of study.  Regnér & Zander (2011, 
p. 825) argue that MNCs are “arguably the most complex organisations in existence today” 
and that “the study of MNCs allows researchers to study the complexity of different 
environments and semi-integrated internal units that are willing (or sometimes forced) to 
interact under a common corporate roof”.  As a result, the MNC provides an opportunity to 
‘leverage complexity’, in particular understanding how coordination is achieved (and the role 
of power in this) in the context of such a complex organisation.  As such, “the complex nature 
of MNCs is used as an asset (instead of a complicating liability) in our quest to understand 
fundamental organizational phenomena” (ibid., p. 824).  The same approach is seen in Kostova 
et al (2018, p. 2613) who emphasise “that although developed for the MNC case, our model is 
applicable to any large and complex organisation…  [we] leverage the distinctiveness of MNCs 
to challenge boundary conditions and assumptions of existing theories for the purposes of 
modifying and extending them.” 
Such a perspective of the MNC distinguishes it by degree, rather than by kind.  Such studies 
are not necessarily studying theories of the MNC per se, but use the MNC as a particular or 
extreme context to examine or test theories of wider relevance (Peterson & Thomas, 2007).  
Indeed, Regnér & Zander (2011) go as far as to argue that the MNC is the general case, of 
which small, local organisations are the ‘special case’. 
Consequently, studying the MNC matters.  Apart from their sheer scale and impact on our 
globalising world, they face specific challenges from their international spread which can bring 
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the need for specific theorising.  Above all else, MNCs provide contexts of great heterogeneity 
and complexity and consequently research within the multinational organisations can 
generate insights that help understand both the MNC itself, and complex organisations more 
widely. 
 
2.2 Structural Conceptions of the MNC: Empirical and Theoretical Understanding 
This section now turns to consider the dominant way in which the MNC is conceptualised in 
the literature.  This emphasises the theoretical and empirical attention that has been given to 
the MNC as a structure of units (frequently characterised as embedded in distinct geographic, 
cultural and institutional environments), and especially in understanding the dyadic 
relationship between HQ and subsidiary.  Based upon this, a typology is developed that 
categorises the literature depending upon the emphasis between the centralisation and 
dispersion of leadership, and between hierarchy and network forms. 
The dyadic perspective can be seen to have emerged from the early thinking of the MNC that 
focused upon it as an organisation performing business activity across multiple countries.  
Performing activities in another country requires an organisation in the host country.  In part, 
national subsidiaries fulfil the legal requirements required to operate in a particular 
jurisdiction, yet their primary purpose is to provide the ‘on-the-ground’ presence required to 
undertake activity – with most MNCs relying on a range of units in key locations for their 
development (Birkinshaw & Pedersen, 2009).  Consequently, geography and location are 
unavoidable design variables in the strategic ‘architecture’ of the MNC (Westney, 2014). 
The understanding of the relationships between the home-country ‘headquarters’ and host-
country subsidiaries has evolved significantly over the last thirty years.  Greater focus upon 
the subsidiary and the introduction of network concepts give a much more nuanced 
perspective of the MNC than that of a headquarters dominated hierarchy.  Yet much of the 
thinking around the MNC continues to be dominated by largely rationalistic theories and 
impersonal forces in which the agency of key actors is largely absent. 
 
2.2.1 The Orthodox View of the MNC 
With the origins of the MNC seen in the international expansion of strong domestic firms 
setting up new organisations in foreign markets, the relationships and hierarchy between 
these units was apparently clear.  Top management sat within the home-country HQ and made 
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decisions about where to invest, i.e. where to establish operations.  Capabilities were largely 
built in the home-country and then exploited in foreign markets.   
In this ‘rationalistic’ (following Morgan & Kristensen, 2006) or ‘mainstream’ (Dörrenbächer & 
Geppert, 2006) view, the multinational is a hierarchy.  Although the focus of relationships is 
upon the HQ-subsidiary dyad – such as seen in Mudambi’s (2011) analogy of a wheel with the 
HQ as the hub and the various subsidiaries as the different spokes – it is clear that the HQ 
dominates, and the “overriding assumption is that final authority resides at the top of the 
structure (the HQ), and that all intraorganizational interactions are structured for the 
achievement of the inclusive goals of the organization” (Ghoshal & Nohria, 1986, p. 4).  
Consequently, the HQ is ‘commander-in-chief’ (Forsgren et al, 2005), or the organisation’s 
‘brain’ (Beer, 1981), and is “the central authority formally making all strategic decisions” 
(Dörrenbächer & Geppert, 2006, p. 252).  Its role is to optimise the strategy and structure of 
the organisation given the challenge (‘contingencies’) that the firm faces.  
Other units are, literally, subsidiary – an instrument of the HQ (e.g. Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1986; 
Porter, 1986).  In the ‘ethnocentric’ multinational (Perlmutter, 1969), the role of the foreign 
subsidiary was to be the ‘long arm’ that existed solely to implement the strategies of the 
mother company (Andersson et al, 2001), a ‘dumb subcontractor’ (Delaney, 2000), to carry 
out the legitimate will of the parent (Morgan, 2006).  The role of subsidiaries is selected and 
imposed by the HQ, in what Birkinshaw & Hood (1998) refer to as ‘head office charter 
assignment’.   Furthermore, by assuming that the HQ has legitimate authority and fiat rights 
(Foss, et al, 2012), conflict and resistance is problematic or dysfunctional (Dörrenbächer & 
Geppert, 2006; Morgan, 2006).  Challenge and resistance are therefore regarded as evidence 
of “the power-hungry manager, a few deviant subordinates or an organization that is in 
terminal decline” (Fleming & Spicer, 2007, p. 11).   
 
2.2.2 Developing Empirical Themes 
The HQ dominated perspective continues to appear in literature on the MNC (e.g. Jaussaud & 
Schaaper 2006; Vida & Obadia, 2008) – although frequently being taken for granted, rather 
than explicitly discussed as an assumption (Barner-Rasmussen et al, 2010).  However, over the 
last thirty years there have been developments based upon empirical observation that 
significantly develops this approach in two different directions. 
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Shift to Focus on the Subsidiary 
Firstly, there has been a shift in the literature from the role of the HQ to that where “the 
subsidiary is at the heart of the action” (Birkinshaw & Pederson, 2009, p. 367).  This partly 
resulted from a recognition that geographically and culturally distant subsidiaries may have 
knowledge that is not immediately accessible to the HQ (e.g. Foss & Pederson, 2002).  
Furthermore, the transfer of such knowledge becomes problematic given the size, complexity, 
technical dispersion and geographic spread of the MNC, leading to issues of problem of 
‘information overload’ (Andersson & Holm, 2010).  As such, the headquarters of the MNC 
cannot be all-knowing and their rationality must be bounded (Foss, 2003). 
In parallel, subsidiaries can develop distinct and specialised capabilities (e.g. Birkinshaw & 
Hood, 1998; Rugman & Verbeek, 2001), particularly in areas where local knowledge is 
particularly relevant, such as innovation (e.g. Phene & Almeida, 2008) or for handling local 
customers and marketing (e.g. Collinson & Wang, 2012).  Critically, such capabilities may be 
difficult to transfer within the MNC, particularly when based upon tacit knowledge (Polanyi, 
1967; Kogut & Zander, 1993), thus creating a dependence of the wider MNC upon the 
subsidiary.  Consequently, the subsidiary contributes to the overall competitiveness of the 
MNC (e.g. Cantwell & Mudambi, 2005), providing the basis for the subsidiary to play a key role 
as a “semiautonomous actor with its own distinctive environment and resources, capable of 
making its own strategic choices within certain constraints” (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008a, p. 
478) and, therefore, becoming “strategizing actors in their own right” (Ferner, 2008).     
However, recently Ciabuschi et al (2011) have gone further and suggest that the problem faced 
by the HQ is not so much one of ‘bounded rationality’, but rather that distant HQs suffer from 
‘sheer ignorance’ (see also Ciabuschi et al, 2010; Ciabuschi, Forsgren & Martín, 2012) where 
the HQ experiences such uncertainty that they ‘‘do not, they cannot, know what they need to 
know’’ (Tsoukas, 1996, p. 22). 
Consequently, even with good intentions (an assumption that can itself be challenged, see 
Foss et al, 2012) locally embedded knowledge and competences of the subsidiary mean that 
it becomes either extremely costly or impossible for decisions to be made centrally (Hoenen 
& Kostova, 2015) and that conflict between HQ and subsidiary may emerge as “a normal 
consequence of organizing and managing across national borders” (Schotter & Beamish, 2011, 
p. 243).  HQs may find it is completely impractical to implement supposed fiat rights, as 
illustrated in the lack of control Philips NV had of its US subsidiary (Bartlett, 2008).   Similarly, 
Kristensen & Zeitlin (2001, 2005) provide a detailed account of life in subsidiaries of a UK 
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multinational where HQ initiatives appeared “stupid and wrong when measured by the local 
rationality” (2001, p. 75).   
Development of a Network View of the MNC 
The second major theme is the shift in understanding the multinational as a hierarchy with 
simple dyadic relations between HQ and subsidiaries, to more network-like perceptions of the 
multinational.  Such a model recognises the clear interdependencies between subsidiaries, 
where greater specialisation and fine-slicing of the value chain (Buckley, 2011) is leading to a 
fundamental change in the focus and capabilities of subsidiaries (Birkinshaw & Pedersen, 
2009) such that the self-sufficient ‘national operating company’ is becoming an “endangered 
species” (p. 368).  Rather, a subsidiary is seen as one of “a series of discrete value adding 
activities (a sales operation, a manufacturing plant, an R&D centre) each of which reports 
through its own business unit or functional line” (ibid.).   Being both differentiated and 
mutually reliant, these subsidiaries operate within a ‘differentiated network’ (Ghoshal & 
Nohria, 1986).   
This network perspective has two major consequences.  Firstly, it emphasises that horizontal 
intra-firm linkages other than the simple HQ-subsidiary link are important (White & Poynter, 
1989).  Secondly, given their increasing specialism, it further highlights the differentiation of 
roles that subsidiaries play within the broader MNC (e.g. Porter, 1986; Jarillo & Martínez, 1990; 
Gupta & Govindarajan, 1991). 
 
2.2.3 Typologies of Perspectives of the MNC Organisation 
Combining these two different development themes provide us with a 2x2 matrix that gives a 
typology of the empirical views of the MNC.  In one dimension this separates between those 
that focus upon the HQ as the primary ‘designer’ of the MNC strategy, where leadership and 
control is centralised, versus a situation where this becomes dispersed as the HQ lacks the 
understanding or ability to unilaterally make decisions and control subsidiaries.  In the second 
dimension differentiates between views that focus upon the HQ-subsidiary dyad, versus those 
that understand a multi-dimensional, network view.  This is illustrated in Figure 2.1.  
Within this matrix, the upper left box reflects the ‘orthodox’ view of the MNC discussed above 
– the perspective that focuses on dyadic relations between the HQ and subsidiary, and 
considering the HQ as the locus of strategy, direction and capability.  The other three boxes 
present different perspectives which will be considered in turn. 
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The ‘Semi-Autonomous Subsidiary’ 
At a relatively early stage in the development of thinking around the MNC it was seen that 
many MNCs overcame the obstacles of geographic distance and distinct local market 
characteristics by creating ‘miniature replicas’ of the parent (White & Poynton, 1984), which 
Bartlett & Ghoshal (1998) referred to as a ‘multi-domestic strategy’ and Perlmutter (1969) as 
‘polycentric’.  These subsidiaries’ activity would typically embrace most of the value-chain 
(Porter, 1985) including manufacturing, marketing and sales and distribution – mirroring the 
scope of the domestic parent.  While the role of these subsidiaries may be tightly delimited – 
frequently based on a combination of product and geography – the subsidiary often had 
considerable freedom to shape its own strategy within these boundaries.  Consequently, this 
can be characterised as a situation of ‘bounded autonomy’ (Geppert et al, 2003; Child, 1997) 
More recently, writers have described such semi-autonomous subsidiaries as caught between 
the tensions of “the centripetal forces of ownership systems versus the centrifugal forces of 
the different industrial systems to which individual units belong” (Barner-Rasmussen et al, 
2010 p. 93) such that the MNC becomes a “heterogeneous, loosely coupled organization” 
(Forsgren et al, 2005, p. 184).  Similarly, in their review of the literature, Birkinshaw & Pedersen 
(2009) saw that subsidiaries frequently operated with far more freedom than officially 
condoned.  
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This view of the ‘semi-autonomous subsidiary’ has led to a body of work, led by Julian 
Birkinshaw and colleagues, that explore the dyadic relationship between the HQ and 
subsidiary.  These challenge the perspective that the mandate or ‘charter’4 of subsidiaries are 
solely defined by the HQ.  Birkinshaw & Hood (1998) saw that by developing (or neglecting) 
their capabilities, subsidiaries may be able to win (or lose) ‘charters’ of responsibility from the 
parent.  Consequently “as the subsidiary increases its stock of distinctive resources, it lessens 
its dependence on other entities and takes more complete control of its own destiny” (p. 778).  
Yet the subsidiary is never fully independent and may require corporate resources, or HQ 
approval for initiatives, thus requiring it to get the appropriate attention from the HQ to 
achieve its objectives (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008b).  Indeed, in drawing the intention of HQ 
– either deliberately, or as a consequence of the initiatives it takes – such action may lead to 
a restriction of the subsidiary’s autonomy (Ambos & Birkinshaw, 2010; Ambos et al, 2010). 
Critically, this debate highlights the potential for a mismatch between the HQ and subsidiary 
on the view of the role and strategy of that subsidiary – which Birkinshaw et al, (2000) referred 
to as a ‘perception gap’ between HQ and subsidiary (see also Friesl & Silberzahn, 2017).  
Similarly, initiatives proposed by subsidiaries may encounter resistance from the HQ in the 
form of a ‘corporate immune system’ (Birkinshaw & Ridderstråle, 1999). 
This body of literature highlights a more nuanced view than that of simple top-down 
perspective seen in the HQ-centric approaches.  This accepts the inevitability and legitimacy 
of differences in knowledge and perspective of the HQ and subsidiary.  This leads to both 
tension and an opportunity for subsidiaries to exhibit initiative.  Subsidiaries are seen to have 
a role in building a “shared understanding” of the scope of their responsibilities (Birkinshaw & 
Hood, 1998, p. 782).  Rather than reflecting HQ diktat, this may result from the ‘negotiation’ 
between HQ and subsidiary managers (Birkinshaw et al, 2000) through an informal process of 
‘give-and-take’. 
The ‘Designed Network’ 
The third perspective of the MNC can be termed that of the ‘designed network’.  This 
recognises that the nature of the subsidiary as the national unit is changing as they become 
differentiated both in terms of their capabilities (Ghoshal & Nohria, 1986) and the 
environments within which they are operating.   
                                                          
4 “A shared understanding between the subsidiary and the headquarters regarding the subsidiary’s 
scope of responsibilities” (Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998, p. 782). 
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Following the traditional perspective of Chandler (1962) that ‘structure follows strategy’, it is 
the role of the HQ to set the strategy and then design a structure to deliver it.  Similarly, 
Egelhoff (2010, p. 107) in considering the challenges facing the MNC stressed that “to 
implement such demanding strategies, firms have had to change their organizational design”.  
Within such a view, the HQ must design or ‘orchestrate’ (Pedersen et al, 2014; Valentino et al, 
2014) the organisational architecture to exploit specialisations and interdependencies, while 
fitting to the different contexts and characteristics across which it operates (Ghoshal & Nohria, 
1989, 1993).  Nadler & Tushman (1997) called this ‘competing by design’.   As such, the HQ has 
to select from “an array of options in both configuration and coordination for each activity in 
the value chain” (Porter, 1986, p. 25).   
A crucial element of this is seen as having clear and differentiated subsidiary mandates, 
typically varying in response to the different needs of the Integration-Responsiveness 
framework (pioneered by Prahalad & Doz, 1987, but sharing similarities with Bartlett & 
Ghoshal’s, 1986, and Porter’s, 1986, internationalisation strategies).  A key model within this 
theme is Bartlett & Ghoshal’s (1998) construct of the Transnational Organisation, where the 
differing requirements of local responsiveness, efficiency and learning needed to be matched 
to the specific needs and circumstances of the MNC – a contingency theory (Galbraith, 1973) 
of organisational design (see Egelhoff & Wolf, 2017).  Critically though, it remained “the 
corporate headquarters that functioned as the selection agent for the MNC system as a whole, 
balancing the … selection subsystems over time and across issues, in order to enable the MNC 
system as a whole to succeed.” (Westney, 2014, p. 14).  Key within this is that the HQ has to 
manage the interdependencies between units, with (Prahalad & Doz, 1987, p. 236) arguing 
that “to be exploited, interdependencies across businesses have to be managed explicitly”. 
However, the limits of the practicality of the design perspective are clear and have frequently 
been highlighted within the literature.  The requirements for the HQ knowledge are more 
extreme than is the case in the dyadic view of HQ-subsidiary relations.  As such, Foss et al 
(2012, p. 253, emphasis added) concluded that “complemented with bounded rationality and 
radical uncertainty, such lack of information suggests that the HQ in actuality is unable to 
perfectly design the organization of the MNC.”  Similarly, only a few years after publishing 
their book on the Diversified MNC (DMNC), Doz & Prahalad (1991, p. 147) conceded that “the 
size and complexity of the typical DMNCs, often with hundreds of business units active in 
scores of countries, means that linkages and interdependencies cannot be planned, or 
centrally managed.”   
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Yet, while the difficulties of such an approach are clear, the assumption that the view that HQ 
dominates and can design the complex organisation underneath it persists as an unwritten 
assumption in both the academic and practitioner literature.  For example, in a Harvard 
Business Review Kumar & Puranam (2011) asked Chief Executives whether they ‘have 
restructured for global success?’, while in their recent book chapter Egelhoff & Wolf (2017) 
use a contingency model to focus upon the design choices faced by the HQ. 
The Heterarchy 
The final box in Figure 2.1 reflects network type models of the MNC where leadership and 
control are dispersed around the organisation.  This idea is perhaps best reflected in Hedlund’s 
(1986, 2005) concept of heterarchy (Zander and Matthews, 2010).  In the notion of heterarchy 
Hedlund provides a vision where subsidiaries have differentiated roles, including those that 
may be supranational, yet at the same time subsidiaries are entirely interdependent with 
other units in the organisation.  Within the heterarchy “subsidiaries talk directly to 
subsidiaries, division to divisions, and so on” (Hedlund, 2005, p. 201).  However, in parallel 
units are simultaneously nodes in key networks that are largely external to the MNC (e.g. 
Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1990).  In such a context, Hedlund argues that “it is obvious that the 
subsidiaries of large MNCs cannot be seen only as instruments of the centre, the headquarters, 
the corporate group, or whatever” (Hedlund, 2005, p. 211).  The distinction between ‘business’ 
and ‘parent’ becomes blurred (Goold & Campbell, 2002).  Indeed, rather than there being a 
single discrete HQ within the heterarchy there may be “multiple centres integrated by cross-
unit ties unmediated by headquarters” (Westney & Zaheer, 2009, pp. 349-350) and “where 
‘management’ is as much a horizontal as a vertical affair, and becomes part of every unit’s and 
individual’s task” (Hedlund, 2005 p. 216).  As such “notions of ‘headquarters’, centre’, ‘home 
country’, and ‘corporate level’ dissolve and are not synonymous” (Hedlund, 1986 p. 21).  
The appropriate metaphor for the firm becomes one of the “’firm as a brain’ model rather 
than a ‘brain of the firm’ model” (Hedlund, 1986, p. 26).  Within the vision of the heterarchy 
it seen as impossible for the MNC to be run from the centre as the “idea that people the top 
(or at headquarters) have strategic wisdom and those further down (or in the subsidiaries) 
implement, is breaking down.  One reason for this is that God (the CEO) does not any longer 
know everything, nor can he usefully integrate all the pieces.” (Hedlund & Ridderstråle, 1997, 
p. 352). 
As such there may be no obvious apex within the organisation and none of the normal 
dimensions (country, product or function) is uniformly superordinate (Sölvell & Zander, 1995), 
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so ordering will not be stable between units and may be transitive across dimensions 
(Hedlund, 2005). 
While Hedlund’s vision is perhaps an extreme version of this understanding of the MNC, 
similar ideas are seen in other conceptions of the MNC, that are sometimes seen as synonyms 
to the heterarchy – including the ‘multicentre organisation’ (Forsgren, 1990), the ‘holographic 
organisation’ (Ridderstråle, 1992), the ‘metanational’ (Doz, et al, 2001), the ‘multifocal MNC’ 
(Doz, 1986; Prahalad & Doz, 1987), the ‘horizontal MNC’ (White & Poynter, 1989, 1990), the 
‘multiplex’ organisational form (Greenwood et al, 2010), the ‘federative MNC’ (Andersson et 
al, 2007) the ‘transnational’ (Bartlett, 1986; Bartlett & Ghoshal 1992, 1998), and the 
‘differentiated network’ (Nohria & Ghoshal, 1997).  
These different conceptions generally share the premise of heterarchy that units within the 
MNC are interdependent, and that flexibility is required given the differentiated contexts and 
the need to simultaneously exploit global integration and local responsiveness.  Similarly, 
these forms recognise the limitations of hierarchy, particularly due to the HQ’s limited 
understanding of the multiple contexts.  Importantly however, these concepts fundamentally 
differ in their philosophical understanding of headquarters.  On the one extreme, Forsgren’s 
(1990) ‘multi-centre organisation’ sees a very limited role for HQ there being multiple centres 
and strong subsidiaries – with strategy and role shaped by intra- and inter-firm networks 
“rather than by any specific decision at the top of the formal organization to which it belongs.” 
(p. 265).  In contrast, within the ‘transnational’, ‘metanational’ and ‘differentiated network’ a 
role remains for a strong HQ to design and police an organisation that is suitable for sensing 
(Doz et al, 2001), limiting intra-organisational politics and preventing ‘corporate holy wars’ 
(Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1998), or to provide the “dominant overall integrative mechanism – 
whether through strong centralization, formalization, or normative integration” (Nohria & 
Ghoshal, 1997, p. 181).  Consequently, to a large extent these latter models – although sharing 
aspects of the heterarchy – belong more closely with the ‘design network’ perspective of the 
MNC as they interpret the organisational form of the MNC as a deliberate construction of the 
HQ in the face of the conflicting challenges it faces.  
Heterogeneity Between and Within MNCs 
Although understanding of the MNC might have broadly shifted in a south-easterly direction 
in Figure 2.1 during recent years, this should not be taken to mean that all MNCs fit within the 
category of heterarchy.  Firstly, MNCs face different challenges and environments, and there 
must be a significant extent to them adapting (either through deliberate strategy or 
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‘evolutionary’ pressures) to the different contexts within which they operate.  As Ghoshal & 
Nohria (1993) remind us there is a need of ‘horses for courses’.  Consequently, there are 
almost certainly MNCs that fit in each of the categorisations to a greater or lesser extent.  It is 
also probable that elements of each may exist within the same multinational company with   
Hedlund (1986) emphasising that different organising principles can co-exist simultaneously 
within the heterarchy.  Consequently, in a complex multinational, certain parts or dimensions 
of the organisation (product, function geography) could operate in a relatively hierarchical 
way, while others function much more like a network. 
It is also important to note that the review of the literature above primarily focuses upon one 
specific category of multinational – that which Doz & Prahalad (1991) called the ‘diversified 
MNC’.  These are primarily manufacturing organisations that are involved in the physical 
manufacture of products, and largely originate from Europe and North America.  Zander & 
Matthews (2010, p. 36) remind us that Hedlund’s work was “primarily concerned with the 
future of the old and well-established multinational” and that Hedlund was focusing upon only 
one of the types of ‘hypermodern’ MNC and that others exist – for example the ‘born global’ 
MNC (Knight & Cavusgil, 1996), and the ‘pipe-line’ MNC (which primarily coordinates external 
activity, such as Apple or Nike).  While this newer literature adds to the understanding of MNC 
forms, this is not examined here as the focus of this study is upon precisely such an ‘old and 
well-established’ manufacturing MNCs based in Europe.  ‘GlobeCo’ fits the traditional view of 
the MNC and was the type of firm in mind when most of the MNC literature was produced. 
 
2.3 The Dynamics of Organisational Change in the MNC 
While the previous section has reviewed the variety of models that have been developed to 
conceptualise the MNC, this analysis essentially looks at four different static situations.  
Specifically, this does not address the processes by which an MNC may develop from one 
organisational structure to another – the process of strategic or organisational change in the 
MNC.   
Consequently, this section focuses firstly upon understanding how changes in organisational 
relations are understood in the extant literature.  By drawing on a synthesis approach from 
the wider organisational change literature this shows that this remains largely focused upon 
the HQ-subsidiary dyad, while missing how wider organisational restructuring building and 
shaping interdependencies within the organisation develop. 
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While the literature on change in the MNC is significant, this falls as a sub-set of the massive 
literature on change in organisations.  This provides a number of structured approaches that 
can be specifically applied also to change within the MNC, including Van de Ven & Poole’s 
(1995) seminal contribution of the four theories or ‘motors’ of change.   
Van de Ven & Poole focused largely upon organisational change in considering ‘change’ as “an 
empirical observation of difference in form, quality or state over time in an organizational 
entity” (p. 512). They highlight four broad approaches to studying change: a life-cycle approach 
that considers stages of development such as birth, maturity and death; a teleological 
approach which focuses upon change guided by a purpose or goal driven by an individual or 
group; a dialectical theory that sees change as the result of competition and struggle between 
opposing groups; and an evolutionary approach that mirrors biology in seeing change as a 
continuous cycle of variation, selection and retention. 
In applying this approach to the MNC, we can also see that the literature considers change at 
two distinct levels where change can be seen to occur.  Firstly, change can occur at the level 
of the total MNC (such as a fundamental change in strategy or in organisational form) and, 
secondly, change within the strategy or scope of existing units. 
By combining these two dimensions, Table 2.1 highlights key examples can be found within 
the literature for each of van de Ven & Poole’s motors, both at the total MNC level and at the 
level of the subsidiary.  From this, three observations can be drawn. 
Lack of Focus upon Change at the Level of the Total MNC 
Firstly, there is a relative paucity of literature focusing upon how strategic change occurs at 
the total MNC level, and particularly how it moves towards a network form (Malnight, 1995, 
1996).  This contrasts to the rich literature on evolving roles and strategy in subsidiaries.  
Indeed, where there is reference to the total MNC, it frequently takes a normative position 
describing how authors perceive that MNCs should act, consequently taking a teleological 
perspective which sees changes in the form of the MNC as the outcome of planned decisions 
and vision, and specifically those of the HQ.  This is seen in views of the sort of organisational 
design that an MNC should pursue such as the ‘transnational’ form (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1998) 
or in improved design of matrix forms (Egelhoff et al, 2013).  
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Indeed, in this literature the assumption that the organisational structure as designed and 
implemented top-down is rarely challenged.   Although MNCs seem to have developed 
network-like or heterarchical features, there is little explanation in this literature about how 
these changes come about (Pihl & Paulsson, 2014). 
The notable exception to this is the evolutionary work of Malnight (1995, 1996, 2001).  In 
response to the identified gap in understanding, he specifically questions how MNCs move 
from an ethnocentric to an integrated network structure.  Through studying the cases of three 
multinationals (Eli Lilly, Citibank and Hoffman LaRoche), he concludes that this fundamental 
was the product of multiple small shifts over time, rather than through revolutionary change.  
Rather than being the outcome of a planned process or vision, each of the many individual 
small changes made “represents a viable strategic response to then-existing challenges and 
opportunities” (1996, p. 43).  While this helps us to unpick part of the picture of how such 
organisational change occurs, Malnight calls for others “to pursue an important new research 
agenda in the globalisation literature stream: building an understanding of how firms adjust 
how they conduct their operations around the world” (1995, p. 140).  To date, that call has 
largely gone unheeded. 
The Subsidiary as Change Agent 
The second theme that clearly emerges – led by the work of Birkinshaw and colleagues – is 
that the subsidiary itself plays a role as agent in shaping the strategy of the firm and 
consequently in initiating or shaping change.  This shift is seen in the considerable attention 
during the last 20 years to examining ways in which subsidiary roles change (Birkinshaw, 1996; 
Birkinshaw et al, 2000, 2005; Birkinshaw & Riddersträle 1999, Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998).  This 
highlights that through building capabilities and knowledge subsidiaries can influence the roles 
that they play within the multinational.  Related to this is the significant literature on 
‘subsidiary initiatives’ (e.g. Delaney, 2000; Birkinshaw, 1999), which Strutzenberger & Ambos 
(2014, p. 314) define as “entrepreneurial proactive behaviour in organizational subunits 
aiming to influence strategy-making in the organization”.    
This stream of work emphasises that the two-way nature of the relationship between the HQ 
and subsidiary.  Yet despite this work, there is still a sense that this area is under-researched, 
and that “still, we do not know a great deal about dynamics of headquarters subsidiary 
relationships that result in changing levels of subsidiary autonomy.” (Ambos et al 2011, p. 
302). 
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The Prominence of the ‘Dialectic’ Perspective of Dyadic Relations 
The third key theme that emerges is the growth of the perspective that sees development 
within the MNC as the product of a tension between HQ and subsidiaries.  This perspective 
emphasises issues such as ‘perception gaps’ between HQ and subsidiaries (Arvidsson, 1999); 
the need for subsidiaries to fight against a ‘corporate immune system’ (Birkinshaw & 
Riddersträle, 1999; Birkinshaw & Fry, 1998); the discursive processes of selling and resistance 
to change (Balogun et al, 2011) and the ‘perpetual bargaining’ within the MNC (Andersson et 
al, 2007). 
Combined with the observations on the contribution of subsidiaries to defining their own role 
and charter, we see a picture that contrasts strongly with the traditional top-down perspective 
where “the academic literature said, essentially, that subsidiaries existed to follow the orders 
of their parent company” (Birkinshaw et al, 2014, p. 46).  Rather, there is both top-down and 
bottom-up pressures which need to be resolved.  Such a view presents the MNC as a site of 
internal tension and, indeed, conflict. 
However, this dilemma between top-down and bottom-up reflects a key dilemma within the 
MNC.  In particular, this echoes the ‘Bower-Burgelman’ model of strategy (Burgelman, 1991; 
Noda & Bower, 1996) which contrasts how strategic action can be driven ‘top-down’ (induced) 
or be allowed to emerge from lower within the organisation (autonomous).  For Burgelman’s 
(1991, 2002) this meant that a key role for top management (the HQ) to determine the 
tightness or looseness of strategic scope (resulting in ‘induced’ or ‘autonomous’ strategy).   
However, it is not yet clear from the literature on the MNC that the HQ always have this choice 
of tightness and whether the HQ can effectively enforce this if subsidiaries are able to 
negotiate (or demand) changes to their role or mandate or act independently with impunity 
(e.g. Philips US).   So, from the perspective of the MNC a key question that remains is how the 
supposedly dominant HQ, and the bottom-up initiatives of subsidiaries interact to determine 
both the strategy of the MNC including its organisational shape. 
 
2.4 Implications of the Debate on MNC Organisation 
The previous section has addressed the substantial literature focused upon the organisational 
form of the MNC, and how this has developed from one focused upon an MNC driven by a 
dominant headquarters with submissive subsidiaries, through literatures that recognise both 
the importance of the subsidiary, and the growing networked nature of the MNC.  Yet four key 
observations on this literature stand out. 
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Firstly, while the role and distinctiveness of the subsidiary has emerged as a key theme in 
recent decades, the dominance of the HQ as the source of ‘legitimate authority’ is frequently 
unquestioned.  The ongoing prominence of agency theory (e.g. Hoenen & Kostova, 2015; 
Alfoldi et al, 2012) highlights the continued focus upon problematising the behaviour of the 
subsidiary in terms of non-compliance with the will of HQ.  Even in the literature that 
recognises the bounded rationality of HQ due to the complexity of the MNC and knowledge 
limitations, it is still seen as the HQ as the “dominant overall integrative mechanism” (Nohria 
& Ghoshal, 1997, p. 181).  The subsidiary may play a role in advancing its own position or 
scope, but how this can impact upon the shape and organisation of the whole MNC remains 
unclear. 
Secondly, the debate remains one that is essentially static.  Units – headquarters and 
subsidiary – are assumed to pre-exist and be clearly defined.  The boundaries of these units 
are largely unchallenged, while accepting that their roles may develop.  Yet it is clear that 
boundaries change, and new units are ‘born’ and old ones ‘die’.  Except for assuming that this 
results from the direction of the HQ, there is little – other than Malnight’s work – to theorise 
how such fundamental structural changes come about. 
Thirdly, the debate focuses upon units that are embedded within distinct geographic and 
institutional contexts.  The has consequently focused upon the dyadic tensions that arise from 
this, in particular how ‘perception gaps’ can arise between HQ and subsidiary (Birkinshaw et 
al, 2000) that lead to strategic mis-match – largely assumed as a dysfunctionality.  
Furthermore, the pressures of simultaneously achieving legitimacy within the different 
institutional fields of the broader MNC and the local geographic context mean that subsidiaries 
face the particular challenge of ‘institutional duality’ (Kostova & Roth, 2002).  Yet this debate 
largely assumes that these units are individually homogeneous – subsidiaries are 
geographically bounded and internally culturally uniform, while the HQ is assumed as 
imprinted with the institutional characteristics of its home country.  Consequently, this fails to 
adequate address the impact of any cultural and institutional heterogeneity within units  
This leads to the fourth observation that this analysis of the MNC is highly impersonal.  The 
dominant theories used to explain the MNC organisation see this organisation largely as a 
response to optimising (or achieving ‘best fit’) to the context of the external environment – be 
this through the lens of evolutionary theory (see Westney, 2009), contingency theory (e.g. 
Egelhoff & Wolf, 2017), or institutional theory (e.g. Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Kostova & Roth, 
2002; Westney, 2005).  Yet this would seem to be an inevitable consequence of a literature 
that focuses upon the corporate and collective agency of units.  By focusing upon the units 
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and their relationships as the unit of analysis, the literature on the organisation of the MNC 
potentially misses the voice of the kay actors.  Both the creative and conflictual voices of 
managers are silent, with a gap in understanding the ‘human dimension’ that tends to be at 
‘assumed away’ by economistic and rationalist models of MNCs (Piekkari & Welch, 2010).  
Rather, it is necessary to consider the role of the individual actor in order to provide “context-
sensitive explanations of how and why corporate strategies are enacted in the way that they 
are, and how organisational structures are produced and reproduced” (ibid p. 268).   
Consequently, the next chapter focuses upon the smaller literature on the individual and the 
MNC, considering how this provides insights into the working of the contemporary 
multinational. 
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3. The Individual and the MNC 
The previous chapter presented a range of perspectives of the MNC that conceptualised it as 
a structure of largely impersonal organisational units.  Yet this view contrasts with that in the 
wider organisational studies literature that highlights that organisations, and the units that 
comprise them, are neither exogenously given nor stable, but are socially constructed by the 
actors within the organisation.  Morgan (2006, p. 137) emphasises that “organizations are in 
essence socially constructed realities that are as much in the minds of their members as they 
are in concreate structures, rules and relations”.  Strauss et al (1963) introduced the concept 
of organisations as ‘negotiated orders’ reflecting the temporarily negotiated pattern of 
activities that emerge from the interplay between individuals – itself highlighting the informal 
aspects of organising (see Roethlisberger, 1968).  Weick (1979) emphasised that the process 
of organising is dynamic, whereas a formal organisational design or structure is static, at best 
a temporary ‘snapshot’.   While the MNC literature generally assumes units to be clearly 
delimited within well-defined borders, the wider organisational studies work suggests that 
boundaries are multi-dimensional, constructed and ambiguous (Vakkayil, 2012; Heracleous, 
2004). 
These wider perspectives all highlight the dynamic relationship between the individual and 
the (formal) organisational structure – reflecting not only on how the individual’s behaviour is 
shaped by the structure, but the ways in which their actions shape structural aspects of the 
organisation.  While the majority of work on the MNC is largely tied to organisational structure, 
these wider perspectives can be seen in a more limited debate within the MNC.  Morgan’s 
(2001a, 2001b) consideration of MNCs as ‘transnational communities’ starts to consider how 
individuals within the MNC can be members of multiple units or groups reflected in a “a thick 
web of communicational possibilities vertically and horizontally” (2001b, p. 121).  The linkage 
between individual and organisation was highlighted Kostova et al (2008, p. 1002) arguing 
“individual actors must engage in a process of creating some level of a shared understanding 
of what constitutes the rule system” within the MNC.   
This focus upon the individual has also been picked up in two relatively recent streams of work.  
Firstly, those that emphasise the micro-politics of the MNC with its focus upon the political 
behaviour of individual actors inside the organization (Becker-Ritterspach & Blazejewski, 
2016a) given their diverse interests and perspectives.  Secondly, the role of the individual 
emerges in the literature focusing upon discursive perspectives of the MNC and the way in 
which the MNC is ‘constructed’ by networks of conversations (Koveshnikov et al, 2017).   
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Yet despite these emergent voices, it is clear that in much of the work on the MNC the role of 
the individual manager as actor and agent is largely lost (Schulte Steinberg & Kunisch, 2016; 
Becker-Ritterspäch & Dörrenbächer, 2011) with Piekkari & Welch (2010, p. 467) highlighted 
that “research on multinational management has focused on strategising in this complex 
organisation rather than operating in it. The field has struggled to incorporate the human 
dimension; that is, the ‘lived experience’’’.   
In the rest of this chapter I will explore these themes in more depth in the context of reviewing 
the development of thinking around the multinational company.  Through this, I argue that 
there is an insufficient understanding of the role of individual actors and their agency within 
the MNC, and how they shape the activity that we see, and how they coordinate actions and 
interdependencies to achieve outcomes.   
In the subsequent chapter I will then turn the focus upon the literature on power in 
organisations, particularly within the multinational, which offers a way to reintroduce the 
agency of the manager into the understanding the workings of the MNC. 
 
3.1 The Wider Perspective on Organising 
Although the MNC literature privileges the organisational unit as the base ‘unit of analysis’, 
the wider organisational studies literature suggests that this view is too narrow.  At the heart 
of this is the recognition that organisations, including businesses, are social constructs – as 
Whitley (1991, p. 160) emphasised: 
“The socially constructed nature of business enterprises as systems of coordination 
and control of economic activities seems self-evident to most social scientists in the 
same way that other social institutions and collectivities are socially constituted and 
variable.” 
As such, it is inappropriate to regard the organisational structure as exogenous or 
predetermined.  Rather, both the formal rules and structures of the organisation, and how 
these are perceived and understood, need to be seen as the consequence of social processes 
and discourse as well as being interpreted as part of those social processes.  Consequently, 
both the existence and implication of organisational structure cannot be divorced from the 
individuals involved in those social processes and discourse, in which “the social and 
organizational structures often taken for granted are in fact the outcome of patterns of actions 
at the micro, interaction level” (Heracleous & Marshak, 2004, p. 1294). 
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This, of course, links directly to the wider – and fierce – agency/structure debate within 
sociology.  While it is inappropriate to discuss this in detail, there is considerable support for 
perspectives that “formulate a conception of agency and structure, and of the complex 
dynamic interplay between them, which … deal with the ‘double constitution of agency and 
structure’” (Reed, 2005, p. 290).  That is that agents (especially individuals) are constrained by 
structures (including structures within organisations), but at the same time, through their 
agency they have an ability to both reproduce or challenge those structures.  Such thinking is 
reflected, albeit from significantly different philosophical positions and with different 
emphasis5, in both Giddens (1984) Structuration Theory and in Clegg’s (1989) Circuits of Power 
(see Chapter 4).  
 
3.1.1 Informal Organisations and Negotiated Order 
This interplay between organisational structures and individual actors is seen repeatedly in 
the literature on organisations, including those of firms.  Firstly, it is seen in the view that the 
formal organisational structure may not reflect the way in which individuals within the 
organisational actually work.  As early as 1939, Roethlisberger & Dickson (1939, p. 559) wrote: 
“Too often it is assumed that the organization of a company corresponds to a 
blueprint plan or an organization chart.  Actually, it never does…  Many of the 
actually existing patterns of human interaction have no representation in the formal 
organization at all, and others are inadequately represented by the formal 
organization... The formal organization cannot take account of the sentiments and 
values residing in the social organization by means of which individuals or groups of 
individuals are informally differentiated, ordered and integrated.”  
This was followed by a significant literature that stressed the gap between the formal and the 
informal organisation (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).  Among these, were ideas theorised by Strauss 
et al (1963) who introduced the concept of organisations as ‘negotiate order’.  Here 
“organizations are viewed as created by individuals and collectives who negotiate and interact 
with each other on a regular basis in changing contexts” (Piekarri & Tietze, 2016, p. 210).  This 
                                                          
5 Reed (2005) argues that Giddens places much more emphasis on agency (regarding structure as having 
only ‘virtual existence’), while arguing that Clegg places primacy on structure which “analytically 
reconstitute agency as an effect or epiphenomenon of deeper, ineluctable social forces that totally 
determine the inclinations and capacities of agents” (p. 296). 
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perspective stresses the importance of the negotiated and informal pattern of activities that 
emerges from the interplay between individuals reflecting their shared understanding of how 
tasks should be performed.  Yet these understandings were clearly temporary, risked being 
unstable “and have to be made and remade over time” (Watson, 2015, p. 411).  As such, the 
‘negotiated order’ approach stressed the “importance of understanding interaction processes 
as well as the structural features of organizational life” (Maines & Charleton, 1985, p. 272, 
quoted in Strauss, 1993, emphasis added). 
The implications of this perspective are profound, as it highlights that not only can we not 
understand organisations solely from their formal structure and rules, but it highlights the way 
that individuals create (informal and temporary) structural elements through their 
interactions and ‘negotiations’ as well as the context of those negotiations.  As March (1962, 
p. 672) emphasised “the composition of the firm is not given; it is negotiated.” 
Similar ideas are seen in the work of Weick (1979) and his emphasis ‘organizing’ rather than 
‘organisation’.  He sees organising as the consequence of a combination of organizational 
member actions, social interactions, and task-role interrelationships.  This reflects the shift 
from a focus upon entity, to one on process (Van de Ven & Poole, 2005) in which order is 
transient and that there is ongoing work to establish order:  
“People make sense, try to introduce order…  When people ‘introduce’ ‘order’, there 
is no guarantee that it will persist.  Typically, order is transient and needs to be 
reaccomplished repeatedly.” (Weick, 2006, p. 1724). 
Critically, these people, individuals, are heterogeneous and are more than clones of their 
wider institutional environment.  As Strauss (1993, p. 252) stresses:  
“Endemic to interaction is the probability of discrepancies between the perspectives 
of some participants in any interaction.  This multiplicity of perspectives derives from 
differential statuses, experiences, and membership in groups, organizations and 
social worlds.” 
Weick puts particular emphasis upon the way in which people use language in organising, 
particularly stressing the way in which individuals ‘make sense’, or help others to ‘make sense’ 
in a process of Sensemaking (Weick et al, 2005).    Indeed, he reflects that:  
“Organization is talked into existence when portions of smoke-like conversation are 
preserved in crystal-like texts that are then articulated by agents speaking on behalf 
of an emerging collectivity. Repetitive cycles of texts, conversations, and agents 
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define and modify one another and jointly organize everyday life.” (Weick, 2006, p. 
1725). 
As such, through these repetitive cycles, ephemeral talk becomes reified texts or objects that 
act to define and shape the processes of organising. 
 
3.1.2 Boundary Shaping 
A similar focus upon the emergent nature of organisation has been seen in the wider 
organisational literature in the recent focus upon organisational boundaries.  In particular, 
these are seen as multi-dimensional, constructed and ambiguous (Vakkayil, 2012; Heracleous, 
2004), challenging how we view the internal boundaries of complex organisations such as 
multinationals (e.g. how we should understand the boundaries of the headquarters or of a 
subsidiary?).   Vakkayil (2012, p. 206) emphasises that such “boundaries should not be taken 
as pre-existing entities which need to be managed through stable arrangements, but rather as 
constructed and brought forth by organizational actors in their daily interactions… [which] is 
not a simple process that can be hierarchically mandated from the top”.  Rather, Heracleous 
(2004, p. 99) sees these as emerging through a recursive and constructive process in “what we 
recognize as ‘objective’ boundaries can be seen as social structures that are in the final analysis 
and in a fundamental way produced by, based on, and legitimated by ongoing social processes 
at the action level of analysis.” 
The importance of these wider perspectives is that they all focus upon the relationship 
between the individual and the (formal) organisational structure – reflecting not only on how 
the individual’s behaviour is shaped by the structure, but the ways in which their actions shape 
structural aspects of the organisation.   
 
3.2 The Individual as Actor in the MNC 
As argued above, orthodox studies of the MNC have “struggled to incorporate the human 
dimension” (Piekkari & Welch, 2010, p. 467) largely focusing upon the organisational unit as 
the ‘unit of analysis’ at the expense of the individual.  However, this wider theorising on the 
role of the individual can help us understand the assumptions required to accept a model of 
the MNC as discrete units.  Furthermore, this literature has led to a growing debate – largely 
from a ‘critical’ perspective – upon the role of the individual specifically within the MNC.  These 
will be addressed in turn. 
Power and Coordination in the Multinational Company  Page | 37 
 
3.2.1 Challenging the Role of the Individual in the Orthodox View of the MNC 
In the light of this wider ideas on organising it is possible to both examine and challenge the 
basis upon which the individual is largely ignored within the orthodox perspective of the MNC.  
In particular, this leads to a challenge of the key assumptions seen in the “strongly dominant” 
notion of “the MNC as a unitary rational actor, masterminded by the grand organizational 
designs of headquarters” (Barner-Rasmussen et al, 2010, p. 100) 
Firstly, the wider perspective challenges the view of the MNC as the result of top-down 
decision making – assumed largely to reflect planning to meet the contingencies faced by the 
MNC, focusing upon the ‘fit’ “between organisational design and strategy or environment” 
(Egelhoff, 2005, p. 172).  As such, this privileges top management as the architects of the 
organisational structure, without particular reflection of the impact of the agency of other 
managers upon either the formal or informal structures of the organisation or upon the 
processes of organising.  There is an assumption that the organisation is planned, and that 
formal structures are key to achieving coordinated action – despite the evidence of Strauss 
and others that this is not sufficient.  Indeed, Barner-Rasmussen et al (2010) argue that this 
has led to a ‘blind spot’ as “corporate top managers are not the only individual actors in an 
MNC with the power to make a difference – for better or, from a headquarters perspective, 
worse.” 
Secondly, we can see that the orthodox approach to understanding the MNC reflects a view 
of “organizations as unitary and tightly integrated entities making univocal decisions” (Pache 
& Santos, 2010, p. 456).  This follows the ‘unity of command principle’ (Simon, 1946; Fayol, 
1949) which Stopford & Wells (1972, p. 27) described as “one man [sic] has sole responsibility 
for a specified part of the business and is accountable to a single superior officer”.  
Consequently, the organisational unit could be treated as a homogenous actor, with all its 
organisational members having a shared set of goals within a single reporting hierarchy 
(Malnight, 1995). 
This may be a useful simplifying assumption, particularly where the hierarchy is dominant, and 
units are restricted within a single geographic/institutional/cultural boundary.  In such a 
situation it may be appropriate to regard the unit and its CEO as effectively synonymous.  
However, empirically the assumption of ‘unity of command’ has been challenged as not 
reflecting actual practice in many organisations (Malnight, 1996; Davis, 1984; Levinthal & 
Workiewicz, 2018; Lenka et al, 2015) while the concept conflicts with a view of an organisation 
being comprised of heterogeneous individuals with differing perspective or frames given their 
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diverse histories.  Morgan (2001b, p. 115) emphasise that his concept of ‘transnational social 
space’ implies “a more open-ended set of cross-border connections between multiple nodes 
in which the forms of interaction become more than simply the sum of interactions between 
different ‘national’ units.”  Furthermore, this assumption is particularly doubtful in the context 
of the heterarchical MNC where Hedlund (1986) highlights that we can no longer assume the 
effectiveness of hierarchy within an interdependent organisation.  In particular, as we see the 
emergence of units with multinational responsibility, we cannot assume that a particular unit’s 
members are all imprinted with the same cultural and institutional instincts.  Consequently, 
there is a need to challenge the assumption of homogeneity and accept that there may be 
disagreement and differences of opinions between individuals within the units.  The units 
themselves are therefore ‘conflict systems’ (March, 1962) within the broader ‘conflict system’ 
of the MNC. Furthermore, March’s work importantly highlights that in order to understand 
the resolution of conflict at the macro (firm) level, it is necessary to simultaneously resolve the 
conflict at the sub-unit (subsidiary) level. 
 
3.2.2 The Individual as ‘Carrier’ of Institutions 
Although the focus of work on the MNC has been upon discrete units embedded in 
heterogeneous cultural and institutional fields, it must be recognised that the individual 
manager is seen to play a key role within this.  Westney (2005, p. 49, emphasis in original) 
argues that it is important to recognise that “the environment is not only external to the 
organization; the environment enters the organization.”   This echoed Scott (1983, p. 16) who 
argued that “the beliefs, norms, rules, and understandings are not just ‘out there’ but 
additionally ‘in here’”, but critically added that “participants, clients, constituents all 
participate in and are carriers of the culture”.  Rather than institutional forces being 
impersonal, they operate through members of organisations who transmit institutional 
understandings into the organisation.  As Dacin et al (2002, p. 47) say “actors perceive the 
meaning of institutions and infuse their actions with meaning based upon these perceptions.”  
These ideas have been taken up in the study of the MNC.  Kostova & Roth (2002, p. 218) argued 
that “institutional elements enter organisations through the people working within them”, for 
example highlighting that “employees’ judgments about a new practice will be influenced by 
their cognitions and beliefs, which in turn have been shaped by the external institutional 
environment in which they operate” (ibid). 
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From this institutional perspective, an individual decision is primarily determined by the 
institutional forces carried at the individual level.  This includes not only managers but also key 
employees.  Yet while such a view does not preclude the role of human agency, institutional 
perspectives “have frequently been accused of downplaying the agency of individual actors, 
who are simply viewed as ‘institutional takers’” (Piekkari & Welch, 2010, p. 472; see also 
Jackson & Deeg, 2008).   
Yet in their in their critique of the institutional perspective, Kostova et al (2008) have argued 
that the combination of diverse institutional pressures from multiple local contexts and 
heterogeneity within and between units creates more ‘institutional freedom’ for actors, 
allowing social agency to come into play.  Accordingly, they concluded (2008, p. 1002): 
“At the individual level such cognitive processes will remain influenced by 
individualized and localized experiences and, as a result, will not be collectively held. 
Therefore, second, individual actors must engage in a process of creating some level 
of a shared understanding of what constitutes the rule system. We expect this to be 
a negotiated political process where power and influence come into play since 
different outcomes would benefit the interests of different actors. Who influences 
this process and how it is done are therefore critical to understanding institutional 
explanations of MNCs.”  
Thereby, they emphasise the importance of individuals, the inevitable heterogeneity of actors 
within the MNC (and the MNC unit), and that outcomes cannot purely be understood as the 
consequence of institutional pressures upon specific actors.  Yet they leave unanswered the 
questions of how such ‘shared understanding’ comes about and how and by whom this is 
influenced.  Indeed, Clegg et al (2018, p. 746) emphasise that the institutional theory “is 
lacking a full recognition of the significance of struggle and conflict” while Smets & 
Jarzabkowski (2013, p. 1282) argue that there remains a “dearth of empirical work that looks 
beyond field-level actors and takes seriously the role of individuals as ‘carriers of institutions’”. 
 
3.2.3 The MNC, ‘Transnational Social Space’ and the Micro-Political Perspective 
In part, a response to Kostova et al’s (2008) challenge to the institutional perspective can be 
seen in a more limited ‘critical’ debate on the MNC that has emerged during the last 20 years.  
This responds to the wider perspectives on organising, moving focus clearly from the unit to 
the individual. 
Power and Coordination in the Multinational Company  Page | 40 
 
Although MNC literature of the 1990s made passing reference to the MNC as a ‘social 
community’ (Kogut & Zander, 1993) or ‘social structure’ (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1993), Piekkari & 
Welch (2010, p. 467) argue that “in much of this research, lingering rationalistic assumptions 
underlie the conceptualisation of the MNC as a social community”.  Rather than the individual 
becoming the focus of these studies, human behaviours were “isolated and assigned to a 
separate stream of research, namely international human resource management” (ibid). 
The major challenge to this rationalistic characterisation can be seen to have emerged 
particularly from the work of Glenn Morgan and colleagues from the critical perspective.  In 
particular, Morgan (2001a, 2001b) developed the perspectives of the MNC as transnational 
communities and as transnational social space.  Breaking the assumption of firms as unified 
social actors this sees MNCs as “space[s] of social relationships that are internally structured 
in complex ways” focusing upon the “precarious and conflictual nature of the social order that 
develops within them” (Morgan, 2001a, pp. 11, 12).    Consequently, ‘transnational social 
space’ describes where “socio-economic action takes place, where multiple social 
relationships emerge, power is exercised, and consensus, conflict and resistance are played 
out.” (Rees, 2012, p. 3).  As a consequence, rather than being the outcome of some impersonal 
economic rationality, decisions and decision processes within the firm reflect “the ability of 
different actors (shaped with differential powers by the social contextual shaping of 
organizational structures) to make their interests count in the various areas of negotiation that 
exist within and across the firm” (Morgan, 2001a, p. 10). 
Morgan has particularly linked this thinking upon the individual as a player within this 
transnational social space to a form of institutionalism:  “actors in the various parts of the firm 
respond … not simply as participants in the achievement of a common goal but also as social 
actors with interests constructed and shaped by their institutional context.” (Morgan & 
Kristensen, 2006, p. 1469).  Yet it is important to recognise that in this perspective the 
institutional context more than just an individual or organisational constraint.  Firstly, this 
provides the basis for misunderstanding between managers in HQ and subsidiaries and 
between managers in different subsidiaries, creating ‘battlefields’ and conflict (e.g. Kristensen 
& Zeitlin, 2001, 2005).  Secondly, these institutional contexts provide “the resources necessary 
to strengthen or defend their position” (Morgan & Kristensen, 2006, p. 1473), providing the 
basis for individuals engaged in strategising within the MNC (Kristensen & Zeitlin, 2001). 
This ‘actor-centred comparative institutionalism’ (Geppert et al, 2016) has led to a stream of 
work focusing upon the internal politics between individuals within the MNC, particularly 
associated with the work of Mike Geppert, Christoph Dörrenbächer, Florian Becker-
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Ritterspach, Susanne Blazejewski and colleagues.  More specifically, the term ‘micro-politics’ 
has been increasingly adopted for politics sited within the organisation (e.g. Dörrenbächer & 
Geppert, 2006, 2009a, 2009b; Blazejewski, 2009; Piekkari & Tietze, 2014), with Blazejewski & 
Becker-Ritterspach (2016, p. 18) explicitly seeing micro-politics as “political behaviour of 
individual or group actors inside the organization”. 
As such, the micro-political perspective sees MNC’s as composed of individual actors driven 
by their own interests and goals – including their personal career aspirations (Dörrenbächer & 
Geppert, 2009b).  While these interests are influenced by the actors’ social embeddedness 
(Becker-Ritterspach, 2006; Becker-Ritterspach & Dörrenbacher, 2011; Geppert et al, 2016) 
such institutional factors are not deterministic and embeddedness “does not mean that actors 
in organizations are entirely compliant executive instruments of structural and institutional 
constraints” (Dörrenbächer & Geppert, 2009b, p. 382).   
Emphasis is given to the individuals ‘resource mobilization strategies’ (Dörrenbächer & 
Geppert, 2009a; Becker-Ritterspach & Dörrenbächer, 2011), and how actors leverage local 
cultural and institutional resources as ‘toolkits’ for their socio-political strategising (Williams 
& Geppert, 2011; Geppert et al, 2015).  This frequently requires actors “to cooperate to 
achieve both individual and organizational strategic goals” (Dörrenbächer & Geppert, 2009b, 
p. 378).  Consequently, this builds upon March’s (1962) concept of coalition forming (Whitford 
& Zirpoli, 2016; Geppert et al, 2015; Dörrenbächer & Geppert, 2009a).  Similarly, there is an 
emphasis upon ‘game playing’ (Kristensen & Zeitlin, 2005; Dörrenbächer & Geppert, 2009b), 
where in a range of political games (including include ‘budget’ games, ‘career’ games, etc.), 
actors act within certain accepted rules to both compete and cooperate with other ‘players’ 
to achieve their goals. 
As organisational behaviour of the MNC is understood through considering political 
interactions and agency at the individual or micro level (Becker-Ritterspach & Blazejewski, 
2016a, 2016b), the focus of the micro-political stream is upon the ‘key’ actors that are ‘political 
brokers’ (March, 1962), who can leverage power to influence the development and outcome 
of the event (Becker Ritterspach and Dörrenbächer 2011).  For example, Blazejewski (2009) 
highlights the differing interests of key actors in a GM subsidiary in Germany, and how they 
fought to shape the subsidiary strategy in different ways.  Although these ‘key actors’ are 
typically seen as HQ managers, research has been extended to include worker representatives 
and extra-organisational actors such as union leaders and politicians (Becker-Ritterspach & 
Dörrenbächer 2009; Blazejewski 2009; Becker-Ritterspach & Blazejewski, 2016a, 2016b).   
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Such studies see the MNC as a site of competition (Becker-Rittersapach & Dörrenbächer, 2011) 
where all key episodes “are underwritten and constituted by politics.” (Becker-Ritterspach & 
Blazejewski, 2016b, p. 185).  Thus, the challenge is to understand how through their agency 
the key actors influence such outcomes.   
The focus upon micro-politics offers a clear benefit in that it is “first and foremost about 
bringing back the actors and examining the conflicts that emerge when powerful actors with 
different goals, interests and identities interact with each other locally and across national and 
functional borders” (Dörrenbächer & Geppert, 2006, p. 255).  Critically, the unit and actor are 
no longer seen as synonymous as “the main units of analysis are individual actors or groups of 
actors whose behavioural rationales cannot be equated with the behavioural rationale of an 
organizational level” (Becker-Ritterspach & Blazejewski, 2016a, p. 91).  Consequently, we see 
a much more nuanced understanding of conflict and reconciliation within the multinational. 
Yet overall the research on the internal politics of MNC remains “surprisingly slim” (Geppert 
et al, 2016, p. 1210) and “questions of how structural and institutional circumstances and/or 
constraints and an actor’s individual room to operate correlate with and influence each other 
are interesting yet still largely empirically unexplored issues” (Dörrenbächer & Geppert, 
2009b, p. 382).  Furthermore, the existing research frequently remains positioned within the 
context of understanding wider dyadic struggles (Becker-Ritterspach & Blazejewski, 2016a), 
particularly between HQs and subsidiaries.  Indeed, Geppert & Dörrenbächer (2014, p. 236) 
concluding that “most studies have focused on the study of micro-political games played 
between the HQ and its subsidiaries to influence budget allocation, mandate change and 
relocation decisions.”  Consequently, what is far less clear is how micro-political games effect 
day-to-day coordination, going beyond the “few powerful key actors … actively involved in 
micro-political strategizing.” (Dörrenbacher & Geppert, 2006, p 256).  Equally through focusing 
upon micro-political games and conflict within the existing organisational structure, this gives 
little insight into how individual agency can shape the boundaries within the MNC. 
 
3.2.4 The Discursive Perspective of MNC Actors 
During the last 15 years there has emerged another small, but lively literature taking a 
discursive perspective to the MNC – particularly associated with the work of Eero Vaara, Julie 
Balogun and colleagues.  Like the micro-political perspective, this is rooted in critical theory 
(Geppert et al, 2016), with the influence of post-modernists’ and post-structuralists’ 
perspective of power (particularly Foucault), this perspective focuses upon the way in which 
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language is used to legitimise and reproduce (or delegitimise and resist) strategies and power 
relations.  As such, MNCs “are seen as socially constructed by networks of conversations, 
which draw on and contribute to prevailing discursive practices and wider societal discourses” 
(Koveshnikov et al, 2017, p. 238).  Through its focus upon the micro-level activity of individuals 
the literature shares close links with the strategy-as-practice field (Balogun et al, 2014) in 
exploring strategy as a situated socially accomplished activity. 
Within this perspective there is a key role for sensemaking and sensegiving (Weick, 1995; Gioia 
& Chittipeddi, 1991) – i.e. how individuals make sense of the world in which they live and work, 
and the way in which others can act to shape that sense.  Focus has been upon the narrative 
construction of the organisation, as “MNCs are seen as constituted by discursive struggles and 
competing efforts of sensemaking” (Geppert et al, 2016, p. 1215), while power and politics are 
regarded as “an outcome of the ongoing sensemaking, interactions and negotiations between 
social actors” (Whittle et al, 2016, p. 1325).   
Key within this is the idea that discourse provides the frame (Goffman, 1975) through which 
actors make sense of issues.  In doing so the discourses constrain actors (Vaara & Tienari, 2008) 
as the ‘taken-for-granted’ precludes certain courses of action (Whittle et al, 2016).  Discursive 
struggles (or what Kaplan, 2008, called ‘framing contests’) arise particularly where there are 
multiple ‘contextual realities’ within which different understandings of the world dominate.  
Indeed, the MNC appears to be particularly rich in such heterogeneity, including differences 
of language/culture (e.g. Vaara et al, 2005); national identities (Ailon-Souday & Kunda, 2003); 
institutional environments (e.g. Western European versus post-socialist Eastern European 
seen in Clark & Geppert, 2011); differing perspectives of large subsidiaries versus small 
subsidiaries (Jarzabkowski & Balogun, 2009); local managers and global executives (Erkama, 
2010); merging companies (Vaara & Tienari, 2011); and of HQ and subsidiary (Whittle et al 
2016).  Indeed, Koveshnikov et al, (2017, p. 258) highlighted: 
“Whereas at the surface it appears relatively easy for key managers to negotiate 
based on business rational what decisions are to be made, what actions to be taken, 
and whose interests are to be lifted up or sacrificed for the benefit of the MNC, yet 
the elucidated discursive struggle is bound to be ongoing in the MNC precisely 
because it is much more difficult for managers to accept how they and their cultural 
identities, subject positions and the attached worldviews are perceived by and in 
relation to those of ‘the other’ within the multinational context of the MNC.”  
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Consequently, the challenge is seen to be to achieve a common understanding within the MNC 
in which “actors each have their own concept of the purpose of the activity, based on their 
localized understandings about ‘the way we do things here’ … that will need to be modified in 
order to establish common activity for the system as a whole” (Jarzabkowski & Balogun, 2009, 
p. 1261).   Outcomes will only arise “from active negotiations and compromises between these 
actors.” (ibid., p. 1255).  However, once a new frame or discourse becomes accepted this 
creates a new ‘reality’ that can be difficult to undo or reverse, as Mantere et al (2012) highlight 
through their study of an abandoned merger.   
Inevitably, the focus of this literature is upon discursive aspects of selling, resisting and 
reconciling (e.g. Balogun et al, 2011), identity construction (Vaara et al, 2005; Clark & Geppert, 
2011), and upon the key role of legitimation (Vaara & Tienari, 2011; Balogun et al, 2019).    Yet, 
these approaches have been criticised for their lack of focus upon micro-level activity (Geppert 
et al, 2016) and remains largely situatied within the context of existing dyadic HQ-subsidiary 
struggles such as charter changes (e.g. Balogun et al, 2011; Whittle et al, 2016), HQ initiatives 
(e.g. Balogun et al, 2019), or consider the specific situation of the pressures of integration 
following a merger (Vaara, 2002; Vaara & Tienari, 2011). 
 
3.3 Coordinating Individual Action 
If we accept the perspective that individuals have multiple perspectives and interests, then 
the challenge of coordination within the MNC becomes a clear challenge.  As Morgan (2001a, 
p. 10) stressed: 
“In complex organizations such as multinationals with multiple sites of production, 
different sorts of managers and workers, and economic processes that need 
coordination from across the world, it is probably more appropriate to admit a sense 
of wonder that organization is accomplished rather than to start with this 
expectation.” 
Consequently, even without regarding the dynamics of the resistance to, or selling of, large 
organisational initiatives, we need to understand how an interdependent MNC organisational 
change, the MNC faces the daily challenge of operating in a coherent and unified way.  That 
is, how is coordination achieved? 
Within the literature there are multiple definitions of coordination in the MNC, these generally 
highlight that this is about processes for managing interdependencies within the organisation.  
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For example, coordination is seen by Okhuysen & Bechky (2009, p. 463) as “the process of 
interaction that integrates a collective set of interdependent tasks” and by Gkeredakis (2014, 
p. 1473) as “the process of managing interdependence and fitting together different 
activities”. 
In principle the issues of coordination are common to all large and complex firms and are 
neither original nor exclusive to MNCs (Martinez & Jarillo, 1989).  However, coordination may 
be made more difficult by geographic distance and the different cultural and institutional 
environments within which units are embedded (Mudambi, 2011; Yu et al, 2009).  
 
3.3.1 Coordination through Hierarchy 
For authors who take an HQ-centric view of the MNC, with the HQ as brain, the key 
requirement is ensuring that both subsidiaries and individual actors within them comply with 
the plans and strategy (and indeed the ‘will’) of the HQ.  In such a perspective coordination is 
largely equated with ‘control’.  Following Brenner & Ambos (2013, p. 774), this is “any process 
(mechanism, instrument, or strategy) applied by an organization to ensure the execution of 
organizational goals and plans”.  Fundamentally, such controls are seen to emanate from the 
formal authority of the HQ (Andersson et al, 2007) and are regarded as legitimate by 
assumption (Brenner & Ambos, 2013).   
Such control is perceived to be needed where interests (or objectives) of an individual 
manager or a whole subsidiary differ from that of the HQ.  While this might be a consequence 
of different cultural and institutional environments, it may also derive from the different 
interests of the managers.  Promoting a subsidiary or a subsidiary initiative may, for example, 
be a way of key managers advancing their own careers (e.g. Becker-Ritterspach & 
Dörrenbächer, 2011; Fenton-O’Creevy et al, 2011).  
At the level of the organisational unit, HQ-subsidiary relations can therefore be considered a 
‘mixed-motive dyad’ (Birkinshaw et al, 2000; Ghoshal & Nohria, 1989) in which the perceptions 
of the two parties frequently diverge.  This divergence has frequently been understood by 
applying agency theory (Hoenen & Kostova, 2015).  Building on the initial ideas of Arrow 
(1985), this problematises the MNC as an HQ (as ‘principal’) that need to delegate decision 
making to subsidiaries (the ‘agents’), but without being able to fully observe whether the 
subsidiary is exercising the delegated authority in the appropriate way.   Consequently, if there 
are any differences in motivations between the parties it can result in the subsidiary and the 
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managers within it behaving in ways that are not perceived to be in the best interest of the 
MNC (at least from the HQ perspective). 
HQ’s have been seen to use a wide variety of structural and formal mechanisms to attempt to 
exercise control.  Indeed, much of the literature on the organisational form of the MNC – as 
reviewed in the previous chapter – is struggling with the challenge of designing a structure 
that gives adequate control.  This includes the way in which HQ may use intermediate 
structures such as regional head offices to facilitate manageable spans of control (e.g. Alfoldi 
et al, 2012; Mudambi, 2011; Mahnke et al, 2012). 
However, the need for control is not solely solved by organisational structure.  Martinez & 
Jarillo (1989), looking beyond the MNC, highlighted a number of control mechanisms that act 
at the level of the organisation, including: the formalisation of procedures and rules (written 
policies, job descriptions, authority levels); the use of planning and budgeting processes; as 
well as what they called ‘output and behaviour control’ through direct supervision including 
that enabled by financial reviews, sales data, etc.  More specifically, focusing upon the MNC, 
Jaussard & Schaaper (2006) emphasised a wide variety of “organizational procedures such as 
formal definitions, job descriptions, reporting paper documents, meetings of the board of 
directors” (ibid. p. 43). 
However, it is also clear that the such formalistic controls may be inadequate.  The legalistic 
and disciplinary aspects of contractual control may be blunt instruments for achieving the will 
of the superiors – while subsidiary managers can be fired, or subsidiaries disposed of, these 
can hardly be used to direct everyday decisions.  Yet more fundamentally, direct bureaucratic 
control as means of coordination requires the organisational apex to have both the knowledge 
and capacity to make decisions to control and coordinate actions in distant actors.  However, 
as we have already seen the complexity of the modern MNC together with the bounded 
rationality of the HQ makes such an assumption difficult to accept.  For example, in their study 
of one multinational Kristensen & Zeitlin, (2001, p. 175) concluded that acts of control & 
coordination “may only accidentally have an intelligent relation to what is controlled and 
coordinated, at least from the perspective of the subsidiaries.”   
 
3.3.2 Social Control as a Basis for Coordination 
Consequently, there has been a shift in “the analytic focus from coordinating mechanisms as 
reified standards, rules and procedures to coordination as a dynamic social practice” 
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(Jarzabkowsi, et al, 2012, p. 907).   With the increasing complexity of MNC a greater reliance 
is seen to be made of ‘social control’ (Edström & Galbraith, 1977).   
Such social control – sometimes referred to as ‘socialisation’ or ‘normative’ control – has been 
defined by Brenner & Ambos (2013, p. 775) as “mechanisms and strategies that aim to achieve 
high degrees of shared norms and values, and in so doing, enable the headquarters to control 
without direct intervention or process control”.   Martinez & Jarillo (1989) see these 
mechanisms as being more ‘informal and subtle’, embracing lateral relations, informal 
communications (including business trips, conferences) and socialisation through “building an 
organizational culture of known and shared strategic objectives and values” (p. 491).  Within 
Jaussard & Schaaper’s (2006) work, such social control is seen in their categorisations of 
‘control by means of human resources sent from the MNC’ and ‘training and socialisation’ of 
managers.   
Prominent within this literature has been a focus on the role that individuals can play as 
boundary spanners.  These are key individuals who understand the multiple perspectives and 
institutional contexts of different units (Tushman, 1977) and become a conduit for information 
between units (e.g. Tippmann, et al 2014) or as a vehicle for conflict resolution (Schotter & 
Beamish, 2011).  Within their focus upon building legitimacy of controls, Brenner & Ambos 
(2013), go further in highlighting the roles of three categories of actors, ‘networkers’ who 
emphasise lateral relationships and informal communications; ‘organisational culture 
builders’, who strive to build a common organisational culture within the MNC; and ‘trainers’ 
who aid spill-over of organisational knowledge 
Given the multinational dimension of the MNC, there is a specific focus seen on boundary 
spanning role of expatriates (Johnson & Duxbury, 2010; Au & Fukuda, 2002; Thomas, 1991) 
and inpatriates (Harzin et al, 2016; Reiche, 2011) with their experience of multiple country 
contexts, and particularly those that have networks that embrace both HQ and subsidiary 
(Kleinbaum & Stuart, 2014).  As they move between units they play a key ‘bridging’ role 
(Harzing et al, 2016) in the transfer and redeployment of knowledge (Kobrin; 1988; Fang et al, 
2010) – both in disseminating their personal experiences and knowledge (e.g. Minbaeva & 
Michailova, 2004; Tan & Mahoney, 2006) as well as in facilitating transfer of organisational 
knowledge both from and to the parent firm (Hocking et al, 2004).   
Yet expatriates can also exert more subtle forms of vertical control over subsidiaries.   Edström 
& Galbraith (1977) suggest that ‘a trusted manager’ can be appointed to a key subsidiary 
position to “increase the capacity of the communications between the centre and the 
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subsidiary and to allow greater local discretion and responsiveness” (p. 251, emphasis added).  
Through their engagement in the subsidiary the control and purpose of the wider MNC can be 
socialised as “thereby obviating the need for procedures, hierarchical communication and 
surveillance” (ibid.).  As such, expats “can serve to replace or complement HQ centralization 
of decision making and direct surveillance of subsidiaries by headquarters managers” (Harzing 
2001, p. 360). 
Social control is seen to be of particular importance within more network forms of the 
multinational.  Given the high level of interdependencies envisaged in such models there is a 
strong need for lateral forms of coordination between subsidiaries that are not dependent 
upon top-down instruction (Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000).  While bureaucratic processes can 
play a key role here in delimiting responsibilities – for examples through statements of 
authority, or workflow processes – social forms of control are also critical.  For example, 
Bartlett & Ghoshal (1998) argued that a transnational company required a combination of 
three coordinating mechanisms: centralisation, formalisation and socialisation.  The latter of 
these focused upon the individual in “building a context of common purpose, values and 
perspectives among managers to influence their judgements” (ibid., p. 80).  Similarly, Foss et 
al (2012) emphasise such network MNCs are characterised by a low degree of formalisation 
but high ‘normative integration’ where “subsidiary managers are imbued with the values and 
goals of the MNC” (p. 254).   
Hedlund went further in considering the heterarchy, arguing that the challenge is less one of 
control but one of coordination, and that “integration is achieved primarily through normative 
control, and only secondarily through calculative and coercive/bureaucratic regulations” 
(1986, p. 23 emphasis in the original) in which ‘corporate culture’ and ‘management ethos’ 
become critical.  In his latter works he started to reflect upon whether it was possible to 
impose coordination.  Rather, his focus shifted from vertical to lateral communication, and 
considered the ways in which individuals worked together within the heterarchical MNC 
putting a focus upon “personnel at 'lower' levels in interfunctional, interdivisional, and 
international dialogue, rather than handling coordination through 'managers' and only at the 
top” (Hedlund, 1994, p. 82). 
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3.3.3 Outstanding Issues of Coordination in the MNC 
While the literature on control and coordination gives us a long list of control mechanisms that 
are seen within the MNC (or are envisaged to possibly exist), there is a sense that it remains 
constrained in its approach. 
Firstly, the debate around coordination focuses upon the mechanisms of control (Okhuysen & 
Bechky, 2009), even though ‘coordination’ is largely defined in terms of a process.   We see a 
lack of dynamic perspective of the processes that help us understand how these come about 
– be that in the way bureaucratic controls change over time, or in the evolution of shared 
values.  For example, while some see socialisation developing as the result of a deliberate 
strategy of headquarters (e.g. Brenner & Ambos, 2013), it may equally evolve as a necessary 
coping mechanism between interdependent units. 
Furthermore, while recognising that coordination is required at the level of the 
agent/individual, much of the debate remains focused upon control of discrete units.  
However, if there are multiple differentiated voices within units, then the key relationships 
within the MNC are not necessarily dyadic (HQ-subsidiary), or triadic (subsidiary with HQ and 
subsidiary), but polyadic.  Multiple HQ actors may be simultaneously trying to coordinate 
multiple subsidiary actors within multiple subsidiaries who are also attempting to coordinate 
their own interdependencies.  Thus, the challenge is not just that of the coordination of units, 
but coordination within and across units – and indeed could be considered as the challenge of 
coordinating coordination.   
Furthermore, even when discussing the role of individuals, the literature on coordination 
remains largely impersonal.  Where the key actors in the MNC are collective, corporate bodies 
then it is hardly surprising that research focuses primarily upon mechanisms and structures 
rather than upon relationships.  While individual managers feature as expats or boundary-
spanners they generally do so as a class where they become a tool or lubrication for the 
smooth operation of the MNC.  Similarly, while the literature highlights the need for, and 
benefit of, communication through meetings, travel, project teams, this does not focus upon 
how that communication brings about coordinated action.  Consequently, this perspective 
risks losing the creativity and interaction between individuals and how this could be 
fundamental to coordinating outcomes within the MNC. 
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3.4 Implications for the Debate on the MNC 
This chapter has focused upon the literature focusing upon the role of the individual within 
the MNC.  It has shown that the wider organisational studies literature has recognised a 
perspective of organisations as socially constructed entities (both formal and informal), and 
sees organising as a social process in which order is negotiated and boundaries challenged.   
Such views stand in sharp contrast to the conceptualisation of the organisation that remains 
dominant within the orthodox perspective of the MNC.  Here units are clearly defined, stable, 
and essentially ‘given’ – with the assumption that top-down hierarchy can (and should) resolve 
disfunctional conflict.   
However, we have also seen that a relatively small literature has introduced the more critical 
perspectives to the MNC as ‘transnational communities’ or ‘transnational social space’ 
(Morgan, 2001a, 2001b).  This moves us on from a perspective of homogeneous and nationally 
bounded units, but still links closely to the impact of geography with a focus upon ‘actor-
centred comparative institutionalism’ (Geppert et al, 2016).  Such specific geographic 
differences are important.  Firstly, they highlight a cause of conflict at the individual level, as 
the MNC is made up of individuals who are not only ‘imprinted’ by their contexts, and who 
can be seen as ‘carriers of’ institutional forces (Kostova & Roth, 2002), but more widely have 
diverse perspectives, understanding and interests.  Secondly, the diverse institutional contexts 
provide actors with resources that contribute to the ‘toolkits’ that they can use in their 
struggles (Williams & Geppert, 2011).  Consequently, rather than hierarchical decisions being 
accepted and adopted without question, the MNC is seen to become a heterogeneous 
organisation within which individuals to play micro-political games to advance their own ends, 
or engage in discursive processes to construct shared-understandings of the MNC, its strategy 
and the way in which it works.  
Yet these literatures largely focus their research upon the context of inter-unit disputes, and 
retain an assumption of the integrity of units, despite Hedlund’s (1994, p. 82) suggestion that 
heterarchical MNCs should be regarded as “temporary constellations of people and units 
rather than permanent structures”.  Consequently, the extant literature largely fails to address 
how individual agency shapes macro-level organisational change within the MNC.  At the same 
time, they do not reveal at a micro-level how day-to-day coordination is achieved between 
actors, particularly in the context of interdependent, heterarchical MNCs.  While it is 
recognised that ‘social control’ will be required, it remains unclear how individuals within the 
heterarchical MNC work to achieve coordination. 
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Consequently, in the next chapter we turn to review the literature on power, and particularly 
how a positive view of ‘power to’ provides a lens through which we can theorise how 
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4. Power, Agency and the Multinational Company 
The previous chapters introduced the MNC and the dominant literature that conceptualises 
such an organisation in terms of a hierarchy of units and a largely rationalistic strategy.  The 
role of the individual within the MNC was then considered.  Yet, as we have seen, this leaves 
a sense of incompleteness – in a focus upon statics rather than organisational instability, a 
reliance upon impersonal optimisation as the dominant logic; and in the primacy of units 
rather than individuals. 
The literature on power provides an alternative lens to look at the organisation.  While MNCs 
may give an impression of solidity and permanence, all organisations are social constructs 
(Morgan, 2006), the result of a myriad past choices and actions. These actions reflect the 
enactment and outcomes of power – the “force that affects outcomes” (Hardy, 1996, p. S3).   
Furthermore, we have seen that a key challenge for organisations, and particularly an 
interdependent heterarchy, is the need for coordination – yet this requires power in some 
form as “the ability of different parties to achieve something together they could not 
accomplish individually” (Baum, 1989, p. 193).  As Clegg et al (2006, p. 2) argue “we cannot 
make serious enquiry into organizations without an enquiry into power.”  
Initially, this chapter reviews the broader literature on power, highlighting that the concept of 
power is both complex and multifaceted (Haugaard & Clegg, 2009) as well as contested (Lukes, 
2005).  This complexity is reflected in the use of multi-dimensional perspectives of power. 
(Hardy 1996, Fleming & Spicer, 2014).   
Yet “despite the rich variety of politics and power perspectives in current OS literature, these 
concepts are rarely applied to the study of MNCs.” (Geppert et al, 2013, p. 429).  The chapter 
shows that where power is studied in the MNC it is – perhaps not surprisingly – largely 
considered in the context of organisational units (Geppert & Williams, 2016), particularly in 
terms of the resources they control (Vaara et al, 2005) and “little attention has been paid to 
the communicative aspects of power” (Erkama, 2010, p. 152).  The more recent literatures are 
then considered that focus upon power and the individual actor within organisations (Geppert 
et al, 2016) – interpreting in terms of concepts of power the literatures on micro-political 
games and the use of language/discourse as episodic tools, and their relationship to 
underpinning the power-relations within the MNC.  Yet each of these approaches is seen to 
focus upon a specific sub-set or dimension of power, and largely fails to outline linkages 
between episodic and systemic aspects of power. 
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However, the wider literature in the social sciences suggest that it is inappropriate to focus on 
the different dimensions separately.  Notably, Clegg’s (1989) concept of the ‘circuits of power’ 
highlight the necessity to consider how episodic power is both rooted in systemic 
relationships, and how episodic action is used to reinforce or reconstruct systemic power 
relations.  Yet such thinking has hardly ever been applied to the MNC, and the heterarchical 
multinational in particular.  What are the power relations that allow coordinated activity in an 
interdependent organisation and what is the dynamic of their interaction?  This is the debate 
that informs the second research questions of this thesis. 
 
4.1 Concepts of Power 
While the word ‘power’ is widely used and understood in everyday language, within academic 
study the concept of power is abstract and multifaceted without having a single agreed 
definition (Haugaard & Clegg, 2009).  Power can be about domination and control (e.g. Lukes, 
2005), or it can be about empowerment and achieving outcomes (e.g. Hardy & Leiba-
O’Sullivan, 1998).  Power can be seen in episodic acts of agency (e.g. Dahl, 1958) or can be 
embedded in those systems and taken-for-granted assumptions that limit the agency of actors 
(e.g. Foucault, 1966/2002).   
Consequently, rather than there being one definition of power, the term embraces a variety 
of concepts that, in Wittgenstein’s term, have a ‘family resemblance’ (Haugaard, 2002, 2010).  
“No one of these usages is right or wrong.  These concepts are conceptual tools, each of which 
enables the author in question to make sense of certain aspects of social life” (Haugaard & 
Clegg, 2009, p. 4).  This further highlights that power can become a ‘contested concept’ (Lukes, 
2005), for what is treated as power (and what is used in evidence) becomes constrained and 
shaped by the philosophical and political position of the person using that power concept.  
Within this, there are a number of key conceptual dichotomies that highlight the debate over 
the nature of power. 
‘Power-over’ or ‘Power-to’? 
One key differentiator of perspectives of power is between those that primarily focus upon 
the way in which power enables an individual to control others (power-over) versus power as 
an enabler to achieve outcomes (power-to).   
The power-over perspective, with its focus on domination and control, has a long history.  It is 
seen in Machiavelli’s (c1515/1995) ‘The Prince’, as well as in Weber’s view of power as “the 
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probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his will 
despite resistance” (1922/1978, p. 53) and that of Dahl seeing power as “A has power over B 
to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do’’ (1957, pp. 
202-3).  Such a perspective continues to be central to critical perspectives of power as a way 
for elites to maintain their position (see Zald & Lounsbury, 2010).  
However, such conceptualisations of power have been criticised for their predominantly 
negative focus on power as a constraint, or prohibitive, preventing other actors from 
undertaking some action and/or that is contrary to their interests (Clegg et al, 2006).  In 
contrast, others have stressed power-to – the enabling aspects of power that are productive 
and transformative (Edwards, 2006) and that empower other actors (Knights & Morgan, 1991).  
Mintzberg (1983) sees power as ‘to be able’ while Clegg et al. (2006, p. 3) stress that “power 
… need not always be seen as something to be avoided.  Power can be a positive force; it can 
achieve great things”.  As such, power is at the heart of coordination of activity.  
Yet although the distinction between power-to and power-over is frequently highlighted in the 
literature (Göhler, 2009), this may be something of a false dichotomy.  Pansardi (2012) argues 
that in most, if not all, non-trivial cases there is a ‘quasi-equivalence’ between power-over and 
power-to saying that “since all the instances of power to included in the social understanding 
of power are based on social relations, they all coincide with instances or sets of instances of 
power over.” (Pansardi, 2012, p. 82).  That is, to achieve any non-trivial outcome that relies 
upon more than your own personal ability then you need to engage others in permitting or 
achieving that outcome.  As such, power-to requires a degree of power-over and (vice versa, 
as is reflected in Dahls’ empirical test of power-over as the individual’s ability to achieve some 
outcome).  Consequently, this dichotomy is perhaps better seen as reflecting a choice of 
perspective: whether to focus upon how power constrains a particular individual (power-over), 
or how that power enables specific outcomes (power-to).  
Power as Possessional or Power as Relational? 
Historically, the literature has also been split between those which regard power primarily as 
a possession of the individual compared to those that see it as an essentially relational 
concept. 
Early perspectives of power followed Weber (1922/1978) in seeing power as something which 
resided ‘in’ the individual (e.g. through their charisma, persuasion or intellect) or within their 
position of ‘authority’.  This is reflected in Dahl’s (1957) definition that power is something an 
individual ‘has’ and subsequent developments of this such as French & Raven’s (1959) five 
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‘bases’ of power, and remains important, particularly in psychology where it remains the 
‘standard’ model (Turner, 2005).   
Yet Clegg et al, (2006, p. 231) challenges this, arguing that power cannot be seen in the actor, 
and rather that “power is only visible in effects”.  As such, in considering two actors one cannot 
be ‘seen’ to have power, except in the response of one to the other.  When the First World 
War officer commanded his men over the top, it was the private soldiers that needed to act; 
when the CEO said cut costs, it was his project team that needed to change behaviour.  Such 
a perspective sees power as inherently relational: it cannot be divorced from the social context 
(Geppert & Dörrenbächer, 2011) depending both upon its deployment and upon the 
enactment by another party (Weick, 1979).   
However, viewing power as only visible in its ‘effects’ imposes limits, particularly in potentially 
excluding influencing (‘affecting’) from definitions of power.  In particular, Morriss (2002, p. 
30), from a strong power-to position, argues that “simply affecting something or somebody is 
not an exercise of power unless the actor thereby effects something.”  Yet others take a rather 
broader perspective recognising the potential role of influence as an aspect power in 
relationships – for example seen in Lawrence et al’s (2012, p. 105) definition of power as “the 
dimension of relationships through which the behaviours, attitudes, or opportunities of an 
actor are affected by another actor, system or technology”.   
Yet while we may focus upon the relationship between an ‘A’ and a ‘B’, this is itself embedded 
within a network of discourse and relationships (Hardy & Leiba-O’Sullivan, 1998).   Within such 
a power network, an actor may try to ‘pull the strings’ of power but may not be certain that 
this will lead to the desired outcomes.  As such, power is “no longer a convenient, manipulable, 
deterministic resource under the control of autonomous, sovereign actors” (Hardy & Leiba-
O’Sullivan, 1998, p. 459) – rather it may become a web within which are all constrained. 
Episodic versus Systemic Power 
A third key dichotomy in the literature on power is the distinction between episodic and 
systemic manifestations of power. 
Episodic power “refers to discrete, strategic political acts initiated by self-interested actors” 
(Lawrence et al, 2005, p. 182).  This is seen by Fleming & Spicer (2014, p. 240) as being “the 
direct exercise of power … [that] rely upon identifiable acts that shape the behavior of others”, 
that is, the direct result of agency (Haugaard, 2010).  Such power is overt, being seen in 
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definable, but largely transient, acts that might include issuing orders, directing resources or 
through political deal making.  
In contrast, systemic forms of power are seen to endure as they “work through the routine, 
ongoing practices of organization” (Lawrence et al, 2005, p. 182) and are captured in the 
“network of relations and discourses” (Hardy & Leiba-O’Sullivan, 1998, p. 458) and become 
the constraints of the taken-for-granted (Haugaard, 2015).  Such power is diffused throughout 
an organisation and becomes ‘congealed’ in more enduring forms of institutions, cultures and 
norms (Fleming & Spicer, 2014).  As such, systemic power cannot be attributed as the 
possession of an individual, rather it “resides between actors” (Blazejewski & Becker-
Ritterspach 2016, p. 35).  Consequently, systemic aspect of power can be much subtler than 
overt episodic power, such that they “tend to work in an ongoing, prosaic fashion” (Lawrence 
et al 2001, p. 630) – an ever-present force that may be shaped and constrained an actor in 
ways that they may be unaware of and cannot control. 
 
4.2 Syntheses of Power in Organisations 
One way of dealing with the complex, multifaceted nature of power is through models that 
try to synthesise and characterise power in organisation.  Although concepts of power have 
been summarised in many ways, two syntheses are prominent because they were developed 
with a focus upon organisations: Cynthia Hardy’s four dimensions of power developed to 
understand strategic change in organisations (Hardy, 1996; Hardy & Leiba-O’Sullivan, 1998), 
and Fleming & Spicer’s (2007, 2014) four ‘faces’ of power in organisations.  While relying upon 
the same source authors and theoretical building blocks (especially Lukes, 2005, three faces 
of power6), the two interpretations differ in tone as Fleming & Spicer adopt a critical power-
over perspective, while Hardy’s primary focus is one of power-to achieve outcomes.  These 
differing perspectives are summarised in Table 4.1 and considered in detail below.  
 
  
                                                          
6 Originally published in 1974. 
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4.2.1 The First Dimension: Dahl and Coercion or The Power of Resources 
The first dimension of power is the ‘mainstream’ view of power (Hardy & Leiba-O’Sullivan, 
1998) with Lukes (2005) identifying it closely with the type power highlighted in the Dahl and 
Weber.  This follows a quasi-mechanical approach to power, which Clegg (1989) refers to as 
‘causal power’ – and is reflected in Dahl’s idea of A getting B to do something B would 
otherwise not do.  This is overt power, exercised by one party over another, with the action of 
one and then the response of another.  Consequently, from a more critical and power-over 
perspective, Fleming & Spicer (2007) label this dimension as ‘coercion’. 
Yet frequently, this dimension of power is associated with the control of resources and their 
use to influence outcomes or modify the behaviour of others.  Dahl saw that “the base of an 
actor’s power consists of all the resources – opportunities, acts, objects, etc. – that he can 
exploit in order to effect the behavior of another” (Dahl, 1957, p. 203).   This was further 
developed through French & Raven’s (1959) bases of power as well as resource dependency 
theory (Salancik & Pfeffer 1978, Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  However, this thinking embraces a 
very broad array of resources that constitute both ‘carrot and stick’ – including the ability to 
hire and fire, the ability to reward and punish, and in the ability to create/reduce uncertainty 
(for examples see Thompson, 1956; Crozier, 1964). 
However, Hardy (1996) calling this dimension ‘the power of resources’ argues that the impact 
of such power deployment can be limited.  It is task-oriented and context specific, and its 
episodic nature requires the repeated deployment of either reward or punishment if desired 
outcomes are to be sustained. 
 
4.2.2 The Second Dimension:  Bachrach & Baratz and Manipulation or the Power of Process 
Lukes’ (2005) second dimension of power recognises the possibility for decision-making 
processes and agendas to be modified to make certain outcomes more, or less, likely.  This 
directly follows Bachrach & Baratz (1962) second ‘face’ of power where they questioned 
whether decision-making processes were accessible to all.  In considering community 
government they saw that “to the extent that a person or group – consciously or unconsciously 
– creates or reinforces barriers to the public airing of policy conflicts, that person or group has 
power” (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962, p. 499).  Biases among the ruling group can lead to confining 
the scope of decision making only to ‘safe’ or unimportant issues – and where issues that are 
important to ‘B’ are either not formulated or addressed, the result is ‘non-decision-making’.  
As such this dimension is about ‘agenda setting’ where “there is no direct exercise of coercion 
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here. Instead, there is an implicit shaping of issues considered important or relevant” (Fleming 
& Spicer, 2007, p. 17). 
Non-decision-making has been seen to work in different ways.  It can be that “the powerful 
may not attend to, may not listen to, or may not ‘hear’ demands articulated by the less 
powerful” (Clegg, 1989 p. 77).  However, it is also possible that issues may not even be aired 
due the anticipated reaction from raising an issue (either from a lack of confidence that 
anything will be achieved, or from the negative consequences expected from ‘rocking the 
boat’), or simply from a belief or acceptance of what can be said and what cannot.   
While such ‘non-decision-making could be seen to have structural components (as Clegg, 
1989, makes clear), it is upon the episodic, agentic aspect of non-decision making that both 
Hardy and Fleming & Spicer focus.  Hardy (1996, p. S7) specifically highlights the use of process, 
saying that this “form of power resides in organizational decision making processes … that can 
be invoked by dominant groups to influence outcomes by preventing subordinates from 
participating fully in decision making” and are “part of a deliberate strategy to achieve 
intended outcomes” (Hardy & Leiba-O’Sullivan, 1998, p. 455, emphasis added).   Similarly, 
Fleming & Spicer (2007, 2014), calling this dimension of power ‘manipulation’, stress the 
episodic “whereby actors seek to either limit the issues that are discussed or fit issues within 
(what are perceived to be) acceptable boundaries” (Fleming & Spicer, 2014, p. 242).  
 
4.2.3 The Third Dimension: Lukes and Domination or The Power of Meaning 
Lukes great contribution to the understanding of power was to suggest that while the first two 
dimensions both required the presence of conflict, it may also be possible to prevent conflict 
appearing in the first place.  Through biases in thinking, possible outcomes may neither be 
consciously chosen nor considered.  Consequently, his third dimension of power focuses upon 
the potential to shape perceptions, thinking and preferences to produce apparent consensus 
and acquiescence – as Lukes (2005, p. 27) says, “A may exercise power over B by getting him 
to do what he does not want to do, but he also exercises power over him by influencing, 
shaping or determining his very wants”.  Through meaning, discourse and language, this third 
dimension is tied up with what people are able to say, think and feel (Clegg et al, 2006).  
This third dimension of power was initially considered from a critical perspective in the context 
of the societal and class mechanisms seen to perpetuate the status quo to the detriment of 
another’s interests. 
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“Is not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent people, to 
whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions 
and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of 
things, either because they can see or imagine no alternative to it, or because they 
see it as natural and unchangeable?” (Lukes, 2005, p. 24) 
As such, Lukes was concerned with how people might be “duped, hoodwinked, coerced, 
cajoled or manipulated into political inactivity” (Saunders, 1980, p. 22, quoted in Gordon, 
2009).   
Within this, Fleming & Spicer’s focus is primarily upon systemic aspects.  Apparent consensus 
and acquiescence are achieved though the production of everyday beliefs and practices – 
producing a Gramscian hegemony where power structures are legitimized by the norms of the 
society.  They classify it as ‘domination’, emphasising that “this dimension of power shapes 
our very preferences, attitudes and political outlook” (2007, p. 19). 
In contrast, Hardy’s (1996) emphasis lies primarily upon the episodic, considering how that 
shaping meaning and changing others understanding impacts upon outcomes, hence calling 
this dimension ‘the power of meaning’.  Indeed, such ideas are common within the 
management literature, for example in considering how interest groups legitimate their own 
demands and ‘delegitimised’ others (Pettigrew, 1977).  While this may be employed 
conservatively – focusing upon defending the status quo (Clegg et al, 2006) – there are clear 
cases where the manipulation of meanings can clearly contribute to change, be that in 
‘sensegiving’ around a strategic change (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991) or in creating a ‘burning 
platform’ or sense of inevitability to promote change (Knights & McCabe, 1997). 
 
4.2.4 The Fourth Dimension: Foucault and the Post-Structuralist Approach 
Despite references to systemic bias in both the second and the third dimension of power, from 
a power-to perspective the first three dimensions focus primarily on agency and action.  
Through bringing resources to bear to achieve a desired outcome; through non-decision 
making to exclude issues (and actors); and through managing meaning to alter preferences, 
wants and understanding.  
Alternatively, it is possible to consider the way in which societies’ shared understanding and 
taken-for-granted assumptions are themselves implicated in power relations. This ‘power of 
the system’ (Hardy, 1996) is that which is embedded so deeply within the organizational 
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system that it is taken for granted by all members of the system.  This can be so deeply 
ingrained that even those who benefit from the current system will find it difficult to change. 
Hardy & Leiba-O’Sullivan (1998) are explicit in seeing this fourth dimension as Foucauldian.  
This perspective emerged from Foucault’s (e.g. 1966/2002, 1975/95, 1978) efforts to 
comprehend how we have come to understand the world in the way that we do.  This required 
exploring the tacit and taken-for-granted assumptions which enable people to order things in 
the way that they do (Foucault, 1966/2002).  From this perspective, power cannot be 
understood solely by looking at what individuals do.  Rather, “power relations are rooted deep 
in the social nexus, not a supplementary over and above ‘society’” (Foucault, 1983/1994, p. 
343).  Power is constituted in the discourse that is more than (just) spoken or written 
statements as it is in the repeated practice and ‘rules of formation’ that underlie and condition 
them (see Torfing, 2009).  Such power shapes how we feel, and indeed who we are in that it 
defines “who and what is ‘normal’, standard and acceptable” (Meriläinen et al, 2004, p. 544). 
From this perspective, the subject is socially produced by the surrounding power system that 
gives them meaning (Knights & Morgan, 1991) – hence, Fleming & Spicer’s (2014) terminology 
of ‘subjectification’.   Resistance is reduced as to resist challenges the very meaning by which 
individuals understand themselves.  Consequently, even the apparently ‘powerful’ are trapped 
in the network of relations that appear to give them that power7.  As such, this systemic power 
becomes a constraining force, by defining what is ‘normal’ it restricts the ability of an actor to 
even contemplate an alternative reality and resist or transform the system (see Clegg, 1989; 
Knights & Morgan, 1991).    
 
4.3 Power in the MNC: Power Relations and Organisational Units 
Having considered how power has been conceptualised more broadly within the social 
sciences, the next sections move on to consider the literature on power in the MNC8, with 
reference to the framework of the four-dimensional perspective and a focus upon ‘power-to’.  
Overall, this remains a relatively small literature with Geppert & Dörrenbächer (2014, p. 226) 
                                                          
7 Can a CEO to challenge the capitalist system and assumptions of neo-liberal economics, when they 
form the basis of their position, ‘power’ and identity? 
8 Fleming & Spicer (2014) identified four ‘sites’ from which power relations could be viewed.  Here we 
focus upon power in the organisation, which “consists of struggles within its formal boundaries to 
influence, maintain, or change hierarchies and norms” (ibid., p. 245). However, they also highlight that 
power relations can be revealed through the organisation (considering the organisation as actor); power 
over the organisation (considering how external actors may strive to influence the organisation); and 
power against the organisation. 
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highlighting that “it is notable that power relations in multinational corporations … have not 
gained enhanced attention in the academic community”.  Similarly, Clegg et al (2015, p. 1526) 
have recently concluded that: 
“It is perplexing that mainstream studies, particularly in the domains of international 
business and economics, have either neglected to discuss issues of power and politics 
in multinational corporations (MNCs) or have addressed them in a rather one 
dimensional and rationalistic fashion.”  
Before turning to consider power and the agency of individual actors, this section will highlight 
the debates around power and organisational units, which continues to be the analysis level 
that has received the most focus.  What is notable is that this debate has centred upon the 
contextual conditions that constitute sources of power for them (Becker-Ritterspach & 
Dörrenbächer, 2011), especially the ‘resources’ that those units can leverage (particularly 
within the context of the HQ-subsidiary dyad).   
In contrast, the systemic aspects of the fourth dimension of power are rarely made explicit.  
Frequently, there is an unstated assumption of the legitimacy of HQ power.  Secondly, 
although we expect HQ and subsidiary to be infused with an “unconscious acceptance of the 
values, traditions, cultures and structures” (Hardy, 1996, p. S8) of their institutional context, 
there is little consideration of how clashes are resolved between units operating with 
fundamentally different systemic assumptions of what are the rules of the game and what 
constitutes power. 
 
4.3.1 Power and Headquarters 
While the overall subject of power in the multinational might have received relatively scant 
attention, this is particularly the case for understanding power and the MNC headquarters.  
While Andersson et al (2007) argue that most studies of power in the MNC have focused on 
headquarters’ formal authority and hierarchical position as its source of power, frequently this 
position has been accepted within the literature without question, with little study of how this 
is established and maintained.9  This echoes Hardy & Clegg’s (2006, p. 756) broader argument 
that social theorists “have rarely felt it necessary to explain why it is that power should be 
                                                          
9 To take two examples: Yamin et al (2011, p. 164) state “the fact that given its hierarchical authority 
the HQ can channel resources”; Dörrenbächer & Gammelgaard (2011, p. 30) consider that 
“headquarters have unlimited access to formal power.” 
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hierarchical… Power embedded in hierarchy has been viewed as ‘normal’ and ‘inevitable’ 
following from the formal design of the organisation”.  Indeed, even as the MNC has evolved 
into more network like forms it has been suggested that power structures remain largely 
hierarchical (Andersson & Holm, 2010) and biased in favour of HQ (Dörrenbächer & 
Gammelgaard, 2016). 
The concept of legitimate authority is seen to derive from Weber’s concept of Herrschaft 
which he defined as “the probability that a command with a given specific content will be 
obeyed by a given group of persons” (Weber, 1922/1978, p. 53)10.   Such authority is most 
frequently associated with the first dimension of power, particularly being seen as being 
embedded within the ability of the HQ to control resources.  In part, this is seen as directly 
following the HQ’s ownership rights of key assets (Mudambi et al, 2014), albeit that formal 
ownership does not always lead to effective control (Dörrenbächer & Gammelgaard 2011; 
Aghion & Tirole, 1997).  However, resource control is also seen through the HQ imposing 
sanctions or rewards such as closing or disposing of subsidiaries (Clark & Gepert, 2011) or 
through offering or restricting career opportunities for subsidiary management (Ferner et al, 
2012).   
More specifically, the HQ’s authority is seen in an ability to design and implement processes 
(Ferner & Edwards, 1995) that enables it to control key aspects of resource allocation 
(Dellestrand & Kappen 2011), such that subsidiaries become dependent upon the HQ.  While 
financial resources (including ‘budgets’) are key among these (Mudambi et al, 2014; Mudambi 
& Pedersen, 2007), other resources that have been considered in the literature include 
knowledge (Andersson et al, 2007) and ‘HQ attention’ (Ambos & Birkinshaw, 2010). 
Despite this focus upon resource-dependency and the first dimension of power, we should 
recognise immediately that ‘authority’ has deep systemic foundations in which “subordinates 
obey superiors … because they believe that the latter have a right to exercise power by virtue 
of their position” (Astley & Sachdeva, 1984, pp. 105-6) and, therefore, “accept as binding” (Fox 
1971, p. 34, quoted in Ferner & Edwards, 1995) decisions made by superiors.  Accordingly, in 
his translation of Weber, Talcot Parsons emphasised that Herrschaft required “a certain 
minimum of voluntary submission” (Weber, 1922/1947, p. 324).  Similarly, Clegg et al (2006), 
highlighted that such authority represented “a relationship of legitimate rule, where the 
meaningfulness of the social relation rests on assumptions accepted without imposition by all 
                                                          
10 Herrschaft can be translated as either ‘authority’ or ‘domination’. 
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parties to that relationship” (p. 103, emphases added).  That is, there is a shared 
understanding of the basis upon which an ‘A’ (headquarters) can instruct ‘B’ (a subsidiary) and 
upon which the ‘B’ will react.  Even in the absence of disciplinary tools it may be that B accepts 
the will of A because it is believed to be the legitimate and right thing to do.  However, there 
is surprisingly little investigation of the basis upon which such a shared assumption becomes 
established within the MNC. 
 
4.3.2 Power and the Subsidiary 
Where the literature has given attention to power within the MNC, this has largely focused 
upon understanding the sources of power leveraged by the subsidiary.  It seems that, given 
the normal assumption of the legitimate authority of the HQ, the recognition of the subsidiary 
having sources of power, if not problematic, is at least worthy of attention.  Yet with the 
growth of network forms of organisation subsidiary power has also been considered in terms 
of the subsidiary-subsidiary relationship as well. 
However, again we see the focus of conceptualising upon the subsidiary’s resources (Mudambi 
& Pedersen, 2007).  Mundambi et al (2014, p. 109) argue that “resource dependence theory 
provides a powerful basis for the understanding of relationships between subsidiaries and 
MNCs”.  Within this, three aspects of subsidiary power through resource control are 
prominent in the literature: knowledge, local embeddedness and network position. 
Firstly, subsidiaries are seen to be able to leverage power based upon their knowledge, 
particularly as it is difficult for HQs to exercise ownership rights over such intangible assets 
(Mudambi & Pedersen, 2007).  Mudambi & Navarra (2004) showed evidence to suggest that 
subsidiary bargaining power increased both with their stock of technical knowledge and with 
the flow of knowledge from subsidiary to the rest of the MNC.  However, much of the focus 
upon building distinctive knowledge is upon the embeddedness of the subsidiary in its local 
environment (Forsgren et al, 2005).  Andersson et al (2002, p. 981), for example, consider 
‘relational embeddedness’ as “the extent to which a subsidiary's individual, direct 
relationships with customers, suppliers, competitors etc. can serve as sources of learning.”  
Through the creation and leverage of such intra-organisational networks, subsidiaries are seen 
to be able to build knowledge that is not available to HQ (Tregakis, 2003) and apply this to 
build specific competences. 
However, local embeddedness can have value that goes beyond knowledge.  Subsidiaries may 
be able to leverage aspects of the local institutional environment when dealing with HQ, for 
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example by its positioning of the local legal or industrial relations contexts and how the 
subsidiary can respond to these (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008a; Clark & Geppert, 2011; 
Williams & Geppert 2011; Andersson & Forsgren, 2000).  More generally, the subsidiary may 
use its network to build legitimacy for the MNC that would not be possible for the MNC HQ 
(Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008a; Hart & Sharma, 2004).  
While local embeddedness focuses upon the extra-organisational network of the subsidiary, a 
key role is also given to the position and linkages of the subsidiary within the MNC network.  
In particular, network position/centrality (Astley & Zajac, 1990; Cook et al, 1983) is seen as 
being critical in creating internal dependencies which the subsidiary can leverage (Forsgren et 
al, 2005; Bouquet & Birkinshaw 2008a, 2008b) with Ghoshal & Bartlett (1993) showing that 
subsidiaries with a higher exchange density with other subsidiaries or the HQ achieve more 
prominent positions in MNCs.  However, while growing interdependence gives the subsidiary 
opportunity to exploit the reliance of others (HQ and subsidiary), it is likely that at the same 
time subsidiaries become increasingly dependent upon others.  Consequently, what matters 
is the net dependency between the subsidiary and the rest of the MNC (Forsgren et al, 2005). 
Yet, the literature also highlights that having ‘sources’ of potential power may not be 
sufficient.   Rather, it is what subsidiaries do with these resources that are key (Dörrenbächer 
& Gammelgaard, 2011).  This has been explored in the ways that these are used to reinforce 
issue selling (Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard, 2011, 2016; Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008b), 
initiative taking (Ambos et al, 2010; Dörrenbächer & Gammelgaard, 2016; Bouquet & 
Birkinshaw, 2008a, 2008b; Birkinshaw & Ridderstråle, 1999) or provide the basis for political 
contests (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008a).  Furthermore, the architecture of power resources is 
not fixed, with Andersson et al (2007) showing how HQs could reduce net dependency by 
building their own knowledge of the subsidiaries external network, while Ambos et al, 2010, 
considered the moderating effect on subsidiary power of HQ attention. 
 
4.3.3 Issues with the Unit Focused Approach to Power 
The combination of the network and resource-dependency theories provide an important step 
in advancing the understanding of power relations between units within the MNC.  However, 
there is a sense that this is insufficient, with Ambos et al (2010, p. 1100) going as far as to 
argue that the “stream of literature that conceptualizes subsidiaries as influential and 
powerful actors in their own right… has so far largely failed to explain the sources of subsidiary 
influence and the mechanisms through which they bargain with headquarters.”  Indeed, there 
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appear to be significant limitations with this literature that leave fundamental blind-spots in 
our understanding of power within the MNC. 
Firstly, although considering power within the MNC, such an approach ignores power relations 
within MNC units and the potential importance of the sub-organisational level or individual 
actors (Geppert et al, 2016; Becker-Ritterspach & Dörrenbächer, 2011).  This literature accepts 
that the MNC in totality is a ‘conflict system’ of units (March, 1962), thereby relaxing the 
assumptions of the dominance of hierarchical authority and of homogeneity of interests and 
preferences across units.  Yet, the same assumptions are largely left in place with regards to 
the MNC’s constituent units themselves, regarding them as both coherent and univocal. 
Secondly, this approach remains largely focused upon the rationalistic concept of actors and 
power relations in MNCs (e.g. see Forsgren & Holm 2010) and consequently “the approach has 
largely remained structuralist, with little understanding of how power is socially enacted and 
how political manoeuvring is grounded in micro-level interactions between powerful HQ and 
subsidiary actors” (Geppert & Dörrenbächer, 2014, p. 231).   
Consequently, we now turn to consider those studies that have looked at individual actors, 
their agency and power relations in the context of the MNC. 
 
4.4 Power, the MNC and Individual Agency 
While the dominant approach to power in the International Business literature focuses upon 
units, a niche area of study (Geppert et al, 2016) has emerged that focuses upon power within 
the MNC at a finer level of granularity and which considers MNC relations “as processual, 
political, and actor-centred” (Clark & Geppert, 2011, p. 397).  This moves the focus onto key 
actors, particularly managers, employees and unions operating within the ‘contested terrain’ 
of the MNC (Edwards & Bélanger, 2009).  This perspective recognises the agency of actors – 
that is the “capacity of people to act upon their world … purposefully and reflectively … to 
reiterate and remake the world in which they live” (Inden, 1990, quoted in Holland et al, 1998, 
p. 54).  However, at the same time these actors inhabit specific environments with taken-for-
granted assumptions, cultures and power structures and consequently “are neither the 
executive organs of given structures, nor fully autonomous” (Dörrenbächer & Geppert, 2009b, 
p. 103). 
In the previous chapter, two streams of work were introduced that focused upon the role of 
the individual within the MNC – the micro-political and the discursive perspective.  Both of 
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these ‘emergent critical perspectives’ (Barner-Rasmussen et al, 2010) share a common 
assumption, described by Geppert & Dörrenbächer (2014, p. 237) in which they see: 
“Power relations within MNCs as not pre-given or institutionally determined or the 
outcome of objective managerial decision. Rather, we believe that power is the result 
of continuously socially constructed dynamic relationships among key actors, who 
make use of existing power resources and, in doing so, stabilize and destabilize 
established power.” 
As such both approaches try to capture the role of social agency and the micro-dynamics of 
the structures of the relations of politics and power structures.  Yet, in doing so they highlight 
fundamentally different aspects of power relationships. 
Interpreting Power in the Micro-Political Perspective 
As outlined in Chapter 3, there is a relatively new literature focusing upon micro-politics 
around the different (and contradictory) interests and identities of key actors within the MNC 
(particularly managers) and the micro-political ‘games’ that they play.   These are frequently 
regarded as being closely linked with power – with Delmestri & Brumana (2017, p. 330) 
describing such games as “concrete mechanisms used by interest-driven individuals to 
structure and regularize their relations of power.” 
Interpreted in terms of the literature on power, it becomes clear that the micro-political 
perspective primarily focuses upon the episodic (Geppert & Dörrenbächer, 2014), considering 
the actions of the key actors.  With its focus upon ‘resource mobilization strategies’ 
(Dörrenbächer & Geppert, 2009a; Becker-Ritterspach & Dörrenbächer, 2011) it largely adopts 
a resource-focused view of power.  Becker-Ritterspach & Dörrenbächer (2011) specifically 
highlight that they are see  power ‘constituted by relationships that allow the exchange of 
resources’ (p. 542) and consider how actors can “mobilize resources (based on their resource 
exchange relationships) within and outside the multinational corporation” (p. 533) in order to 
“exchange (or potentially deny) possibilities of action that are relevant to others” (p. 543).  At 
one level, such resource power can be seen in simple episodic action – for examples in 
Boussebaa et al (2012) where actors hoard resources (in this case consultants) thereby 
thwarting a corporate initiative, or where actors initiate wild-cat strikes (Becker-Ritterspach & 
Blazejewski, 2016b).   
In particular, the micro-political perspective puts particular attention upon resource power 
derived from the local (institutional) context within which actors are sited.  For example, 
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Geppert et al, 2015, showed how managers in Lidl in Finland could build a robust ‘toolkit’ of 
resources based upon local collective bargaining and employment law that could be used in 
dealings with the parent company.  More generally, Becker-Ritterspach & Blazejewski, (2016a, 
p. 92) highlight that “to achieve their goals actors mobilize resources through social 
relationships or by referring to broader societal or institutional rules.”   As such, there is an 
acceptance of a systemic background to power relations that shape actors’ opportunities.  
Indeed, Geppert et al (2016, p. 1241) highlight that micro-political perspectives “move into 
systemic power perspectives to the extent that they see actor interests and actor power 
(ability to enter social relationships or the mobilization of resources) as socially constituted by 
unquestioned organizational rules and societal institutions.”   
Interpreting Power in the Discursive Perspective of the MNC 
In contrast, the second theme emphasises upon the discursive nature of power struggles.  This 
“examines the role played by language in the construction of power relationships and 
reproduction of domination” (Vaara et al, 2006, p. 792).   
In part, this focuses upon explicitly episodic action based upon language reflecting the third 
dimension of power, the power of meaning, or what Balogun et al’s (2019, p. 246) study 
consider “a specific kind of power dynamic that builds on reframing.”  Power is exercised by 
those who are able to shape others’ understanding through the “deployment of discursive 
resources” (Whittle & Zirpoli, 2016, p. 1242) both to have positive ‘mobilizing effects’ as well 
as constraining organisational action (Vaara & Monin, 2010).  Key actors participate in 
‘language games’ (Geppert et al, 2014) including those involving ‘issue selling’ (Dutton & 
Ashford, 1993).  Critically, attention has been upon how actors use sensemaking and 
sensegiving to promote a particular course of action for the MNC.  For example, Vaara & 
Tienari (2008, 2011) explore how established narratives (‘antenarratives’) are leveraged to 
make sense of events and through which actors can “position themselves vis-à-vis specific 
discourses or mobilize particular discourses for their own advantage” (Vaara & Tienari, 2008, 
p. 987).  Particular emphasis within the literature focuses upon the way in which actors build 
discursive legitimacy, where “the crux of this struggle revolves around attempts to get … 
interests accepted and shared by others in the MNC as legitimate and worthwhile” 
(Koveshnikov et al, 2017, p. 16).   
Yet the episodic use of meaning seems to reflect an aspect of power that goes beyond that 
seen in the logic of resource dependency.  The research indicates that this is a multi-level 
process that involves individuals at varying levels of the organisation, with opportunities to 
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influence understanding, discourse and outcomes irrespective of their hierarchical position 
(Rouleau & Balogun, 2011; Vaara, 2002), and consequently through examining the discursive 
we gain “deeper insights about both the silencing of powerful players and the gaining of ‘voice’ 
by weaker actors” (Geppert et al, 2016 p. 1218). 
Importantly, within the discursive perspective there is a recognition that episodic discursive 
acts can have a longer-lasting impact upon systemic aspects of power.  Vaara & Tienari (2011, 
p. 385) emphasise that discourses become “constitutive elements of MNCs as institutions and 
organizations”.  Similarly, Balogun et al’s (2011) study of charter change highlights how 
through discourse it was possible to ‘subjectively reconstruct’ the relationship between HQ 
and a subsidiary.  Consequently, this starts to suggest that through discursive practices within 
the MNC managers are not only able to shape specific outcomes, but can start to influence 
the systemic understandings of the multinational and its ways of doing things.   
 
4.5 Implications of the Extant Literature of Power in the MNC 
The previous sections have provided an overview of concepts of power and how these are 
interpreted within the study of organisations and has then reviewed the existing literature on 
power in the MNC.  These studies support Morgan’s (2011, p. 415) view that “no longer is it 
possible to treat MNCs simply as rational unitary actors …  Instead, we now have a view of 
MNCs as consisting of different types of social actors with differing interests and power”.  
However, we are left with a sense of separate strands of analysis each of which focus upon 
specific dimensions of power and which, at best, give a partial picture of the workings of power 
relations in the contemporary MNC.  In his ‘circuits of power’ approach Clegg’s (1989) 
highlights the need for, and provides a framework within which, to understand the linkages 
between episodic and systemic power.  However, the learnings from this are yet to be applied 
to the heterarchical MNC. 
 
4.5.1 The Incompleteness of The Extant Literature 
Analysis in this chapter has examined three main bodies of work on power in the MNC, each 
of which adopts an analytical focus in terms of the units of the power dimensions and unit of 
analysis (see Figure 4.1).   
The HQ/Subsidiary literature is focused upon unit relationships, with a primary reliance upon 
the power of resources as explanans, while making references to processual aspects of power.  
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Lying behind this is a key assumption about systemic power – that of the legitimacy and 
primacy of HQ.  However, the linkages between episodic actions and systemic power 
assumptions are hardly investigated, for example in explaining about how a specific 
organisational structure of units comes about – even though that structure must reflect an 
aspect of the ‘rules of the game’ within the organisation. 
The micro-political stream of research focusing upon power of the individual within the MNC 
also relies primary upon aspects of resources and, to a lesser extent, process.  Yet in its focus 
upon resources and resource dependency, the stream has been criticised in that systemic 
aspects of MNC power relations and macro-political structures are not fully acknowledged 
(Clegg et al, 2018; Morgan, 2011).  Geppert & Dörrenbächer (2014) suggest the need to extend 
understanding to the ‘deep’ structures that underly the episodic games, focusing upon both 
the power implications of the rules of the game (what they and who set them?) and the impact 
of the systemic power relations within which they occur (what determines the aims of the 
game and why are the rules in place?). 
The discursive approach however contrasts other organisational analyses of power and their 
reliance on the resource-based view (Vaara et al, 2005).  Rather, this perspective brings focus 
to the power of meaning as a tool for shaping outcomes, as well as stressing the key role 
played by language and meaning within systemic aspects of power.  Yet, Geppert et al (2016, 
p. 1215) have warned that these approaches remain “rather weak in considering the micro-
level constitution of organizational politics and power”, thereby down-playing the agency of 
individual actors.  Furthermore, the study of discursive struggles within MNCs has largely 
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focused upon reactions to top-down decisions (e.g. an announced merger, a declared 
language policy, or in Balogun’s studies of ‘BrandCo’), rather than including such decisions as 
part of the ongoing discursive creation of the MNC.  Consequently, while the discursive 
approach highlights how power structures become legitimised, there is less understanding of 
how new power structures develop and structures become established (Oliveira & Clegg, 
2015; Logemann & Piekkari, 2015). 
Consequently, what is remarkable is the degree to which the various aspects of power are 
considered separately within the different bodies of literature and rarely brought together.   
Firstly, the extant literature, hardly considers the interaction between power, units and the 
individual within the MNC.  However, it seems empirically clear that at times both the 
structure of units and the actions of key individuals can be simultaneously important.  This 
echoes March’s (1962) approach to conflict systems that highlights the need to understand 
both the relationships between groups (units) and power and conflict within those groups. 
Secondly, the majority of studies focus upon a limited subset of power dimensions – either 
largely focusing on resources (from a subsidiary or micro-politics perspective) or upon the 
power of meaning through a discursive perspective.  Yet there are suggestions in the empirical 
literature that these are not divorced – particularly seen in the recent work of Whittle and 
colleagues.  Although focused upon the discursive aspects of power, they argued that “it is 
through the stories, texts and conversations that circulate within MNCs that actors make sense 
of the resources, knowledge capabilities, alliances and bargaining power that subsidiaries 
have, or may lay claim to” (Whittle et al, 2016, p. 1326) and that “it was through these 
discussions that key decisions were made, which effected who was involved … what resources 
were involved.” (Whittle et al, 2014, pp. 85-6).  That is, they highlight linkages between the 
discursive ‘stories, texts and conversations’ to ‘resources’ and ‘bargaining power’ (while 
incidentally suggesting linkage between both individual actors and collective ‘subsidiaries’).  It 
is such linkages that are explored in the models that consider the dynamics of power.  
 
4.5.2 The Need to Understand the Dynamics of Power 
Consequently, what seems to be largely missing from the current literature on power in the 
multinational is an understanding of the interactions between the different dimensions of 
power, and the different units of analysis (individual and organisational).   
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Such linkages are already discussed in the wider debate on power in the social sciences.  In 
section 4.2 above it was highlighted that there is a clear linkage between systemic and episodic 
forms of power, in that the power relations actors are able to leverage (in the form of 
resources, process or meaning) are themselves based upon the systemic taken-for-granted 
and shared assumptions of society that constitute the ‘rules of the game’ (Clegg, 1989).  For 
example, a manager in an MNC has resources because the rules, processes and norms of the 
system legitimise, and perhaps dictate, that that manager should have those resources.  
Similarly, the ‘schedules of authority’ that require certain individuals to authorise investments, 
or hierarchical positions within units, are key elements of the rules of the game which give 
certain individuals a potentially privileged position in processes. 
Yet at the same time, it can be argued that the ‘power of the system’ is itself shaped by the 
exercise of episodic power.  Hardy (1996) expresses this as individual actors utilising the 
powers of resources, processes and meaning to affect the power of the system, saying “it is 
against this dimension of power that managers must employ the other three dimensions if 
they are to bring about strategic action” (pp. S8-S9).  Consequently, the system can be thought 
of as embedding the history of struggles in the organisation (Hardy & Clegg, 2006).  Clegg, 
(2009, p. 152) presented a similar view, saying, “what is important from the point of view of 
the infinity of power episodes stretching into a future that has no limits are the feedback loops 
from distant episodic outcomes and the impact that they have on overall social and systemic 
integration.”  Rather, the key issue is whether such episodic actions serve to 
reproduce/stabilise or transform/destabilise the existing systemic power relations (Geppert & 
Dörrenbächer, 2011). 
Consequently, we see that there is a two-way interaction between the three dimensions of 
resources, processes and meaning and that of the power of the system.  While the power of 
the system underpins the first three dimensions, agency leveraging these first three 
dimensions inevitably impacts the power of the system, either reinforcing or challenging the 
shared meanings and assumptions on which power is based (see Figure 4.2). 
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While Hardy only hints at the mechanisms of the relationship between the power of the system 
and the other dimensions, Clegg’s (1989) Circuits of Power offers the most thorough 
theorisation of the interrelationship between episodic and systemic power (Blazejewski & 
Becker-Ritterspach, 2016).  However, it must be stressed that Clegg does not use a four-
dimensional view of power.  Rather, he considers the interaction between episodic and 
systemic aspects of power as operating through three circuits (a simplified schema is shown 
in Figure 4.3) in which power relations are “dynamic, potentially unstable, and resisted” 
(Clegg, 2013, p. 115). 
Clegg refers to the first of these circuits as either the circuit of agency (Clegg, 1989) or as the 
episodic circuit (Oliveira & Clegg, 2015).  This circuit focuses upon the agency of actors within 
the established ‘rules of the game’.  As such it “captures visible exercises of power by actors 
in particular, day-to-day encounters, seeking to obtain outcomes favouring their definition of 
interests” (Clegg et al, 2018, p. 753).  While Clegg (1989) sees this mainly operating via the 
resources that actors have access to, we can interpret this circuit as representing agency 
involved in any of the first three dimensions of power (including the episodic use of meaning 
to achieve outcomes).   
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However, this circuit does not stand alone, as he introduces two other circuits that broadly 
equate with ‘the power of the system’.  The circuit of social integration reflects the ‘rules of 
the game’ which shape actor’s dispositions to behave in certain ways, including the rules of 
membership which “guide actors in making sense of the world, events, others and themselves, 
hence shaping the actors’ knowledge which, in turn, underlies their (re)actions” (Oliveira & 
Clegg, 2015, p. 428).  Finally, echoing Foucault, Clegg adds a circuit of system integration that 
reflects the available techniques of production and discipline (such as business processes, 
production machinery) that he characterises as ‘facilitative’ power. 
In an apparent attempt to avoid referring to structure, Clegg (1989) refers to these circuits 
leading to obligatory passage points (OPPs, see Callon, 1986) which represent reified devices 
that channel and frame the ‘conduct of conduct’ (Dean, 2013).  As such the OPPs “fix the rules 
guiding actors’ actions and constrain available possibilities” (Clegg et al, 2018, p. 753). 
Clegg further explores the relationship between his circuits (and thus by analogy to the 
suggested four-dimensional model).  Firstly, he emphasises that to the extent that power stays 
purely within the episodic circuit, that is within the existing rules of the game, then it 
“automatically reproduces the existing configuration of rules and domination” (Clegg, 1989, 
p. 220). 
Alternatively, changes to power relations can occur through the circuits of social and system 
integration.  Clegg highlights that this may be exogenous (new technologies or sensemaking 
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coming from outside) but may also be endogenous where “changes occur as a result of 
episodic power outcomes achieving either transformations in the rules that fix relations of 
meaning and membership or enhancement in the process of innovation of techniques of 
production and discipline” (Clegg, 1989, p. 224).   As such, episodic, agentic outcomes shape 
systemic power structures as they “serve to either more or less transform or reproduce the 
rules fixing extant relations of meaning and membership in organizational fields; as these are 
reproduced or transformed they fix or refix those obligatory passage points – the channels, 
conduits, circuitry of extant power relations.” (Clegg et al, 2006, p. 241).  However, it is unclear 
what the mechanism is by which instability arises other than through exogenous 
contingencies, with Silva & Fulk (2012, p. 230) arguing that the model “lacks some explanatory 
power when referring to the sources of disturbances in the circuits” and is largely oriented 
towards explaining social and organizational stability 
The logic of circuits of power have been used to analyse an ERP implementation in both 
academia (Silva & Fulk, 2012) and a Portuguese retailer (Oliveira & Clegg, 2015); the dynamics 
of financialisation (Pedraza-Acosta & Mouritsen, 2018; Clegg et al, 2018), struggles over labour 
processes in a shared services centre (Mezihorak, 2018); and in the role of strategic ambiguity 
in a funding body (Davenport & Leitch, 2005).  Yet, although it is nearly 30 years since the idea 
was first published, it is perhaps surprising that it has “hardly ever” been applied to the study 
of multinational companies (Blazejewski & Becker-Ritterspach, 2016, p. 38). 
However, Vaara et al (2005) did explicitly use the construct to examine the impacts of the 
adoption of Swedish as the ‘official language’ following the merger of Swedish and Finnish 
banks.  Yet, this was a somewhat unusual study in that the choice of language was almost 
exogenous, being “something that just ‘happened by accident’” (p. 607) – and indeed only 
lasted two years until English was adopted as the official language following a further merger 
with a Danish Bank.  Consequently, this study’s primary focus was upon investigating the 
“complexity of the power implications” (p. 618) of this one-off change in the ‘rules of the 
game’.  Rather than focusing on the dynamics of power, a ‘circuits of power’ model was used 
to legitimise looking at the effect of the change on three levels of power: episodic power in 
social interaction; power as part of identity/subjectivity construction; and, power as 
hierarchical structures of domination.  As such this provided, at best, only a partial perspective 
of the dynamics of power relations within an MNC (Blazejewski & Becker-Ritterspach, 2016). 
Geppert et al (2015) similarly used elements of the framework to consider games around 
power relations within a European discount retailer.  In particular, highlighting three levels of 
episodic power, rules of the game and domination.  While this emphasised “the importance of 
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investigating the deeper levels of organisational power” (p. 254), this again remained focused 
upon “the three dimensions of power rather than on the dynamic linkages between them” 
(Blazejewski & Becker-Ritterspach, 2016, p. 39) 
Very recently, in the introduction to a special issue of ‘Human Relations’, Clegg et al (2018), 
have proposed the circuits of power as a tool to bring together streams of research on 
politicization and political contests in and around the MNC.  However, the emphasis here is on 
the linkages between internal aspects of the MNC and its external contexts.  This is seen 
particularly in Pedraza-Acosta & Mouritsen’s (2018) contribution to the special issue, where 
they particularly highlight how the dominant ideology of financialisation becomes fixed in 
accounting rules and practices that in turn shaped episodic power. 
Consequently, while the ‘circuits of power’ suggests a way to think about the interactions of 
power within the MNC, there remains a significant gap in understanding the dynamic, and 
potentially two-way, links between episodic and systemic power within the multinational 
corporation.  Echoing Silva & Fulk’s (2012) more general observation of the circuits of power, 
its limited application to the MNC has been surprisingly static, helping understand stability 
rather than dynamics. 
 
4.5.3 Conclusions on Power and the MNC 
This chapter has outlined a summary of the key theories of power seen in the social sciences 
and has reviewed how these have been applied to the study of the MNC.  While our 
understanding of power relations within the MNC have progressed beyond a model that sees 
the MNC as rationalistic and operating through the legitimate authority of HQ, the subject of 
power in the MNC remains relatively under-explored (Geppert et al, 2013).  A number of 
analytically distinct strands have developed that focus on understanding similar phenomena 
which deserve to be better linked. 
Firstly, there is an opportunity to consider the way in which micro-political and discursive 
tactics are combined by actors in attempts to achieve their desired outcomes.  These two 
literatures and approaches need not be mutually exclusive, and there is no reason to expect 
that actors do not use both micro-political and discursive approaches simultaneously within 
the ‘games’ they play within the organisation.  There is a clear opportunity to understand the 
circumstances under which either resource- or meaning-based power is leveraged, or how 
they are used in concert by actors in seeking to achieve desired outcomes. 
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Secondly, despite recognising the geographic and cultural diversity of the MNC, the literature 
on power within the MNC primarily considers institutional diversity as a source of resources 
to be used either by units or individuals.  The specific requirements of the institutional context 
give actors privileged knowledge of the local environment and enable them to use these 
institutional resources as part of a toolkit to use in micro-politics.  However, the systemic 
aspects of geographical, cultural and institutional differences play a less obvious role.  It is 
recognised that individuals will have different perspective or ‘frames’ that result from their 
past and their context, and that these “greatly constrain specific actors when making sense of 
and giving sense to particular actions” (Vaara & Tienari, 2008, p. 987).  Consequently, the 
action of both units and individuals within the MNC are limited by the systemic aspects of 
power – for example in shared understandings of how things are, or should be, done.  Yet, 
while recognising that such differences are inevitable within the MNC given its geographic 
heterogeneity, the literature says little about the episodic processes by which a diversity of 
perspectives and mindsets are brought together, or coordinated into a particular course of 
action.  Consequently, there is scope to better understand how coordination is achieved in 
interdependent organisations, such as the heterarchy.  How do individuals (or units) resolve 
differences and conflict that arises from different systemic assumptions based upon their 
particular context and backgrounds? 
More generally, there remains a lack of understanding on the way that episodic manifestations 
of power (be that micro-political or discursive) contribute to either the break-down of power-
relations or in new structures (or ‘obligatory passage points’) becoming constituted within the 
MNC.  Clegg et al (2018, p. 760) asked “how do how new, and often informal, power 
hierarchies and asymmetrical headquarters-subsidiary relations become politically 
characteristic … within internal MNC networks”.  For Geppert & Dörrenbächer (2014, p. 240) 
this requires “a closer look at the rules themselves and how they are set.  This is related to the 
skills and identities of key actors when legitimizing or resisting the implementation of new 
rules or the change of established rules.”  Rather than taking the structure of the MNC (the 
hierarchy, the HQ and the subsidiaries) as a given, the discursive approaches to power in the 
MNC highlight that these are socially created through interactions between key actors within 
the organisation. 
Taking a power perspective clearly adds richness to the perspective of the MNC outlined in 
Chapters 2 and 3.  This highlights that individual actors may play a key role, and that power is 
much more than an issue of resources.  Above all, it highlights the need to understand both 
the episodic and the systemic and the linkages between them.  As such, it challenges that 
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apparently structural relationships (such as units and hierarchies) and entrenched shared 
meanings (such as legitimate authority) should be questioned and understood as both a basis 
for power and the product of it.  It is not sufficient just to understand the ‘rules of the game’ 
within the MNC, but to understand how those ‘rules’ form and evolve (Geppert & 
Dörrenbächer, 2014). 
 
4.6 Conclusions of the Literature Review and Research Questions 
On the basis of the last three chapters a number of conclusions have been drawn: 
 MNCs are important objects of study given their importance in the global economy, 
their inherent complexity, and as sites of tensions created by operating across 
geography, culture and institutions. 
 The orthodox perspective of the MNC problematises the MNC as a structure of units, 
with particular focus upon the dyad relationship been a ‘home country’ HQ and ‘host 
country’ subsidiaries’, particularly given the differing institutional context within 
which they reside.  This research recognises a number of organisational design 
solutions, including hierarchy, network and heterarchy – but gives little insight into 
how these organisational forms come about.  Furthermore, through its focus upon 
units, the role of individual agency of managers and other individuals within the MNC 
is largely absent. 
 Despite the side-lining of the individual in the study of the MNC, the wider 
organisational studies literature emphasises the important role of individuals in 
creating organisations, their structures and boundaries.  Such thinking has only 
recently been applied to the MNC, mostly through the ‘critical’ literature emphasising 
the role of micro-politics and the role of discourse.  However, to date, both these fields 
have largely restricted research to the context of inter-unit disputes.  Consequently, 
this largely fails to address either how individual agency shapes fundamental 
organisational change, or how day-to-day coordination is achieved between actors.  
 The interdependent heterarchy provides a particular challenge to achieve 
coordination.  Almost by definition, this is an environment where hierarchy is not 
sufficient, and the literature stresses that forms of ‘social control’ will be required.  Yet 
it remains unclear either how individuals work to achieve coordination, or how they 
experience the complex reality that they face within the MNC.  
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Consequently, the first research question is:  
How do actors navigate the organisational structure of the heterarchical MNC, and 
what are the implications for our conceptualisation of the MNC? 
Chapter 4 has shown that the concept of power provides a theoretical lens with which to 
examine relationships between individuals, and how they coordinate to achieve action – this 
is the positive concept of ‘power-to’.  The large literature on power emphasises that power is 
both relational and multi-dimensional, in particular emphasising the links between actors’ 
episodic action and the systemic, structural aspects of power.  Yet there remains considerable 
scope to apply this further to the MNC: 
 Within the context of the multinational, much of the literature has focused upon the 
power of units in the dyadic conflict between HQ and subsidiary, with limited 
attention to the individual.   
 At the level of the individual, actors within the MNC need to reconcile both their 
interdependencies as well as their different ‘frames’ and perspectives in order to 
achieve coordination. 
 Although both of the critical actor-centred approaches have leveraged concepts of 
power, these have largely taken a limited conceptualisation of power: the micro-
political perspective focusing upon actors’ use of institutional resources (‘power of 
resources’) derived from systemic aspects of power; in contrast the discursive 
perspective focusing on the use of language (power of meaning) and its constitutive 
role in shaping power structures.  As such, current perspectives of the individual and 
power in the MNC remain rather blinkered, choosing to focus upon selected 
dimensions of power rather that adopting a multi-faceted, holistic view as suggested 
in the wider literature.   
 Although the wider power literature suggests the importance of understanding the 
dynamic relationship between the different aspects of power, such a perspective has 
hardly been applied to the MNC – even where concepts such as Clegg’s (1989) circuits 
of power have been used, these have been applied in a rather static fashion. 
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Consequently, this leads to the second research question:   
How should we theorise the dynamic power relations that affect the coordination of 
individuals in the heterarchical MNC? 
These questions are addressed in the empirical findings in Chapters 6-8 and then brought 
together in Chapter 9. 
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5. Approach to Research: Philosophy and Methodology 
This chapter sets out my research approach and how I came to undertake a case study of 
GlobeCo in order to better understand the heterarchical multinational.  Firstly, I review 
aspects to do with me as a researcher: my motivation for undertaking this PhD, my developing 
philosophical position and how these impact upon my research.  I then review the 
methodology and methods followed, explaining the choice and implications of the use of a 
single case study, discuss issues confronted during the research, and outline the approach to 
the data collection and analysis based upon the ‘Gioia’ approach (Gioia et al, 2013).   
 
5.1 Orientations as a Researcher 
I have come to believe that you cannot separate the researcher from their research.  Every 
researcher brings their own history, culture and personality to their research.  These shape 
the researcher’s taken-for-granted assumptions, influence the way that the researcher thinks 
and the decisions that they make during the research and analysis. 
Consequently, as part of this PhD it is necessary to reflect how I, as the researcher, may impact 
upon the research and how the research in turn has impacted upon my own assumptions and 
understanding. 
 
5.1.1 My Motivation 
During my PhD I have frequently reflected upon what is the motivation that caused me to start 
off on this journey, and then to battle through the ensuing periods of private conflict and 
doubt.  Personally, I identified three inter-related factors. 
Firstly, I think I have always had an academic orientation.  In many ways I felt I hit a peak level 
of performance during my final year of my first degree and never felt that I was quite as good 
in the ‘real world’.  Due to circumstances – one of Clegg’s (2004) ‘small acts of randomness’ – 
I ended up not pursuing a PhD 30 years ago.  During my working career I was frequently pulled 
in a more theoretical or academic direction.  Consequently, obtaining a PhD is a rather delayed 
completion of a natural trajectory. 
Secondly, having worked for twenty-seven years in a multinational company, and having had 
the opportunity to take voluntary redundancy, I wanted to do something different.  I needed 
a change from the ‘rat race’ of managerial life. I thought I would enjoy the academic 
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experience, a view which was confirmed by my year studying for a MRes.  In short, I embarked 
on a PhD to enjoy the process and have fun. 
Thirdly, a likely future career for me was in teaching/academia.  This would be a valuable way 
to spend my last working years – giving back to the next generation some of my experience 
and learnings from working in multinational company.  As such, pursuing a PhD was a means 
to the end. 
However, I found that while progressing on the PhD journey it became increasingly clear to 
me that I was also using the process to understand what I went through in my working career.  
With my background in Economics, I had struggled to understand why decisions were not 
necessarily rational, why profit/value was not maximised, and why people rarely behave as 
‘homo economicus’ (Pareto, 1906/2014).  This PhD has increasingly become a cathartic process 
of sensemaking about the world that I used to inhabit.   
 
5.1.2 My Philosophical Journey 
It is appropriate at this point to address my personal research philosophy and the interaction 
of this with my research.  The words ‘interaction’ and ‘journey’ are important, because during 
my research programme I have found my philosophical position shifting radically. 
Journey from Positivism to Social Constructionism 
My background is in economics, with a quantitative focus.  During my first degree issues of 
philosophy were never discussed.  I lacked the tools and understanding to do other than 
accept and embrace the realist ontology and positivist epistemology that dominated the 
discipline of economics. 
The dominance of a positivist approach was largely reinforced by my subsequent working 
experience, where as a finance and strategy professional I sought to optimise the performance 
of the firm.  My work was largely quantitative.  Qualitative arguments would be used, but to 
establish the ‘truth’ and to identify the ‘right’ decisions for the company. 
It was only early in my time at Lancaster, while undertaking an MRes, that I was exposed to 
the breadth of philosophical views.  I increasingly found myself questioning the fundamental 
assumptions about the nature of truth, and the assumption of there being a discrete set of 
laws underlying social relations.  Yet, with hindsight, I see that elements of this uneasiness had 
existed throughout my life.  I had realised the inadequacy of simplistic laws of social action 
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when studying Economic History.  I became increasingly frustrated by quantitative models that 
used potentially spurious proxy variables to show statistical significance but with low 
explanatory power.  As a researcher, should I not be primarily interested in the unexplained 
(see Clegg, 2009)?  As I started to manage groups of people, I became painfully aware that 
they lacked the sort of rationality assumed by economic theory. 
At the time, I could justify these experiences as being a result of the world’s complexity, that 
if the models were extended to include the right variables then the theory would work.  
However, as I took that first course in research philosophy, I started to question whether the 
more fundamental question as to whether ‘social-reality’ (Berger & Luckmann, 1967) can be 
considered in the same way as physical reality.  Could it be that understanding may be best 
found in accepting the richness of life rather than through simplifying assumptions? 
Reading two papers were key in this philosophical journey.  In one, Viner (1999) highlights how 
the concept of ‘stress’ was adopted as an explanation for a set of physiological symptoms in 
rats and then developed from the 1930s onwards to be accepted as a condition and experience 
of people.  In the second, Knights & Morgan (1991) highlight the discursive production of the 
concept of, and need for, ‘strategy’.  The importance of these articles was that they highlighted 
to me how key phenomena, which are widely accepted as taken-for-granted ‘truths’, were 
socially constructed without the inevitability of their construction.   
However, it is only a small extension from this insight to see that different individuals may 
interpret what is apparently the same phenomenon in different ways – that is that it is very 
difficult to talk about an objective ‘truth’, what we see are individuals’ personal, temporally 
situated understandings. 
I have no doubt that this philosophical journey is continuing, and that awareness makes it 
difficult for me to assign static labels to an unfolding understanding.  However, broadly I 
classify my research today as being informed by a relativist ontology – that is the “view that 
phenomena depend on the perspective from which we observe them” (Easterby-Smith et al, 
2012, p. 344) alongside a social constructionist epistemology (Berger & Luckmann, 1967) that 
recognises that that ‘knowledge’ that we call ‘truth’ is not objective but constructed by people 
in the context of their culture and interaction (at least in social matters).  As Holstein & 
Gubrium (2008, p. 3) summarised: “the leading idea always has been that the world we live in 
and our place in it are not simply and evidently ‘there’ for participants.  Rather, participants 
actively construct the world of everyday life and its constituent elements.”  
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My Understanding of ‘Social Constructionism’ 
Social Constructionism has emerged over the last fifty years as a set of ideas that challenge 
the positivist and post-positivist paradigms largely continue to dominate both the natural and 
social sciences (Duberley et al, 2012).   True to its own principles, the term does not refer to a 
single viewpoint of the world, and social constructionist ideas and approaches may be 
identified in a variety of epistemologies, albeit with a number of commonalities (Burr, 2015). 
At its core, social constructionism focuses upon a view that the world as we understand it is 
constructed through social processes and discourse, and such understanding is therefore not 
predetermined (Berger & Luckmann, 1967).  This challenges ‘subject/object dualism’, the 
separation of what is ‘out there’ and that which is ‘in here’ as perceived by the mind (Deetz, 
2009).  In turn, this has key implications for the researcher who can never be fully independent 
of that which they are studying.   
A particular emphasis is given in social constructionism to the culturally specific use of 
language and discourse.  Ideas (concepts, theories and/or ‘facts’) have a shared meaning as 
part of discourse between people in a social context (Wittgenstein, 1955/58), and through 
discourse certain descriptions become valid while others are rejected (Liebrucks, 2001).  
Consequently, both researchers and subjects are limited by the “hand-me-down vocabulary” 
(Gergen, 1999, p. 19) of language and ideas that are available within our culture. 
Social constructionism takes a critical stance towards these taken-for-granted ways of 
understanding ourselves and the world (Burr, 2015), with Barbara Czarniawska (2003, p. 147), 
claiming “the vocation of social constructionism is … to reveal how the taken-for-granted 
becomes taken for granted”.  Yet, this is not just about saying ‘X need not have existed.  Rather, 
what is revealing is to understand why “in the present state of affairs, X is taken for granted, 
X appears to be inevitable” (Hacking, 1999, p. 12). 
It has been empowering to recognise that much of what I had taken-for-granted need not 
inevitably be – be that the need for organisational strategy or the pursuit of the largely 
‘American’ variety of capitalism (Hall & Soskice, 2001).  This has allowed me to ask questions 
as to why and how assumptions become ‘taken-for-granted’ and how then influence the day-
to-day life of the individuals in the multinational company.  In particular, how do certain 
objectives, goals or strategies become taken-for-granted such that they become deeply rooted 
within the everyday assumptions of those working within the organisation?  
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The Research Implications of My Emerging Philosophical Position 
This philosophical journey has had significant implications for my approach to research, which 
has co-developed with my evolving philosophy during the last four years. 
Firstly, in recognising that there will always be multiple perceptions, understanding is 
language-bound, and research findings are interpretations developed within the constraints 
of culture and perspective, I have come to see that it will never be possible to determine a 
unique ‘truth’.  At least in the social world the (interesting) research questions are not 
hypotheses to be proven, but areas where understanding can be developed. 
Secondly, as researcher, my role becomes one of understanding and interpreting the different 
accounts and explanations people give of their experiences and the processes by which their 
perspectives of reality emerge.  Yet, at the same time I must accept that I observe from a 
particular perspective and cannot divorce my interpretation of phenomena from the ‘baggage’ 
of my prior experiences and knowledge. 
This highlights the importance of self-reflexivity on the part of me, the researcher.  This 
requires introspection, continually self-challenging the assumptions, approach and content of 
the sensemaking process.  Cunliffe (2011) challenges the researcher to question our 
assumptions; question how we make sense of others’ experiences, and whether voices or 
conclusions are being excluded.  Such reflexivity is not something to build in as a step in a 
research work plan, rather it is in a mind-set that continually questions what is being done. 
There is inevitably criticism that if ideas are socially created, and can never perfectly reflect an 
external reality, then there is no basis upon which to argue the value of your research (as it 
can never be ‘right’).  Yet Guba & Lincoln (2006) provide a way forward in highlighting the 
criteria of trustworthiness and authenticity.  Williams & Morrow (2009, p. 577) have suggested 
that the former of these criteria embraces the need for “integrity of the data, balance between 
reflexivity and subjectivity, and clear communication of findings”.  The authenticity criterium 
requires “reassurance that both the conduct and evaluation of research are genuine and 
credible not only in terms of participants' lived experiences but also with respect to the wider 
political and social implications of research” (James, 2008).   
 
5.2 Reflection on the Craft of Research 
The description of the underlying methodology of my thesis that follows may seem to describe 
a rigorous, linear process in which a research question was identified, a plan to tackle this was 
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formulated, data was collected, and then was analysed in a systematic manner.  However, 
while this reflects the customary (and perhaps institutionally necessary) way to present a 
research process this does not reflect on the messy and iterative nature of research.  This 
perspective echoes that which was found by Delamont & Atkinson (2001, p. 88) in their study 
of science students who “learn to write professional accounts of their investigations which 
omit the uncertainties, contingencies and personal craft skills.” 
This is particularly seen in the analysis stage of my PhD.  Although the ‘Gioia’ type analysis 
diagrams (Gioia et al, 2013) that follow usefully summarise and structure findings, it should 
not be taken to mean that analysis followed a linear process from first order concepts, through 
second order themes to aggregate dimensions.  While this occurred at times, themes or 
aggregate dimensions might also be suggested from the literature, which encouraged 
investigation of the concepts that could underlie them.  Few if any concepts were stable, as 
they were played with in text and discussion, with experimentation of different linkages 
between the evolving concepts, themes and dimensions. 
Consequently, the process by which the key concepts within this thesis were identified and 
developed was far from mechanical.  Rather, it fits more closely with the concept of ‘craft’ in 
research (Bell & Willmott, 2016; Cunliffe, 2011) which embraces not just skills but ideas of 
virtue, artfulness and the importance of tacit knowledge.  This emphasises the importance of 
the practice of research, considering both its meanings.  There are (good) practices which 
professionalism dictate should be followed.  But it is only possible to become a researcher by 
practicing research – that is by trial and error, sketching analyses and seeing where they lead, 
rejecting concepts that are not working and trialling different ways of communicating your 
thinking.  This echoes Cunliffe’s (2011, p. 67) suggestion that “beauty and rigor lie in crafting 
our research carefully and persuasively, being open and responsive to the possibilities of 
experience, people, ideas, materials and processes.” 
As much as the research process does not follow a fully predefined flow, thoughts and ideas 
emerge unexpectedly throughout the research journey.  Progress and innovation came when 
reading, attending conferences and in discussion with supervisors and others.  But a PhD is all-
embracing and frequently progress was made while not ‘working’.  Living in the English Lake 
District, walking in the fells often proved to be the best way to clear my mind, resolve issues 
and to both discover and play with ideas (see also Alley 1996). 
However, this evolutionary view of ideas implies research is never finished.  There are always 
changes which could be made, or analyses which could be done in a different way.  Yet, as 
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with the artist painting, it is necessary in crafting research to say ‘enough is enough’.  But this 
does not mean that this is the end of the research – for following the PhD I hope many of the 
ideas here will continue to be refined through conferences and peer review in the preparation 
of papers and journal articles.  As such, this PhD thesis is not an end, but rather a snapshot of 
my thinking at a particular moment in my ongoing research journey. 
 
5.3 Methodology and Approach 
This section outlines the selection of research methodology, and highlights the methods used 
in this study.  It starts with an overview of the selection of the broad research strategy, then 
focuses upon the issues arising from the selection of case study research.  The processes and 
challenges of data collection and analysis are then examined. 
 
5.3.1 Research Requirements 
Although my final research questions developed over a long period, it was clear from a 
relatively early stage in my PhD that I was investigating aspects of how power was understood 
and used by managers in the contemporary multinational.  As such my research was not 
setting out to prove (or disprove) hypotheses and was essentially ‘qualitative’ in nature.  It was 
to explore a phenomenon (power relations in a heterarchical multinational) that has not been 
examined in considerable theoretical or empirical depth.  In the absence of an a priori model 
the research needed to be largely inductive – building theoretical insights that are grounded 
in the data of observations and participants own understanding.  Such open-endedness is 
characteristic of what Edmondson & McManus (2007) call ‘nascent theory’ development and 
requires a research approach that provides a richness of data allowing researchers to identify 
and investigate relationships grounded in the data (Glaser & Strauss, 1968).  In this “we try to 
learn what occurs in the research settings we join and what our research participants' lives are 
like.  We study how they explain their statements and actions, and ask what analytic sense we 
can make of them.” Charmaz’s (2006, pp. 2-3) 
More specifically, the aim of the researching power relations at the personal level presented 
three challenges.  Firstly, to learn how managers experience and make sense of power requires 
the collection of rich data in a context where respondents have sufficient time and space to 
be able to reflect on their feelings, experiences and understandings.  
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Secondly, the focus of power, as the key phenomenon under investigation, presents specific 
challenges.  It is both difficult to define and is essentially non-observable.  As a concept it may 
have pejorative interpretation, as something which is negative or somehow inappropriate 
within an organisation.  Furthermore, the literature highlights the role of ‘deeper structures’ 
in the circuits of power (Clegg, 1989) as well as the potential importance of meaning and 
‘taken-for-granted’ assumptions in shaping power relations.  As it is likely to be difficult or 
impossible for respondents to explicitly verbalise these, it is insufficient to obtain data that 
embraces only respondents’ understanding of power.  The study needed to understand the 
wider meanings, interactions and relationships to identify the effects of power (as broadly 
defined).   Yet with “methodological literature on researching the political MNC is still in its 
infancy” (Piekkari & Tietze, 2016, p. 211) there is little guidance on how best to research such 
topics. 
Thirdly, the focus of the research is not just upon the statics of power relations, but those 
dynamics that reflect “the temporal flow of much of organizational life” (Langley et al, 2013, 
p. 4) and how changes between one temporary structure of power relations and another 
occur.  Consequently, this requires data around events that help to illustrate and understand 
the processual nature of the enactment of power, the interactions between events and the 
outcomes that result.  Again, qualitative research is particularly appropriate for investigating 
such dynamic processes given “its sensitivity to organizational context and its potential for 
focusing upon activity sequences as they unfold” (Maitlis, 2005, p. 24).      
 
5.3.2 Case Study Research 
In the light of the research questions, the requirements for a combination of in-depth data 
about managers, and the specific nature of power as a theoretical lens, it was decided to select 
a qualitative case study approach.  This is “an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context” (Yin, 2009, p. 18), and is an approach 
that is particularly useful for “learning about a little known or poorly understood situation” 
(Leedy & Ormrod, 2010, p. 137), as well as investigating longitudinal dynamic and process 
issues (Ghauri, 2004).   
For this research, the case method brings key advantages.  Firstly, it provides the opportunity 
to understand the managers’ experiences in the ‘real’ world.  Case studies have been shown 
to be a particularly useful approach for providing such context-dependent knowledge 
(Flyvberg, 2006).  Secondly, a case study allows the collection and presentation of rich detail 
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and multiple perspectives.  Thirdly, it allows key themes to emerge, rather than being 
predetermined as required in surveys or structured interviews – an inductive approach 
required given the limited prior literature of the phenomenon.  Finally, by building ‘stories’ of 
power, the ‘big picture’ can be retained.   
Given these factors, it is not surprising that case study method dominates much of the work 
on power in organisations – and indeed Stewart Clegg (2009, p. 157) comments 
unambiguously that “researching power and politics in organizations is best done through case 
study.  Only case study can provide the fine-grained contextual detail necessary to being to 
appreciate the finer points of theoretical arguments”. 
Selection of Case or Cases 
The first key decision was whether the research would focus upon a single case, or multiple 
cases.   
Some authors strongly argue for examining multiple cases.  For example, Yin (2009) advocates 
their role in literal replication (trying to get the same ‘experimental’ result) or theoretical 
replication (seeing the impact of a change in a key parameter), while Eisenhardt (1989) focuses 
on comparative case studies.  However, such authors come from a primarily positivist 
philosophical perspective, where the multiple cases are being largely used to replicate the 
logic of ‘large-N’ studies (Tsoukas, 2009).  
Yet there is a strong tradition in organisational research of undertaking case studies of single 
organisations – consider for example the work of Pettigrew (1985) on ICI, Kristensen & Zeitlin’s 
(2005) study of APV, or Balogun et al’s studies of ‘Brand Co’ (2011, 2019; Jarzabkowsi & 
Balogun, 2009). 
Indeed, Yin (2009, p. 51) recognises the benefit of the single case where this is “critical, 
unusual, common, revelatory or longitudinal”.  In this instance, I was aware that the way that 
power ‘worked’ in some multinationals seemed to differ from the picture painted by much of 
the extant literature.  As such, studying a single organisation could be revelatory.  
Furthermore, in this study there is no intention to generate some sort of representative 
sample.  Rather the aim is to explore, compare and contrast similar phenomena in a single 
setting, with Lervik (2011) arguing that focus on a single multinational can increase both 
contextual sensitivity and the precision of interpretations.  Furthermore, by keeping the 
research within one organisation, (corporate) cultural issues and many of the individual 
participants are common to the different stories (or cases) removing unnecessary variation. 
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Selection of Case Organisation 
Having concluded that a case study of a single organisation was appropriate, this still requires 
the selection of which organisation will be the focus of research.  For this study this needed to 
be a multinational company that showed characteristics of the heterarchy.  Furthermore, my 
primary interest was in was with the traditional “well-established multinational” (Zander & 
Matthews, 2010, p. 36) that motivated Hedlund, and remains the focus of much of the 
academic debate on MNCs presented in Chapter 2. 
For me, the selection of GlobeCo was a relatively straight-forward choice for theoretical, 
pragmatic and personal reasons.  GlobeCo is a long-established multinational that has been 
through the journey from a polycentric organisation of loosely connected and quasi-
independent subsidiaries to a heterarchical organisation with a complex matrix of 
interdependent units, teams and functions.  As such, it provided an excellent example of a 
heterarchical MNC.  Furthermore, in returning to academia and interacting with the literature 
on the MNC it became clear that my experiences of the ways in which decisions were made 
and implemented within GlobeCo seemed to challenge the dominant perspective.  As such 
GlobeCo provided a ‘revelatory’ case that offered high potential for developing new insights 
into an understudied phenomenon (Yin, 2009). 
Secondly, there was a pragmatic advantage in selecting GlobeCo as the focal organisation.  
Access was made easier, for having previously worked at the company I had many established 
contacts I could reach out to.  At the same time, my prior history within the organisation 
provided a ‘the stamp of legitimacy’ (Marschan-Piekkari et al, 2004) that seemed to contribute 
to respondents’ willingness to participate.   
Thirdly, I cannot deny that there was a personal interest in trying to better understand the 
organisation for which I spent many years working.  As Dennis Gioia wrote that “no 
organization is more salient or more important to me than my own organization” (Gioia, 2004, 
p. 102).   
However, this did not mean that access was straight-forward.  Initial contacts with senior 
management suggested that nobody felt in a position where they had authority to grant access 
to a researcher for a study that covered so many different parts of the organisation – this was 
an early sign of the issues of ambiguity and the inadequacy of hierarchy in a heterarchy.  
Consequently, I decided to proceed on a snow-ball basis, talking to individual managers 
without seeking formal organisational approval which – so it seemed – no one individual was 
able to grant.  This approach also gave the benefit of removing the possibility of pressure from 
Power and Coordination in the Multinational Company  Page | 91 
 
sponsoring executives to shape research conclusions – a risk that has been reported in other 
studies of power (Piekkari & Tietze, 2016). 
Case Organisation and the Lack of Detachment 
In selecting GlobeCo as research subject, it is necessary to address the potential criticism that 
I am an insider, having had significant involvement in some of the areas that are subject of 
investigation.  While such involvement would be unacceptable within the scientific method, 
where it is critical that the researcher remains detached, it is widely accepted in qualitative 
research (Easterby-Smith et al, 2012). 
However, it is clear that such a situation requires careful handling.  Buchanan & Bryman (2007, 
p. 487) have warned that “personal experience sits at the bottom of the hierarchy of evidence, 
to be treated with caution if not discarded”.  Furthermore, it has been argued that researchers 
should be ‘professional strangers’ (Agar, 1996), yet I was familiar with many of the issues, 
people, practices and processes I was investigating.  This creates a danger of missing the 
outsider (‘etic’) perspective that might be crucial in identifying both what is unusual and what 
is taken-for-granted (Tietze, 2012).  To an extent, such challenges are not unique to this sort 
of study – no researcher is completely free of personal history and biases, nor can they avoid 
entanglement in power and political issues (Piekkari & Tietze, 2016).  However, working within 
an organisation you know requires particular care, with Tietze (2012, p. 56) emphasising that 
this is a precarious balancing act where it becomes necessary “to find the means to render 
strange what is established as ‘normal’, that will find mechanisms that will distance 
themselves from what they already know.”   
There is no single way to resolve this.  However, this emphasises the need to be focused upon 
the data, to ensure a polyphony of respondent voices, to listen carefully to outsiders who read 
and discuss my work and to continue to be analytically reflexive.  But these are the challenges 
for any qualitative researcher.  Ultimately, it must be to the reader to judge whether I have 
been successful in this. 
Historic or ‘Live’ Case 
The third key choice I faced was of the type of incidents or cases that are studied within the 
focus organisation.  Should these be historic – that is, which are essentially completed and are 
considered in retrospect – or ‘live’, studying them as they evolve? 
Power and Coordination in the Multinational Company  Page | 92 
 
A number of authors strongly recommend the benefit of following a ‘live’ case (including Clegg, 
2009).  Apart from avoiding issues around imperfect recollection, this clearly adds additional 
possibilities for gathering data in an ethnographic manner – for example through observation, 
participation or the use of participant diaries.  Such real-time study could be crucial where 
aspects of power may be revealed at a fine ‘micro-level’ of the detailed interaction between 
individuals (Pache & Santos, 2010) – with Langley (1999) stressing that a relevant ‘event’ can 
be in as apparently trivial action as a hand-shake.    
Yet, despite recognising the potential benefits of following a real-time case, eventually I 
decided to focus upon retrospective events within GlobeCo – an approach adopted in the 
majority of case studies (Ghauri, 2004).  For me, this was primarily driven by very real practical 
issues. 
Firstly, the total elapsed time that I could devote to fieldwork was limited, due to the 
requirements of my PhD.  Even if an appropriate live case could be identified, there was no 
certainty that it would be completed within my necessary time horizon.  This could leave me 
analysing an incomplete case or, worse, not completing my PhD.  By focusing upon historic 
events, I could ensure that these were fully played through. 
Secondly, there was no guarantee that a live case within GlobeCo would necessary provide 
appropriate data to address my research questions.  By studying cases historically, it became 
possible to review multiple incidents and identify which of these were likely to be particularly 
revealing and focus upon these for further fieldwork and analysis. 
Thirdly, it was clear from early discussions that access could be a key issue for following a 
project live.  This reflected concerns of the sensitive/confidential nature of the projects as well 
as worries about the presence of a researcher being a distraction. 
Yet the selection of retrospective case had some advantages over and above the efficiency for 
the researcher (Leonard-Barton, 1990).  I was interested in studying the full life-cycle of 
incidents, from the conception of the original ideas, but this is difficult with real-time 
ethnographic study, where researchers can often only identify a project that is well underway 
with focus upon the latter implementation phases (e.g. Balogun et al, 2019).  As will be seen 
in Chapter 8 retrospective data collection allowed an understanding of the evolving power 
relations from the very first contemplation of an idea, through to final implementation with 
the benefit of sufficient hindsight to understand the significance of key events. 
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Nested Cases 
It quickly became apparent that within GlobeCo there were multiple stories illustrating power 
in action that gave insight into how individuals navigate the organisational structures and 
achieve coordinated outcomes.  While each of these could be individually regarded as a ‘case’, 
at the same time, many of these stories could be grouped together as part of a broader story 
of a wider organisational change.  This is illustrated in Figure 5.1. 
This is in effect a ‘nested’ case study (Buchanan, 2012) where there are cases within cases.  
This approach has been adopted elsewhere within studies of MNCs including Pettigrew’s 
(1985) study of ICI which investigates different divisions and their interactions within the wider 
organisation, and Kristensen & Zeitlin’s (2005) ‘Local Players in Global Games’ which studies 
different subsidiaries and their relationships with headquarters. 
 
5.3.3 Data Collection 
Marshall & Rossman (2011) emphasise that there are four main methods of data gathering in 
qualitative research: participation, observation, interviews and analysing documents and 
‘material culture’.  Two of these methods are not available for the researcher who has chosen 
to focus upon retrospective cases.  Consequently, my research primarily relied upon 
interviews, supplemented by analysis of documents and other materials. 
Interview Research 
Interviews provided the most important source of data for the study.  At one level interviews 
are a way of collecting a description of events and action (‘X did this’, ‘we undertook a study 
of Y’).  As such, they represent a form of observation of the events that happened.  Yet, 
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interviews also provide the opportunity to investigate at a much deeper level.  Firstly, 
interviews allow respondents to talk about their own feelings associated with the events 
(Langley, 2009) and can provide a perspective of that which is unseen: “the only thing I get 
stressed about is…”, “what would irritate me was…”.   As such “through interviewing we can 
learn about places we have not been and could not go and about settings in which we have 
not lived” (Weiss, 1994, p. 1).  Secondly, it is almost unavoidable that respondents seek to use 
the opportunity to explain and evaluate (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995) – with comments like 
“generally, we do a pretty good job” or “we made it far too complicated”.  By giving 
respondents space within the interview they can reflect upon their experiences to provide 
their unique perspective and understanding.  It is this richness that led Arvind Parkhe (2004) 
to say, “there is no data source as rewarding as interviews, in order to tap into the brain of the 
person(s) within each organisation under study who are most directly responsible for the 
phenomenon being researched.” 
However, interview data is not without challenge.  Firstly, Kvale (2008, p. 143) has questioned 
whether knowledge produced in is interviews useful arguing that “interview knowledge is not 
collected, but produced between interviewer and interviewee, and the meanings constructed 
in the interaction are again restructured throughout the later stages of an interview inquiry”.  
As such, interviewing can be characterised as relying upon human judgement and generating 
subjective rather than objective knowledge.  But this critique reflects a largely positivist 
philosophy that requires that research methods should seek objectivity, reliability and 
generalisability (Brinkmann, 2013).  In rejecting the search for a single, absolute ‘truth’, such 
requirements can also be rejected.  Rather the researcher – including in his/her role as 
interviewer – accepts that there is a co-creation of meaning with respondents, probing them 
to reflect and consider upon their experiences and helping them interpret these. 
Secondly, there are practical criticisms around the reliability of interview data.  Either due to 
issues with respondent’s memory of events or because people are likely to answer questions 
based on their own interests (Brinkmann, 2013).  These concerns may be unavoidable so, as 
researcher, I feel that the key is to be aware of the possibility, and to take account of it in 
analysis.  Yet, while responses may change with time, it is not obvious why one instance of 
these (immediate response) should be privileged over others (after further thought and 
reflection).   
In terms of attitudes, feelings and understanding there can be no alternative but to rely on the 
respondent’s interpretation.  However, in looking to understands events and actions there can 
be corroboration, or alternative perspectives from other sources.  The purpose here is not 
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really triangulation, as much as to explore what Buchanan (2012, p. 364) calls “the polyphonic, 
polysemic nature of organizations; many voices, many meanings”.    Such multiple perspectives 
may also help to identify cases where a respondent looks to impress or exaggerate their role.  
However, my own experience, was that participants were largely humble about their own 
contributions and limitations while emphasising the achievements of others in the teams 
where they worked. 
Thirdly, there are criticisms around the way that interviews are used – for example that quotes 
are used out of context; interpretations may be disconnected from the specifics of the text; or 
that the context of the interview may not be apparent (including what Potter & Hepburn, 
2005, call ‘the deletion of the interviewer’).  Yet, these are essentially issues around the 
analysis approach and the write-up of the research.  In part this relies upon my personal 
integrity and ethics as a researcher.  However, particularly with the space afforded by the PhD, 
the richness of data provided should help to dispel many concerns.  At times, I have 
deliberately used longer quotes and vignettes to provide context and ensure that the data 
‘speaks for itself’. 
Approach to Interviews 
Throughout the research, to access rich data interviews were semi-structured.  An interview 
guide was developed that provided open-ended questions for the respondent.  This started 
with questions about the respondent’s history and their current role/position and 
responsibilities, and questions around the organisational units or teams they felt they 
belonged to and had relationships with.  The second phase of the interview focused upon 
specific projects or initiatives, asking the respondents to describe how these developed, to 
identify critical moments or turning points, to consider how they and others were able to 
influence outcomes, and to talk about resistance and challenge to the initiative. 
Early interviews were run as a ‘pilot’.  The aim of these was both to cement access into 
GlobeCo and to identify potential cases for the main stage of the analysis.  However, this also 
provided very useful data that helped to identify key concepts and issues (for example the 
issue of ‘alignment’ arose as a concept at a very early stage).  During this ‘pilot’ stage, 
respondents were asked to think in advance of the interview of initiatives that they wished to 
talk about.   
Recruitment for this initial stage was combined elements of convenience sampling and 
‘purposeful’ sampling (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), in that all the respondents were previously 
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known to me, but they also represented a variety of roles with different functional, 
hierarchical and national perspectives. 
These initial interviews confirmed that the interview protocol was producing rich data that 
was addressing issues of relevance to the research questions.  It also became clear that two 
related areas of organisational change highlighted by respondents were potentially 
particularly revealing  Both the formation of Global Business Services and the outsourcing of 
Facility Management in Europe were new initiatives within GlobeCo (requiring ideas to be 
generated and socialised); they resulted in the creation of new units that took over 
responsibilities from many existing parts of the organisation; and they involved multi-
functional teams that themselves reported into different directions.  In short, these provided 
fascinating contexts within which to investigate the evolution of power relations. 
Subsequently, the remaining interviews broadly followed the same interview protocol, but 
with the ‘initiative’ questions focused upon the two major cases.  Respondents were asked to 
reflect upon the case and their participation, explain their perception of issues such as where 
the change originated from, how was it agreed (or not), and how the change initiative was 
modified or resisted.   This aimed is to build the overall ‘story’ of the cases, as well as 
identifying specific ‘critical incidents’ (Flanagan, 1954; Easterby-Smith et al, 2012) while also 
giving insight into the respondents’ perceptions on power.  Flexibility was retained throughout 
the process, with the interview questions evolving as respondents lead into new areas of 
investigation. 
Respondents for this second stage were selected based upon their apparent involvement in 
or experience with these projects, with a specific aim of hearing perspectives from multiple 
levels of seniority (Macdonald & Hellgren, 2004) and different organisational perspectives 
within GlobeCo.  Respondents were asked for suggestions of who would be able to provide 
useful perspectives on the initiatives.  In a limited number of cases respondents were 
interviewed a second time, with greater focus on specific issues, to fill gaps identified in 
previous interviews. 
All interviews were recorded with the permission of the respondents, allowing concentration 
on the interview, rather than upon note taking (Birks & Mills, 2011).  Interviews were 
transcribed verbatim as quickly after the interview as possible.  Notes of my immediate 
impressions and thoughts after interviews were recorded in my research diary. 
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Interview Data Collection 
In total, 33 interviews were held with 29 different respondents (23 male, six female), with four 
respondents interviewed twice.  All respondents were current or former employees of 
GlobeCo – except for one interview with a key consultant who worked closely with GlobeCo, 
and one interview with a lead member of the FM outsourcing partner.  Respondents had an 
average of 18 years’ experience in, or with, GlobeCo and together had experience of working 
in another 30 multinational companies.  They were from 10 nationalities, and between them 
had worked in GlobeCo in 25 countries.  All respondents were either native English speakers 
or were fluent in English as their primary working language.  The respondents were broadly 
split across management seniority levels ranging from extremely junior manager (at the time 
of the case) up to ‘C-suite’ (i.e. Chief X Officer).  Interviews had a mean length of 70 minutes 
(range 41-150 minutes).   
Initial interviews were held face-to-face, either at GlobeCo offices or neutral locations (both 
in the UK and in Continental Europe).  However, increasingly it became clear that a 
requirement to meet in person would constrain who could be interviewed.  After 
experimentation with the technology, most of the later interviews were conducted by video-
conferencing (Skype or Facetime).  This enabled respondents to be easily interviewed from 7 
countries outside the UK (as far afield as Russia and the US), and from 10 different locations 
within the UK.  This was not a deliberate decision made in advance but was a pragmatic 
response to scheduling and geography.  
The Use of Video Conference Technology for Interviews 
As a relatively new technology, the opportunity to use video via Skype or other voice-over-
internet-protocol (VoiP) services for interviewing has only emerged in the last few years as an 
alternative, or supplement, to face-to-face interviewing as the ‘gold standard’ (McCoyde & 
Kerson, 2006).  A small literature has on VoiP interviewing has subsequently developed.  These 
highlight advantages in terms of logistics, cost and flexibility (Deaking & Wakefield, 2014, Cater 
2011).  However, concerns are raised around problems with technology, such as poor quality 
and loss of connection (Sedgwick & Spiers, 2009), as well as worry that there could be a loss 
of richness in the interview due to the nature of the interaction and loss of cultural routines 
(Rowley, 2012; Seitz, 2016) and a lack of visual cues (Hay-Gibson, 2009).   
Overall, I found that the use of Skype aided recruitment. It meant that interviews could be 
scheduled at the respondent’s convenience, and there was no pressure (or constraint) from 
hosting an interviewer.   While I did experience late cancellations (Deaking & Wakefield, 2014), 
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this also happened with face-to-face interviews, and the cost and inconvenience of such a 
postponement of a Skype interview is much lower to the interviewer.   
I experienced no technical issues.  All respondents were familiar with the technology.  While 
it was never necessary, I also felt that the Skype technology makes it easier for a respondent 
to stop an interview, if uncomfortable, which can be done with the press of a button. 
Furthermore, despite the concerns raised in the literature I found no difference in the ability 
to build relationships in Skype interviews versus those held physically face-to-face.  This may 
have been helped that respondents were used to relying upon using video-conferencing as 
part of their international jobs.  Furthermore, it also helped that I knew some (but not all) of 
the respondents personally prior to speaking on Skype.  However, my overall impression 
matches that of Segwick & Spiers (2009, p. 6) who saw videoconferencing as offering “a rich 
medium where multiple nonverbal and verbal cues, the use of natural language, and 
immediate feedback allowed the participants to express personal feelings and emotions”.   
Above all else, Skype allowed me to access a wider variety of respondents than would 
otherwise have been possible, and in doing so enriched the study. 
Documents and Other Artefacts 
Interview data was supplemented by documents and similar material.  Around 60 publicly-
available documents, presentations and videos were particularly useful.  These included: 
 A videoed interview with a former Chief HR Officer of GlobeCo, that addressed key 
issues covered in the study.  This was transcribed verbatim and treated for analysis 
purposes as a primary source, along with my interviews. 
 Presentations by GlobeCo executives to conferences and investors focusing on the key 
projects.  This included PowerPoint presentations with transcribed text.   
 An article in a leading management journal, written by the former head of GlobeCo 
Business Services, along with academic journal articles focusing upon GlobeCo.11 
 Material from the trade press, plus press releases by GlobeCo and major suppliers. 
 GlobeCo annual reports, speeches to the GlobeCo AGM and similar data. 
Additionally, through respondents, I was able to access around 40 GlobeCo internal 
documents that were relevant to the creation of GBS and the Facilities Management project 
                                                          
11 These are not referenced to maintain anonymity. 
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in Europe.  This included briefing presentations, outlines of key proposal documentation, and 
GlobeCo internal announcements to staff. 
Although most of this material was of a more general background nature, the internal and 
external presentations played a key role in confirming timelines and the order of events, while 
the internal material helped to confirm what issues were being highlighted at different points.  
However, I recognise that due to access constraints this is only a partial view of the full 
documentary evidence that sits within GlobeCo.  Consequently, I avoided drawing conclusions 
based upon what was NOT included within these documents. 
Furthermore, I remain conscious of the limitations of documentary and similar evidence.  All 
the documents used as data within this study were written for a purpose.  This may include to 
give a positive impression of either GlobeCo (their external presentations) or the author (e.g. 
the management journal article).  The documents may have been written with a specific 
agenda, for example to justify initiatives to staff, or may deliberately downplay certain issues 
to avoid conflict or challenge.  Furthermore, all documents are ‘social facts’ (Atkinson & Coffey 
2004) that are produced and used in socially organised ways that fit with the conventions of 
the particular institutional context.  This is particularly true of documents such as formal 
proposals, which are required to address certain issues while other issues are ignored.  
Consequently, documentary data can no more be regarded as ‘the truth’ than any other data.  
It is subject to biases, both intentional and unintentional, and needs to be considered in the 
context of who is preparing it, for whom, and for what purpose.   
 
5.3.4 Data Analysis 
As highlighted earlier, this PhD was an iterative process.  Multiple analyses were undertaken, 
and countless memos, diagrams, drafts and other texts produced.  It would be neither practical 
nor beneficial to describe these in detail.  Furthermore, although ‘analysis’ is frequently 
characterised by a discrete stage in the research, in practice reflection and analysis is an 
ongoing process from the opening words of the first interview, through to the final draft of 
the thesis (see Thomas, 2010; Ghauri, 2004).  Consequently, the aim of this section is to give a 
flavour of the way in which the data was analysed, and a sense of the journey that was 
travelled. 
A key characteristic of qualitative data is that it is messy and voluminous.  As Pettigrew (1990, 
p. 274) wrote “there are times when one feels overwhelmed by detail.”  To this I would add 
that as analysis proceeds there are many different journeys on which your data can take you.  
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At times, it is necessary to make choices based upon hunch or instinct that a code, or a concept 
or a branch of thinking is superfluous – at least for the moment. 
Furthermore, there is no one, clearly agreed, set of rules of procedures for dealing with 
qualitative data (Langley & Abdallah, 2011; Pratt, 2009).  In coming to an approach that 
worked for both me and the data that I had, several methodological papers were important 
for me.  First was Ann Langley’s (1999) work on theorising from Process Data.  This highlighted 
the variety of ways in which qualitative data can be approached and combined – and 
emphasised the danger in being too rigid in adopting an inductive (data-drive) or deductive 
(theory-driven) approach.  Indeed, she stresses that “closing of the gap between data and 
theory can begin at either or both ends (data or theory) and may often iterate between them” 
(Langley, 1999 p. 694), and that this process includes the “uncodifiable step that relies on the 
insight an imagination of the researcher” (ibid., p. 707).   
Secondly, I was especially motivated by two papers that explored the approach that has 
become labelled the ‘Gioia method’: Gioia et al, 2013, and Langley & Abdallah, 2011.  This 
approach is particularly relevant to my context in that it has been used for understanding of 
areas similar to that which I am investigating such as sensemaking during strategic change 
(Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; Gioia & Thomas, 1996), the interplay between HQ and subsidiaries 
(Balogun et al, 2019) and institutional duality in MNC subsidiaries (Pant & Ramachandran, 
2017).  The approach also relies primarily upon a single case study as a revelatory case  – 
although the nature of the case can vary in level – for example from a single initiative to an 
entire industry – and can incorporate multiple levels of analysis within the single case (e.g. Nag 
& Gioia’s 2012 study of executives in the metal-casing industry). 
To an extent, the Gioia method appears to be becoming increasingly institutionalised as an 
approach (Langley & Abdallah, 2011).  However, Gioia et al (2013, p. 26) argue strongly that 
their approach should not be a prescriptive formula, rather it should be “a flexible orientation 
toward qualitative, inductive research that is open to innovation, rather than a ‘cookbook’”.  
Consequently, my approach to analysis was broadly inspired by the Gioia-method, but also 
allowed flexibility and the combination of different approaches as suggested by Langley (1999) 
to fully investigate the data. 
Initial Analysis of Interviews 
All interviews were transcribed.  Forty hours of recordings became 800 pages of text, running 
to over 300,000 words.  During transcription, notes were taken of my immediate impressions.  
This could, for example, be about a series of events that seemed illuminating, the 
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interpretation that a respondent gave to a particular term, or how a question could be refined 
or followed-up on.  Where these seemed to be important, the notes were transferred to my 
research diary, which I used as a running log to record how my thinking developed during the 
project. 
For analysis I decided to use Atlas.ti software.  Through coding and free search it is easy to find 
precise material within the large body of text, and to revisit the text to look for things that 
might have been missed. 
Initially I followed an ‘open coding’ approach (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) that recorded different 
dimensions of data including the actors (who was speaking or being spoken about), the context 
(the organisational setting or event) as well as what was being talked about.  Initially this 
focused upon informant-centric terms, and many in-vivo codes were generated that became 
central to later analysis including “accountability”, “alignment”, “common understanding”, 
“dotted-line reporting” and “understanding their concerns”.  However, it became very quickly 
evident that this purist approach – although ideal in principle as it allows the researcher to 
maintain a clear line from data to conclusions – was very difficult in practice.   For example, 
there were categories of action that required codes that were not straight-forwardly in-vivo 
(‘Challenge & resistance’), processes (‘Decision making process’), ways of behaving (‘Passion’), 
what respondents were talking about (‘Ways that GlobeCo is changing’), description of the 
way in which respondents were speaking (‘Change as a story’) and key aspects of life in the 
MNC (‘Cost pressure/efficiency’). 
While these can all be regarded as largely grounded in the data, I also found that I could not 
ignore my existing understanding of the literature.  There were clear examples of phenomena 
that had been identified elsewhere (‘Boundary spanner’) or behaviour that fitted with extant 
theoretical concepts such as those the ‘power’ that came from having budgetary control 
(‘Power of resources – P&L/budget’).  While these theory-inspired codes were a relatively 
small minority of all coding, including them within the coding proved useful in unexpected 
ways – for example, I used a code for the ‘power of meaning’ (‘Power – shape meaning’) on 
relatively few instances, which led to an investigation of the subtler way in which meaning was 
being shaped even though this was not initially explicit from the way respondents talked. 
Incident Narratives 
From an early stage in the analysis (which was proceeding in parallel with fieldwork), it seemed 
that the data was giving a good ‘cross-sectional’ view of respondents’ attitudes and 
perceptions.  However, it was also apparent that the dynamics of processes were not clear.  
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Consequently, I decided that it was also important to consider ‘incidents’ as units of analysis.  
During the initial coding ‘incident’ codes had been created for the 68 different events that 
respondents talked about – these were discrete ‘incidents’ in which one or more individuals 
could be seen to be acting in order to try to achieve some particular outcome – and could be 
as small as an argument over a coding structure in financial systems through to the outsourcing 
of Facilities Management Services in a country.  As such, these provided dynamic illustrations 
of the different ways in which power and coordination were revealed in GlobeCo.   
Through reviewing these 68 incidents it was clear that some were self-contained within the 
existing narrative, while others were spread across the accumulated text.  Furthermore, some 
of the incidents appeared to offer richer and more relevant data.  Three of the incidents were 
excluded from the analysis as they related to other organisations respondents had worked in.  
However, even among the remaining GlobeCo incidents, in some cases the data was 
incomplete or thin – for example only being based on one or two short quotes – and failed to 
give me confidence that this gave sufficient insight into what was going on.  However, 32 of 
these incidents seemed worthy of further analysis, and so were written up as separate 
narratives combining text from different interviews.  As much as possible, these were written 
using respondents’ own language, but were also supported by documentary evidence where 
this was available.  These narratives varied in length and detail: the shortest was only 630 
words based upon two respondents, while the longest was nearly 5,000 words and included 
text from ten different respondents. 
These narratives were then used in two particular ways.  Firstly, they became standalone 
examples that illustrate the workings of the MNC, extracts from which are presented in later 
chapters.  However, they were also used as a derived data source and were then themselves 
coded.  A sub-set of the original codes were used (as by then my research was becoming more 
focused), plus further ‘action’ codes were added which helped to understand the dynamics of 
the case (e.g. ‘Action – link issues’ or ‘Action – lobbying’) thereby providing additional richness 
to the first-level coding.  
Extended Case Study Narratives 
During the early interviews it had become clear that there were two projects that could be 
particularly revealing to examine in depth, and these became the focus for subsequent 
interviews with around two-thirds of the ‘incident narratives’ were linked to these in some 
ways.  Subsequently, these were used as the basis for preparing two extended narratives – 
one for the creation of GlobeCo Business Services and the second for the outsourcing of 
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Facilities Management in Europe.  In these, the existing ‘incident narratives’ were 
supplemented by documentary evidence, plus further examination of the original transcripts.   
The purpose of these extended cases was to be able to provide the sort of detailed story that 
is a key component of almost all process studies (Langley, 1999), particularly by providing an 
in-depth chronology which helps to understand the detail and subtlety of linkages between 
events.  This may be particularly important for complementing a Gioia type methodology that 
“sometimes seem to describe phenomena at rather a high level of aggregation … so that a 
complete understanding of how and why things occur in the everyday from one moment to 
the next is to a degree glossed over” (Langley & Abdallah, 2011, p. 217).  A narrative story of 
the events also allows me to retain the ‘big picture’ which can otherwise be lost in the 
fragmentation of information during coding (Bryman & Bell, 2011).  Furthermore, the ‘thick’ 
description with its contextual detail is also likely to become a key part of the research output 
that will allow readers to assess credibility and judge the transferability of ideas to other 
situations. 
After reflecting on each of the cases it became apparent that both could be split into four 
relatively discrete stages.  Consequently, codes were added to the original transcript data to 
aid analysis, covering: 
1. Context: the background to the project, key preceding events, etc. 
2. Idea: highlighting material that referred to the origin of the key ideas, both prognostic 
and diagnostic, for the projects. 
3. Solutioning: considering how each solution was developed and refined, and how 
agreement was reached upon this within GlobeCo. 
4. Implementation: issues around the implementation of the ‘agreed’ solution and 
resistance that was faced. 
This reflects a ‘temporal bracketing strategy’ (Langley, 1999) whereby “a shapeless mass of 
process data is transformed into a series of more discrete but connected boxes” (ibid., p. 703).  
Following Langley, these phases were selected such that “there is a certain continuity in the 
activities within each period and there are certain discontinuities at its frontiers” (ibid.).  In 
these cases, for example, it was at the end of the ‘idea’ phase that there is agreement to invest 
significant resources in developing a solution, while at the end of the ‘solutioning’ phase there 
is was some sort of formal ‘go/no go’ decision. 
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Through such temporal bracketing it became easier to present the projects in tabular form.  
This in turn helped identify how the cast of actors that were involved in the project changed 
between phases.  
However, in this final thesis only one extended narrative is extensively presented, with the 
second referred to only in passing.  This reflect a combination of the limitations of space, and 
that the Facilities Management Outsourcing case was more revelatory of the dynamics of 
power relations. 
‘Second Order’ Coding 
The initial coding process that I went through led to the production of a very large number of 
codes (approaching 500).  This, perhaps, reflected my inexperience as a researcher, using 
codes that were too granular.  In part, this was managed by merging codes where, upon 
reflection, they seemed to reflect similar attitudes, processes or actions.  Additionally, from 
an early stage ‘code families’ were created that embraced codes from a similar theme, while 
the underlying coding was retained for further analysis.  In this way family codes for ‘power’, 
‘resistance’, ‘heterarchy’, ‘legitimacy’, ‘autonomy’, etc. were developed and used at different 
times.   
These codes reflected the start of the process of ‘axial’ coding (Strauss & Corbin, 1998), that 
is “the process of reassembling or disaggregating data in a way that draws attention to the 
relationships between and within categories” (Wicks, 2010, p. 153).  In practice, this turned 
out to be a long process of moving between the data and analysis, constructing and 
reconstructing categories, looking for the evidence upon connections between categories and 
reflecting upon different presentations of this.  At this stage it also became clear that some of 
the themes I was identifying were already highlighted within the literature.  Yet while I cross 
referencing this with the literature to understand similarities and differences in definition (e.g. 
considering Alvesson & Sveningsson, 2011, on ‘ambiguity’), the concepts were derived 
empirically. 
This work was reflected in myriad pieces of writing.  Some were memos for my own use, others 
were shared with my supervisors.  Longer papers around key concepts were prepared (notably 
one on ‘Autonomy and Alignment’ for my second-year review) and drafts of papers were 
prepared for conferences.  The process of writing each of these contributed to exploring the 
concepts – while reflecting upon these papers (particularly on rereading) and the response of 
others to them were key to identifying how concepts could be refined and extended. 
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This writing extended to the multiple drafts of the chapters that now constitute this thesis.  
These included themes and relationships which have subsequently been materially modified.  
Indeed, the first drafts of the first two empirical chapters did not include any explicit data 
structure as is presented within this thesis. 
‘Gioia’ Type Analysis 
During preparation of some of these papers it became apparent that the use of a ‘Gioia-type’ 
data structure assisted me to produce analysis that was more structured and focused, and 
consequently I adopted this for all parts of the study.  
At the heart of this approach is a three-level structure of the data and analysis.  There are 
‘first-order concepts’ that are respondent-based, representing (in-vivo) codes or groups of 
codes (my ‘open’ coding).  However, these are linked to ‘second-order themes’ that are more 
abstract and theoretical.  These in turn are grouped into a limited number of ‘overarching 
concepts’ (or ‘aggregate dimensions’) that summarise the key elements of the emerging 
model.  The model that follows is typically presented showing the linkages between the 
‘overarching concepts’ and all the ‘second-order themes’ (see Gioia et al, 2013, and Langley & 
Abdullah, 2011, for a full review of the ‘method’). 
Personally, I found the benefits of this approach were two-fold.  Most importantly, in building 
the data structure I found this helped me to work abductively.  That is, I found myself both 
working up from the data, reviewing second-order themes and considering the aggregate 
dimensions; but also developing potential dimensions and themes and seeing how this linked 
back to the data.  Through this iterative approach, combined with multiple drafts of writing, 
the key constructs were refined.  Secondly, having established a data structure it made the 
process of structuring the writing of the chapter much more straightforward. 
Initially I developed separate data structures for each chapter.  However, it became clear that 
this was problematical.  Some of the draft ‘second order themes’ were still too empirical, 
whereas these needed to be clearly theoretical.  Furthermore, linkages between the data 
models within the different chapters were starting to emerge.  Consequently, I decided to 
rework the analysis into a single data model for the entire thesis (Figure 5.2).  This is what is 
presented within the following chapters. 
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However, as Gioia et al (2013) emphasise, the data structure is a static representation of a 
dynamic phenomenon.  Consequently, what followed was the development of a model that 
accounts not only for the concepts, themes, and dimensions, but also for their dynamic 
interrelationships, highlighted by the arrows which “set in motion” (Nag et al., 2007, p. 829) 
the data structure (also see Whetten, 1989). 
Again, the process for developing this model (presented in Chapter 9) was iterative.  In 
exploring the linkages between themes and dimensions, that created new challenges of the 
themes and dimensions themselves.  Linkages raised questions about inconsistencies of the 
unit or level of analysis of different themes as well as challenging whether labels were 
sufficiently precise.  Through reflection, inspiration and iteration the model developed, and 
the data structure refined to a stage where I felt that I had reached the point of theoretical 
saturation (see Morse, 2004). 
  
Power and Coordination in the Multinational Company  Page | 108 
 
6. The Instability of Organisational Relations in the Heterarchical MNC 
This chapter introduces the case study of GlobeCo as a heterarchical MNC and focuses upon 
managers relationship with the organisational structure of the MNC, providing key insight for 
the first research question: how do actors navigate the organisational structure of the 
heterarchical MNC, and what are the implications for our conceptualisation of the MNC?  As 
such this chapter also helps understand the context within which we should understanding 
power relations within the heterarchical MNC. 
This chapter starts with an introduction to GlobeCo as the focus organisation, and then 
considers the characteristics of GlobeCo as a heterarchy and how by focusing upon the 
individual this dissolves key aspects of stability of the organisation and power relations.  From 
the first-order coding arising from initial analysis of the research material, three second order 
themes of potentially broader relevance were identified – those of organisational ambiguity, 
organisational flux and organisational contestation.   The data structure for this analysis is 
presented in Figure 6.1. 
The literature review in Chapter 3 highlighted that the dominant perspective of the 
multinational is that focusing upon the (largely dyadic) relationships between well-defined 
headquarters and subsidiary units.  However, the case of GlobeCo challenges many of the 
taken-for-granted, structural assumptions around the MNC.  In response to the pressures of 
globalisation, GlobeCo’s evolution has been more than just progressing from a polycentric 
organisation with multiple independent units, to a heterarchical organisation of 
interdependent units.  Within this, the coherence of units is challenged with ambiguity around 
their boundaries, responsibilities and membership.  Teams or units – both formal and informal 
– are unstable and contested, coalescing and dissolving in a dynamic manner.  Individual 
managers find themselves with multiple reporting lines and members of multiple teams, 
struggling with multiple ‘authorities’ each claiming some form of legitimacy.  Managers 
recognise both these ambiguities and the inevitability that other individuals – both within their 
‘units’ and across unit boundaries – will have different interests, perceptions and 
understandings.   It is these ambiguities and differences that drive contestation, and that need 
to be sufficiently resolved for coordination to become possible. 
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6.1 GlobeCo as a Heterarchical MNC 
GlobeCo12 is a major European multinational, with a history that dates back to the nineteenth 
century.  It has subsequently grown through a combination of major mergers in Europe, 
organic expansion and acquisitions to become a global player active in more than 100 
countries with revenues of well over £30 billion.   The operations today embrace a wide variety 
of branded products sold both through retail outlets (e.g. pharmacies) as well as to 
institutional customers (e.g. hospitals). 
Today the headquarters of GlobeCo are situated in the UK, and English is the lingua franca of 
the organisation.  However, the company’s heritage in Western Europe remains very apparent 
with a high percentage of senior management coming from Continental Europe. 
Typical of many European MNC’s at the time, GlobeCo grew as an organisation of strong 
local/national operating companies, loosely coordinated from the Head Office.  This strategy 
reflected the barriers to trading across borders, as well as the material difficulties in 
communicating across distance in the 1930s.  The self-sufficiency of subsidiaries became even 
more pronounced during World War II, with many subsidiaries based in Axis occupied 
territory, beyond the influence of headquarters. 
This strategy of independent subsidiaries proved to be very successful and became embedded 
in GlobeCo culture and strategy throughout the second half of the 20th Century.  Indeed, as 
late as the 1990s this focus was reflected in a GlobeCo Annual Report which described the 
company as the “multi-local multinational” in which “our deep roots in local cultures and 
markets around the world are unparalleled inheritance”.   
 
6.1.1 GlobeCo as a Polycentric Organisation 
This was the GlobeCo that many of the respondents in this research joined, a network of 
independent national companies.  The key building blocks of the company were the 
subsidiaries which remained independent of other units and the headquarters: 
“When I started GlobeCo was a conglomerate … the German annual report that said 
proudly that GlobeCo consisted of 500 independent operating companies around the 
                                                          
12 Pseudonyms are used throughout, with some details are changed to help provide anonymity.  The 
timing of events has been moved by a discrete number of quarters. 
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world.  So, it was a conglomerate, with a holding structure, with a corporate head 
office and the rest was independence all over.”   
“We've had a strong heritage of being very diversified and very localised then that 
was ingrained in the culture of the business … in the local company you did 
everything.”  
This independence was built upon each subsidiary having their ‘own’ factories, running their 
‘own’ marketing organisation and operated their ‘own’ sales force – although this also meant 
that companies developed bespoke IT systems, and even had their own accounting definitions.  
Stand-alone companies focused upon specific markets in their host country, and in many 
European markets there were many GlobeCo subsidiaries acting independently.  
The day-to-day independence of the subsidiaries was embedded in key processes.  A major 
review was held with each subsidiary to agree the ‘Annual Budget’.  Yet, other than this yearly 
meeting, and occasional trips by Head Office personnel to subsidiaries, oversight was limited.  
Financial results were submitted monthly but received only limited scrutiny.  Consequently, 
subsidiaries could pursue their own strategy with little interference from Head Office: 
“So, if you go back 10, 15 years … the Centre’s instructions were something to be 
found a way around if you could, and only complied with if you have to.”  
As such, GlobeCo showed the characteristics of what Perlmutter (1969) described as a 
polycentric organisation – that is a firm that follows “the assumption that host-country 
cultures are different… Local people know what is best for them and the part of the firm which 
is located in the host country should be as ‘local in identity’ as possible…  A polycentric firm, 
literally, is a loosely connected group with quasi-independent subsidiaries as centers – more 
akin to a confederation” (Perlmutter, 1969, p. 12). 
However, the strong independence of the local operating companies in GlobeCo would not 
last.  In response to ongoing trade liberalisation and technological change, GlobeCo undertook 
a steady transformation to globalise its operations.  In particular, the introduction of the ‘single 
market’ in Europe in 1992 removed tariff barriers and obviated the need for production 
facilities to be duplicated in each country.  This allowed factory rationalisation, with the rapid 
growth of inter-subsidiary trade requiring both harmonisation and coordination. 
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6.1.2 The Journey to Interdependence and the Heterarchical MNC 
The pressure on independent subsidiaries accelerated after GlobeCo issued a profit warning 
in the early 2000s, the first in its long history.  There was a belief that GlobeCo has accepted 
lower levels of efficiency in order to preserve existing structures and ways of working.  
Competitors, particularly GlobeCo’s major rival Colossus, were seen as being more effective, 
and that there was a need for GlobeCo to ‘catch-up’.   
“Colossus had driven regional… supply chains much more rapidly than we had.  Also, 
Brand Development, if you only need to develop one brand, one product formulation, 
etc. for a certain type of product, you don't want to be doing it in 15 – or however 
many … European markets we had… Basically GlobeCo was losing to Colossus and 
had been for quite a number of years.”  
What followed was a series of actions to leverage GlobeCo’s scale.  Under the mantra of 
‘OneGlobe’, the key aim was to remove duplication of activity and achieve synergies: 
“[This] programme aligns the organisation behind a single strategy, simplifying our 
business and leveraging our scale more effectively.” (GlobeCo website) 
Through this, the responsibilities of GlobeCo’s European operations were fundamentally 
changed.  Key responsibilities for product innovation and branding were transferred to a new 
global organisation; the GlobeCo European Supply Organisation (GESO)  was formed to 
manage the supply chain on a regional basis, with the national companies as its key customers; 
a single instance ERP (accounting and planning) system was introduced, allowing the GESO to 
run integrated operations across Europe; steps were taken to regionalise Finance, IT and HR 
back-office operations into either in-house or outsourced shared service centres.   
Where multiple operating companies remained within a single country, these were merged 
into a single entity.  Subsequently, these were further consolidated into ‘multi-country 
organisations’ that embraced a cluster of potentially similar countries within one organisation 
(e.g. the German, Austrian and Swiss companies formed GlobeCo DACH).  While from 2010 
onwards, remaining ‘back-office’ services were removed from national companies, regional 
organisations and functions and brought together into a new global unit. 
As such, GlobeCo has become a much more highly interdependent organisation.  Units could 
do little on their own as they were reliant on other parts of the organisation to deliver the 
physical product, to provide innovation ideas and marketing resources, and to support the 
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day-to-day transactional activities of the operations.  As such it is no longer possible to see 
GlobeCo units surviving independently: 
“So, could [my unit] stand alone without any engagement with other functions?  No, 
impossible, impossible, we would simply not survive!”  
GlobeCo has changed dramatically since its days as a polycentric organisation.  Rather, with 
highly independent units it resembles the characteristics of Hedlund’s (1986, 2005) vision of 
the MNC as a ‘heterarchy’ (Table 6.1). 
 





Principles:   
Managers experience the company being managed along multiple dimensions: 
“Ultimately, GlobeCo’s increasingly become a 4x8 organisation: so four global 
[product] categories with 8 [geographic] clusters.”  
“So the initiatives either come from Category or Function, basically, these days, 
and then go global.”  
“Myself being part of a global function, that's delivering to the companies, that's 
our job.” 
The Shape of the 
Organisation:  
Managers understand the organisation as asymmetric and flexible: 
“Well now we have 8 Clusters.  However, not every Cluster is equal.”  
“I think some functions are very global, and should be, like Finance, HR - other 
functions have got to find the right balance like Supply Chain and Marketing.  And 
other functions need to be very local.”  
The lack of clear apex where decision authority resides: 
“If you had a more formalised approach to where you have one decision maker … 
and they called the shots, and it's not challenged … then clearly you'd be able to 
move at much more speed, but that's just not the reality of how it works.”  
‘Headquarters’ 
and the Location 
of Thinking:   
Managers challenge the traditional view of the HQ: 
“It's clear that the traditional head office of a single place globally where it all 
comes together and where physically all decision are taken is ... is virtually 
outdated”  
“I think the concept of corporate headquarters is gone … what makes sense to be 
run globally versus locally is the more important conversation.”  
The Subsidiary:  Units may have global focus: 
“[My current unit] we are focused on driving the most efficient global processes.”  
 “I'm part of the [Product] Leadership Team, which is a global body.”  
Units have become highly interdependent: 
 “I think we're in an age of collaboration.” 
 “Nobody can do anything independently.  It's always a collective and 
collaborative effort.”  
Nature of 
Control:   
There are clear limitations to the hierarchy: 
“You'll never be successful forcing a mandate, or forcing it from the top down.”  
 “So we try not to push things up … if it does go up, it will go to one person who 
will then solve it, and probably be frustrated that it got pushed up there.” 
“Decisions are … based on networking and strategic influencing.”  
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6.2 Ambiguity of the GlobeCo Organisation 
The first finding from the research is that individuals experience the ambiguous nature of the 
organisation.  Many authors have suggested that ambiguity is an inevitable feature of 
organisational life (e.g. Alfoldi et al, 2017; Alvesson, 2001; Alvesson & Sveningsson, 2003).  
Specifically, Alvesson & Sveningsson (2011, p. 351) define ambiguity as “uncertainty and 
incoherence that is more or less continual and that cannot be significantly reduced through 
more information” while Meyerson & Martin (1987, p. 625) refer to “that which is unclear, 
inexplicable, and perhaps capable of two or more meanings”.  As such the concept of 
organisational ambiguity suggests that there may be different understanding of, and 
meanings attached to, the organisational structure.  In particular, there may not be a unique 
and consistent interpretation of unit boundaries, membership and responsibilities. 
Four specific themes are highlighted.  Firstly, that there is frequently a lack of single-point 
accountability, both for ‘units’ and for specific issues.  Secondly, that managers face an 
ambiguity of membership by being members of multiple teams and having multiple ‘bosses’.  
This, thirdly, leads to an ambiguity of responsibility for resolving issues and taking decisions.  
Finally, it is insufficient to rely on the hierarchy (i.e. somebody more ‘senior’) to resolve these 
ambiguities.  Supporting quotes are presented in Table 6.2. 
 
6.2.1 Lack of Single-Point Accountability  
A key feature of GlobeCo that emerges from the research is the extent to which respondents 
see themselves as being interdependent in terms of decision making, and the limitation that 
this imposes on single point accountability. 
“Ultimately, what is good in an organisation is to have one point at the top, … one 
person who has … the decision making.  [But] one of the challenges … is that the 
reporting lines didn't … provide that clarity.”  
Interdependence Across Units 
A clear characteristic of the heterarchical organisation is the interdependence of the units of 
which it is composed.  This is clearly true of GlobeCo.  By the early 2000s units were highly 
restricted on what they could do on their own without support from other parts of the 
organisation.  As the Finance Director of one Asian company said: 
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“So, you are very dependent on what the Categories can deliver in terms of products 
for you and mixes for you, can they deliver them on time?  We're very dependent 
upon Supply Chain – can they get you the products you want to your market?  So, 
you are dependent upon a whole host of people, at times it goes wrong, yeh, and 
they … screw up your results and at times you do stuff that screws up their results.”  
The scope of the local GlobeCo subsidiary had dramatically reduced compared to when 
GlobeCo was a polycentric organisation.  This is clearly seen from a summary of the value chain 
(Porter, 1985) in Figure 6.2.  Whereas the national subsidiary previously had responsibility for 
all aspects of value chain activity (except for R&D), many of these roles now sit with other 
units.  The physical supply chain is managed by GESO, GlobeCo’s European Supply Organisation 
(in green); standardised support services in Finance and HR are delivered through GlobeCo 
Business Services (blue); product/brand development is driven by the Global Category 
organisation (orange).  Indeed, the remaining responsibilities of the local subsidiary are now 
largely limited to local marketing and sales (yellow). 
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This interdependence dramatically reduces the ability of any one unit to operate an 
independent strategy.  Rather, it becomes necessary for units to find ways to work together 
to achieve outcomes, a challenge highlighted by a former CHRO: 
“You have a set of leaders who have been used to operating in an independent, 
autonomous fashion, and now we need them to play as part of a team in an 
interdependent organisation.”  
Given that issues no longer fall within the boundary of the operating unit, issues need to be 
solved across organisational boundaries involving multiple other units.  This raises key issues 
of accountability.  Does responsibility for a new product launch in France sit with the French 
operating company that is the sales and marketing unit, or with the Supply Chain that makes 
the product, or the Category Organisation responsible for new product development? 
Multiple Reporting Lines Out of Units 
While the interdependence of units is a well-recognised feature of the heterarchical or 
network organisation, it is also clear that the response of GlobeCo to manage these 
interdependencies has also undermined the clarity of what constitutes the operating unit, or 
subsidiary.  Therefore, it becomes difficult to see the subsidiary as a coherent and univocal 
unit synonymous with a top manager under the ‘unity of command’ principle (Simon, 1946).   
In the early 2000s functional reporting lines were introduced within GlobeCo.  This requires 
that every role within GlobeCo is assigned to a standard business functions with the clear 
principle that all managers report to a superior of the same function.  This functional line-
manager may be within the same organisational unit – or it may be a hierarchically senior 
member of the function in a different organisational unit.   
“[The HR and Finance Directors] would have a different reporting line.  So, they 
reported into their functional areas, and partnered the business unit in terms of 
decisions around people, succession, recruitment, FTE presence/count, etc.”  
This focus was further embedded by implementing the reward process.  Annual Personal 
Targets (APTs) are agreed with the line manager.  As these are typically a sub-set of the line 
manager’s own APTs, targets become cascaded through the functional line.   
This situation is illustrated in Figure 6.3, which considers the situation of GlobeCo Business 
Services (GBS).  GBS could be considered as a unit of GlobeCo, and within GBS is a sub-unit 
responsible for ‘Workplace Services’.   
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The left-hand part of the figure highlights day-to-day working relationships and suggests a 
clean hierarchy of units.  Yet, the right-hand side shows formal reporting lines, many of which 
fall outside the boundaries of the various ‘units’.  Consequently, within GlobeCo there are 
multiple reporting lines out of organisational units and many senior managers do not report 
to the ‘head’ of the operating unit in which they sit.  Indeed, the senior Finance, HR and Legal 
members of the Head of GBS’s unit report into senior corporate staff of a similar grade to the 
head of GBS, and their (and their team’s reward) was based primarily on the performance of 
the overall function, rather than that of GBS.  This change was seen by some to have 
advantages in that “it enables you to be more neutral … to step back and have a more impartial 
view to some of the business decisions”.  Yet it does this by creating a deliberate tension within 
the system that both challenges the unity of the operating unit – and in turn putting 
constraints upon the subsidiary unit, and its own CEO.  In doing so single-point accountability 
within the operating company is lost. 
 
6.2.2 Ambiguity of Membership 
While the combination of unit interdependence and the introduction of functional reporting 
raises significant questions about the integrity of the subsidiary as a clearly defined 
organisational unit, it also has significant implications for the individual managers working 
within GlobeCo. 
Firstly, it is clear that many of the managers within GlobeCo see themselves as being members 
of more than one organisational unit.  A VP Finance for GlobeCo’s European Supply 
Organisation emphasised: 
“I felt that I was a member of two teams.  The functional team – so the team 
composed of the Finance leadership for Europe, the CFOs of the different operating 
companies of which GESO was one...  And then, of course, I felt very much part of the 
team that was managing GESO itself.”  
Here, the respondent uses the term ‘team’ which has become prevalent to describe the 
different organisational structures within the organisation. 
Membership of multiple, overlapping teams can be illustrated by presenting the team 
membership in the prior example of GBS/Workplace in a Venn diagram (Figure 6.4).   
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Although simplified, this highlights the overlapping nature of teams how individuals are 
members of multiple teams.  For example, the Finance Director GBS was part of Finance, and 
of GBS and of the Workplace Team (as well as a number of other permanent and temporary 
teams). 
With functional reporting structure and overlapping team membership, individual managers 
may experience that they have multiple reporting lines – both a formal, functional ‘line’ 
manager and one or more ‘dotted-lines’ to the leads of the teams of which they are members.  
Such is the case of the VP Finance for GBS who reported: 
 “[I report] solid line into the global controller, and dotted line into the … Chief 
GlobeCo Businesses Services Officer.”  
Consequently, GlobeCo managers may be pulled by multiple ‘bosses’ reflecting leadership of 
the multiple teams of which they are members.  And it may not be the formal line manager 
(who is responsible for targets, bonuses and career) is dominant in setting the direction of the 
manager.  Indeed, one very successful Finance SVP argued that ‘solid’ functional reporting 
lines were unnecessary: 
“I think everyone understands who runs the show.  It's really about what's peoples' 
perception – is there leadership?  Is there someone at the helm that will take no 
bullshit?  Is there someone at the helm that will listen, but in the end is the person 
actually taking the decisions – then you don't really need [solid] reporting lines.”  
Similarly, managers frequently reflected that they identified more as part of the team where 
they worked on a day-to-day basis (and where they may only have ‘dotted-line’ reporting) 
than to the formal organisational unit to which they belonged.  For example, a Finance 
Manager working on a temporary GBS project explained: 
“I think that comes down to did I feel myself as Finance?  No, I felt myself as part of 
the … project team... I identified more myself with that than [as] an individual within 
Finance.”  
Consequently, it appears that there is significant ambiguity of membership within units.  
Although members may have a role that is formally part of a permanent or temporary 
organisational unit (or team), they may report outside that unit and may ‘belong’ to other 
units or teams.  Neither formal nor informal/dotted lines guarantee a manager’s primacy of 
attention – some may closely follow the direction of their formal line manager, but others 
Power and Coordination in the Multinational Company  Page | 123 
 
identify with units where they sit or work on a day-to-day basis and take the lead from the 
‘dotted line’. 
 
6.2.3 Lack of Clarity of Responsibilities 
A consequence of the lack of single-point accountability and the blurring of unit membership 
and boundaries is the apparent lack of clarity about which individual, or which organisational 
unit is responsible for specific issues.   Many issues span multiple teams or organisational units.  
Other issues, even which apparently sit within the remit of one ‘unit’, may require the approval 
of those who report outside the organisation.  As one Finance VP expressed: 
“One of the other… potential shortcomings of multinationals is that your... 
responsibility is shared or can be made to be shared and therefore accountabilities 
are not as well defined.”  
GlobeCo has a clear ‘Schedule of Authority’ that defines who (in terms of role and seniority) 
can approve different levels and types of commitments.  Managers within the organisation are 
clear from this as to what they are not permitted to do.  Yet this neither defines clearly what 
positive actions a manager can take, nor does it limit the number of people that can become 
involved in decision making.  That is, in many cases approval under the Schedule of Authority 
is a necessary, rather than sufficient condition for action.  
As a result, the consequence in GlobeCo is that there are large numbers of people who seem 
to have a legitimate say in key decisions (or at least believed they had the right to be involved 
in decision making).  Repeatedly comments are made about GlobeCo being ‘too democratic’, 
having ‘a culture of … wanting to listen to everybody” and that “everybody wants to be 
involved in every decision” (see the full quotes in Table 6.2).  Indeed, one respondent said, in 
exasperation that “there were hundreds of people that had some way to influence, accelerate 
or delay decision making.”  As such it can even be a challenge to know “who are the key drivers 
in the business” that need to be involved.  The formal processes and authority appear to be 
inadequate, with one GlobeCo veteran stressing that “in such a complex organisation, 
processes can only do so much… decisions are also based on networking and strategic 
influencing.”  
This requires a tacit knowledge that is not always present, with one respondent stressing the 
impact of this ambiguity: 
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“So, to me at least, it still isn't 100% clear and consistent where the power is and 
where the decisions are made.  It seems like a complicated and slightly different 
political dance every time, depending on the factors which are in play at the time.” 
Consequently, the formal processes and authority appear to be insufficient to explain how 
outcomes occur, with one GlobeCo veteran stressing that “in such a complex organisation, 
processes can only do so much… decisions are also based on networking and strategic 
influencing.”  
However, this lack of clarity is not just about the responsibilities of others, but also seems to 
extend to the individual manager and team.    One manager exclaimed that “so from a scope 
of what I'm responsible for, I don't know that it's necessarily ever that bang-on clear”, while 
another, working another VP could say that his responsibilities were “not clear at all, and they 
probably were wrong.”  
 
6.2.4 Limitations of Hierarchy 
This chapter has highlighted ambiguity of responsibilities and decision making that results 
from the lack of single-point accountability, the interdependence of units in resolving issues, 
and the lack of clarity of unit boundaries and membership.  Yet, this would not be an issue if 
there is a point in the hierarchy where the ‘buck stops’ and decisions can be made.  In much 
of the conventional literature of the MNC this is seen as the role of the ‘headquarters’ or 
ultimately the Chief Executive. 
Yet while it is theoretically possible for the CEO to be that decision-making apex, it is also clear 
that in GlobeCo it is frequently not possible to rely upon the CEO as ultimate arbiter.  
Respondents highlight that many issues are of a magnitude that should never attract the 
attention of the CEO.  Issues may be “not big enough for them to worry about”, and that the 
CEO will only be involved in “very high profile, specific” issues.  As one experienced manager 
said, “you can imagine, the idea is not that [the CEO] … decides on everything, otherwise we 
are all wasting our time.”  Indeed, there are examples where top management were not 
prepared to become involved and unblock an issue: 
“The powers-that-be were unhelpful, they didn't want to get involved in the fray, in 
the discussion… They would avoid the discussion and hope that it resolves itself at a 
more junior level.”  
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However, it is not just that the CEO and the Leadership Team do not have the time to make 
such decisions, but their remoteness from the business mean that it is unlikely that they would 
have the required detailed knowledge to make credible decision.  Indeed, within GlobeCo, the 
distance between the CEO and the day-to-day business provides an opportunity for many top-
level decisions to be ignored.  A VP in GBS talked about this in the context of setting up one 
key service area: 
“So, you've got the [CEO] saying you have legitimate power, but no one in the 
business outside the [CEO] believes it.  So, Randy [the VP for the Service Area] has to 
talk to the chairman of a country who says, 'I don't care about you – [the CEO] is 
sitting a far away so I can ignore him'.”  
Randy went on to expand on this, suggesting that generally it is very difficult to impose a top-
down mandate within the organisation: 
“What I found in the last 5 years is that you'll never be successful forcing a mandate, 
or forcing it from the top down…  I think the top-down mandate is really just to help 
opening up the discussion, but it really never works – or rarely works – in terms of 
somebody doing something they didn't want to do.”  
Indeed, this view was also expressed by another respondent that complained that “that the 
biggest single challenge we have is the lack of a mandate that exists within GlobeCo” and goes 
on to say that “they just don't mandate decisions down, people have to be brought along.”  
Consequently, we see an organisational culture that makes it difficult for solutions to be 
imposed.  Decisions that are made ‘higher’ in the organisation may not be enacted.  In other 
cases, organisational ambiguity is not resolved because the issues that are at stake are not 
regarded as being sufficiently important to be worthy of senior attention.   
 
6.3 Organisational Flux 
The second broad theme that emerges from the research is the fluidity and instability of the 
organisational structure.  Whereas the literature on the MNC largely focuses upon considering 
a static organisation, perhaps with the transfer of responsibilities between units (e.g. via the 
transfer of subsidiary mandates), the recent history of GlobeCo suggests that the 
organisational structure, and the responsibilities that are suggested by this, are anything but 
stable.  Rather the heterarchical organisation is fundamentally unstable.  Supporting quotes 
are shown in Table 6.3. 
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6.3.1 Constancy of Organisational Change  
Organisational stability appears to be the exception rather than the rule at GlobeCo, with an 
expectation of frequent changes and reorganisation, seen in the relatively short lifespan of 
many of the organisational units created as the organisation evolves.  Table 6.4 highlights how 
the key organising dimensions for three separate areas of responsibility has changed over the 
last 20 years. 
Indeed, the impression that is obtained from GlobeCo managers is that, to a considerable 
extent, the organisational structure is in continual flux.  That is, that the organisation is not so 
much seen as something which is fixed, but that is constant development or evolution. 
“The organisation is not standing still, and dynamics are changing….  I'm just trying 
to say, of course it's changing, it will never stand still.”  
In part, this frequent organisational change reflects the ongoing search to rectify perceived 
under-performance.  Having failed to realise its own internal growth ambition, and one former 
regional SVP explained: 
“So, it was like 'right, we'll try this', but fundamentally they couldn't find a way to 
get 5% growth out of the markets with the products and brands, marketing...  So, 
had the growth been fantastic, you'd have had much fewer reorganisations.”   
Table 6.4:  Evolving Organisational Forms within GlobeCo Functions 
Function Area Period Geographic Focus Responsible Entity 
Local 
Sales/Marketing 
<2004 Sub-national Multiple subsidiaries within each 
country 
2004-6 National National Operating Company  




<2000 National Local Operating Company 
2000-5 Regional Regional Category Organisation 
2006-16 Global Global Category Organisation 




<2004 Sub-national Multiple subsidiaries within each 
country 
2004-9 National/Regional Mix of National OpCos and Regional IT 
Organisations 
2010-12 Global Split between IT Innovation 
Organisation and GBS 
2013-15 Global Integrated within GBS 
2016 Global Stand-alone GlobeCo IT Organisation 
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This was particularly clear during the frequent restructuring of the first decade of the 2000s 
as GlobeCo’s top executives struggled with the challenge of their first ever profits warning and 
increased investor pressure to improve delivery, with multiple restructuring programmes 
aiming to improve performance (or, at least, give the appearance of action).  
Yet, there is also a perspective that change can be the result of ‘change for change’s sake’ (see 
Vermeulen et al, 2010).  Respondents report a sense that “success in GlobeCo is about 
launching initiatives that create change”.  Senior managers do not achieve advancement by 
managing the status quo, but through launching new projects or initiatives.  While in some 
areas these may be a new system or product, in other cases it is achieved by restructuring the 
organisation.  Therefore, there seems to be a bias to instigate change. 
 
6.3.2 Volatility of Strategy 
While the analogy of organisational change as a journey might imply a clear linear path from 
one static organisational design to another, respondents also paint a picture of considerable 
flux where different organisational design solutions are tried, and then changed. 
“We set up process offices, we broke process offices, and I'm hearing today we might 
be setting them back up again.”  
This ebb and flow seems most prominent in balancing issues around the extent to which 
operations or functions should be centralised or decentralised in order to manage the 
conflicting needs of local responsiveness with global integration: 
“So, there's certain things that it makes sense to centralise, but you can't centralise 
so much that you lose your touch with the markets, your local connectivity.  So where 
do you strike the balance?  And what you often see with organisations is that they 
oscillate, you know, between the two, because there isn't a magic answer.”  
This last quote is particularly revealing.  It is from an experienced executive that had worked 
in both European and American multinationals.  She seems to be suggesting that there is not 
a unique optimal solution for resolving the tensions of local responsiveness and global 
responsiveness.  A solution that works for part of the organisation may create problems 
elsewhere, and in responding to these a new set of challenges are created. 
She went on to give an example from earlier in her career: 
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“Early on in my career when I was at [an] FTSE engineering company that went 
through… first of all it was organised geographically, and then it decided to organise 
itself by product line, and then a few years' later it went back to geography again 
because there wasn't a perfect answer.”  
That there is no ‘perfect answer’ seems to provide the space for alternative strategies to be 
considered and adopted.  When combined with the culture in GlobeCo that success comes 
from creating change, it is perhaps not surprising that the oscillation of strategy and 
organisation is associated with change in leadership.  One respondent used a political analogy 
to describe the impact of different leaders’ philosophies.  While one leader was “Labour party: 
he was all about big government, he wanted big strong central institutions driving out and 
controlling the groups underneath”, his successor “couldn't have been more Tory … he's like 
'this is ridiculous, why do you have such big central staff, this is all about the power of the 
individual, unleash the potential in all of the people right at the front-line.’”  
So even where they do not have single point control or responsibility for their organisation, it 
still seems that “a leader casts a big shadow”.  Their perspectives on the global/local (or 
centralise/decentralise) continuum is critical.  With a lack of a unique solution to these 
challenges, these perspectives inevitably differ over time, geography and business.   
However, this multitude of perspectives on the best way to organise itself creates instability.  
This can result from the simultaneous presence of different perspectives (frames) in different 
parts of the of the organisation – as was clearly the case in GlobeCo: 
“I think that organisations always flex – in and out, in and out.  I think that the 
problem we've got in GlobeCo is that the different functions have flexed slightly 
differently, so we've not done it as a whole.”  
Yet there is also a temporal instability as the emphasis between global/local or 
centralised/decentralised changes: 
“And so, you know, over the time that cycle happens, but of course there's a lag on 
the cycle as well, so the time it takes for that to percolate down.  So just … we finally 
got to the conclusion in some peoples' heads … that 'no, no, no guys, you're not 
central group any more'.  Just in time for the whole curve to turn again.  So you get 
these different time lags in where the agendas are, for a start, so someone's up here 
and someone's down here.” 
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The conclusion from this is that there are almost inevitably misalignments within the 
organisation on both strategy and structure.  These can occur over geographical and 
organisational space where the requirements of the specific businesses or areas differ, and 
they can occur over time as different parts of the organisation adapt to strategic change at 
different rates. 
 
6.3.3 Transfer of Responsibilities and the Creation of New Units 
The previous sub-sections highlight the constancy of organisational change and how the lack 
of a single optimum solution to the challenges of globalisation/localisation and centralisation/ 
decentralisation leads to an inherent instability in the strategy and structures.  However, it is 
also worth recognising that that there are multiple mechanisms through which these changes 
occur.  While this can occur through some sort of charter change between established units, 
it can also be seen in the creation of entirely new organisational entities. 
The Transfer of Responsibilities 
There recent history of GlobeCo provides examples where responsibility was transferred 
between organisational units.  This can be seen in the establishment of ‘Multi-Country 
Organisations’ (MCOs) such as GlobeCo UK & Ireland or GlobeCo DACH.  Prior to the creation 
of these MCOs the subsidiaries in the smaller companies reported directly into the European 
Regional Headquarters.  In effect, the Regional HQ delegated its mandate to manage the 
smaller subsidiaries to the larger countries in the region (what Alfoldi et al, 2017, call a 
‘Regional Management Mandate’).   
The Birth and Death of Units 
Yet the change in the GlobeCo organisation also appears to frequently reflect more than just 
the simple shifting of tasks or ‘charters’ but rather requires the creation, splitting or merging 
of organisational components.  Indeed, in the case of MCO creation, this did not just result in 
a switch in reporting lines, but the transfer of the majority of work out of the smaller countries.  
In DACH, the existing units in Switzerland and Austria were effectively deconstructed, with the 
transfer of work and resources (i.e. people) to Germany, leaving little more than token and 
legal presence in Vienna and Zurich.  
When it came to consolidating activity at the regional or global level it seems that frequently 
these new responsibilities are not granted to existing units but to entirely new units, 
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specifically formed to take over a task or function.  GBS provides an example, as this was 
explicitly constructed as a new unit for managing GlobeCo’s shared and outsourced business 
services (e.g. Finance Services, IT Services, HR Services).  This unit was ‘born global’ (Rennie, 
1993; Knight & Cavusgil, 1996) having been constructed out of units or parts of units from the 
existing regional organisations, as well as taking direct responsibility for aspects of service 
operations sitting within the national operating companies.  There was no existing unit to 
become GBS.  Rather, in their annual report GlobeCo promoted this as “a new business unit”, 
while internally those setting-up GBS also saw it as a new entity – “we were building an 
organisation.”     
This suggests that it is dangerous to view organisational change solely as the shifting of 
responsibilities between established organisational units.  Rather, if we wish to understand 
the multinational, we need to understand about the processes by which those organisational 
units come to be born and to take on the new responsibilities. 
 
6.4 Contesting the GlobeCo Organisation 
We have seen how the case of GlobeCo highlights the continually shifting organisational 
landscape with the creation, growth and evolution of new entities that take over or absorb 
responsibilities and resources from others, while other units shrink or even die.  However, as 
already suggested in some of the quotes above, such changes do not occur without protest.   
Throughout the interviews, respondents were quite clear that both organisational change, and 
the very organisational structure itself, are contested territory.  Ultimately, such contestation 
derives from the inescapable differences in perspectives and interests of actors – be these 
collectively in organisational units (such as HQ and subsidiary), or seen in differing opinions 
and understanding of individual managers. 
Such contestation appears through two guises.  Firstly, the organisational structure and the 
responsibilities can be directly challenged where an actor tries to modify organisational 
responsibilities in their favour.  However, it is also apparent that there are many situations 
where there is ambiguity of responsibility manifest through challenge to the content of an 
initiative or issue13.  While such indirect contestation may not, on the face of it, be directed at 
challenging responsibilities or authority, the way in which the issue is resolved may itself 
                                                          
13 This echoes Koveshnikov et al’s (2017) distinction between ‘struggles over decisions and actions’ and 
‘struggles over power relations’ 
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impact upon participants understanding of the responsibilities embedded in the 
organisational structure (supporting quotes on contestation are provided in Table 6.5).   
 
6.4.1 Inevitability of Contestation 
Such contestation of both organisational responsibilities and initiative content reflects that 
there is not unanimity within the organisation over what it should be doing and how this 
should be carried out.  Different actors seem to have fundamentally different experiences and 
perspectives that lead them to understand or frame a situation in different ways, and have 
different preferences and opinions on possible outcomes. 
In part, the evidence from GlobeCo suggests that such differences derive from structural 
organisational issues, as well of those of geography, as highlighted within the literature.  In 
particular, there is prominence of the global/local dichotomy emphasising how managers 
within a global function may take a much broader perspective than those sitting close to the 
market, yet without necessarily appreciating the heterogeneity of the local market places.  As 
one member of a global team said: 
“Sitting in a little room together and coming up with a solution is never, ever going 
to be 100% correct.  So, as you move into different regions and you come up with 
different processes and … different ways of working it has to change.”  
While another VP who has worked in different global groups expanded on this: 
“In a function you have global people who think this is what's required.  And then 
you have people in the countries who say this is what they really want [laughing].  
Right?  And often we get conflicting views…  Navigating those two voices make it 
grey...  And that's the bit we've got to balance, that's the grey area.  In terms of their 
decision rights as well, not just ours.”  
In this case, interestingly he brought the issue of different perspectives straight back to the 
implication of decision rights. 
Yet it is important to recognise that this is not purely an issue of HQ versus subsidiary, with 
differences in perspective occurring wherever scope differences occur, with one IT director 
pondering that his organisation “can at times be too disconnected from the real on the ground 
work.”  Respondents provided clear examples of perspectives differing by function and 
between within local and global organisations creating ‘silos’ of interested parties.    
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 “Acting in silos, really, that's the biggest challenge to getting things done … [but] I 
don't think people do it consciously, it's not deliberate.”  
Indeed, such differences are seen to be reinforced by a reward scheme that stresses ‘local’ 
rather than global performance.  Frequently managers that play a role within a broad strategic 
project are targeted on focused specific aspects, rather than the project as a whole: 
“They had different targets at a more granular level, and that was what they were 
being measured against, rewarded against, and therefore that's where their focus 
was.  And they would not always take the greater good into consideration when 
looking at it from their perspective.”  
We also see a clear recognition of geography as a significant cause of differences in 
perceptions within GlobeCo.  In part, these may be driven by cultural differences – with one 
manager explaining the differences she had experienced in trying to roll-out common 
processes around the world: 
“There are big cultural differences across the globe, and those cultural differences 
also drive different regional behaviour.  So it's multifaceted here…So the US team, if 
it's not 'made here' they think they can reinvent it…  On the other side, you've got 
the Indian people who would not do anything unless their line manager had told 
them to do it.  So unless you actually got the line manager, and they'd say 'yes, yes, 
yes, yes' and go away and do something completely different.  In [East] Asia, if you're 
clear enough with them, they do, basically they'll put in what you need to do.  So 
you've got that as a regional difference.”  
More generally, another manager recognised the fundamental differences in institutional 
environment that existed across the countries within which GlobeCo operated, and how this 
impacted upon the ability of the organisation to pursue an outsourcing strategy: 
“So, I think the Anglo-American model where the purpose of business is to create 
shareholder value, in that context, outsourcing makes complete sense.  I think in an 
old Europe context … the purpose of business [is] to gainfully employ people, and to 
make a sensible profit in the process of doing so, outsourcing made a lot less sense….  
Even middle management, particularly in places like France, Germany, Italy, … those 
core elements of old Europe, at a very visceral level disagreed.”  
Yet while these quotes support a perspective of contestation as resulting from macro 
geographical and organisational structural characteristics, this represents only a partial view 
Power and Coordination in the Multinational Company  Page | 136 
 
of the causes of contestation.  In particular, perception differences are not just a phenomenon 
of organisational entities, but are seen in differences between individuals – individuals that 
focus upon their own interests and understanding: 
“A lot of it came into 'what's in it for me', with the individuals wherever they were”  
This can be particularly emphasised by a reward system that leaves considerable discretion to 
line-managers.  For example, one manager argued that the approach of his ‘solid’ line manager 
was “‘what did you do to make me look good?’”, while another emphasised the difficulties 
that this could cause: 
“You bring people together to do a project, but unfortunately they still report to their 
boss, and their boss has still got a different agenda.”  
Above all though the impression given by managers within GlobeCo is that having differences 
of perspective and understanding is expected, is natural, and in many ways is desirable.  This 
is about “dealing with human dynamics”.  As one manager stressed that “we are human beings 
…  we are not robots”, while another emphasised that: 
“I think that at the end of the day I'm paid to have a point of view on what we should 
and shouldn't do.  There are other people in the business that will have a [different] 
view, and will try and push that.”  
That is, differences in perspective and the contestation that arises from this are a fundamental 
aspect of everyday life within the organisation.  Such differences of perspective need not be 
dysfunctional as they may be the source of “healthy challenge” that brings about the 
appropriate checks and balances.  For example, one Finance VP emphasised that he saw this 
less as conflict and more as ‘competitive tension’: 
“And tension is generally a good thing in a multination and particularly in GlobeCo, 
it should drive a right economic trade-off and therefore a better decision.  In the 
absence of that we go for the easy call.”  
Above all else, the quotes above highlight that mangers in GlobeCo expect others to have 
different perspectives and views – be these the product of geography, culture, HQ/subsidiary, 
functional role or resulting from the specific history and experiences of individuals.  Such 
challenge is considered a normal part of life in GlobeCo.  While there may include an element 
of managers pushing their own (self-) interest – what one SVP called ‘bad politics’ – largely 
there is an acceptance that other managers are working with a positive intention: 
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“Most of the politics in the company is understandable politics, where people defend 
what they're doing because they genuinely think what they're doing is right.” 
The challenge for a heterarchical organisation such as GlobeCo is not that there are such 
differences of opinions and perspectives – but rather in a volatile organisation with ambiguous 
responsibilities, where hierarchy cannot be relied upon, the challenge is how such 
contestation is resolved. 
 
6.4.2 Contestation of Responsibilities – Directly Challenging the Organisation 
The research has identified instances where the organisation and the responsibilities implied 
by this are directly challenged by actors or groups.  The following vignette provides one 
example. 
Vignette: Responsibility for Marketing ‘Vår Hage’ in Europe 
Since its acquisition two decades ago, Vår Hage has proved to be one of the most successful 
brands in GlobeCo.  The business has grown more quickly than the rest of GlobeCo while 
delivering high profitability. 
The business was led from North America from its energetic and charismatic CEO, Karsten 
Gaarder.  Gaarder, and his team have responsibility for global oversight of the brand and 
innovation programme as well as direct responsibility for the US/Canadian marketing and 
sales. 
However, Gaarder expressed how he had been dissatisfied with the performance and 
organisation in Europe.  He was unhappy with the attention that the European units were 
giving Vår Hage as opposed to the other GlobeCo brands.  He explained how he had 
challenged GlobeCo’s existing approach that has all tactical marketing resource reporting 
to the local GlobeCo operating company: 
“I insisted that [they] report into us, because the coaching that they were getting 
locally was not really … aligned enough with what we wanted to achieve.  And 
they were doing this really silly thing whereby I had 20 [full-time equivalents] in 
Europe spread over 45 people.  And I said, 'look, I'm not looking for part-time … 
people, I'm looking for people that are going to live and die and breath for this 
thing'.  
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In the example of Vår Hage, Gaarder is seeking to gain control of the resources (people) in 
Europe in order to shape the organisation in the way that he wants. 
This theme of control frequently appears to drive organisational contestation.  While there 
may be cases of individuals ‘empire building’ just to have a larger organisation (with the 
possibility of additional recognition and reward), repeatedly in GlobeCo there is emphasis 
upon having the ability to control outcomes.  This may hark back to the earlier days of GlobeCo 
where the subsidiary chairmen had nearly complete autonomy and “they could control 
everything, they could deliver results.”  Conversely, it is the loss of control appears to be one 
of the main drivers of resistance to organisational change.  As an SVP that implemented a key 
shared services programme reflected: 
GlobeCo is an incredibly collegial and friendly place to work.  However, it has an 
enormous immune system when you suddenly say 'we're going to change this, and 
this, and this', the system fights back.  And that definitely happened here. 
But … having done a few of these things, you work out the solution, you hire the 
cheapest but reputable consultants that writes up what you want them to write, 
so you present it to [the CEO], you cascade it down to the organisation, and you 
make the economics work.   
And that’s basically what we did.  We worked out the solution, we got [a leading 
consulting firm] who was advising [the GlobeCo CEO] on many other issues, they 
verified that our idea was absolutely right, they reframed it…  The maths really 
worked, we can deliver higher performance with a leaner structure, with more 
scalability across Europe.  So, it became very hard from a business point of view 
to say 'we don't want to do this'.  
And then finally I [have] worked closely with [the President of GlobeCo Europe] for 
many, many years, so… [he] knows a deal when he sees a deal, and this was a 
deal!”  
Thus, we see a case where a key individual directly challenged the organisational structure 
and principles and the resulting lack of responsibility that he had in a key area.  In this case 
(from his perspective) the contestation was successful and resulted in a formal change in 
responsibilities. 
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“[Resistance] starts very basic with the top for me, that people lose.  'I have control 
over my books, I have control over my canteen'.  And that is deeply felt, and I have 
also initially under-estimated it.”  
While another director stressed “it is emotional, because they want to control Jane and 
Johnnie … because they want to be the ones who are making all those decisions.”   
Indeed, even at the top leadership level a 'Chief Officer' was left “feeling somewhat robbed … 
[GBS] were taking away stuff”.  On a more individual level, a senior Finance professional 
involved in setting up shared services reported the reaction of the VP Finance in a large 
country: 
“We had a lovely meeting, he smiled all the time, then we had a one-to-one session 
behind closed doors and he basically said in very plain English to me … 'I [don't] give 
a dam of a few late paid invoices if you screw that up, so be it, your problem.  But if 
you screw up my reporting' – and that's where it turns from 'the' invoices to 'my' 
reporting – 'if you screw that up, I will hit you hard' and he used a few swear words 
just to make the point.”  
As such, a key driver of contestation to the organisation is the need for, or loss of control, and 
with it the autonomy to deliver both the outcomes that the individual wants and delivered in 
the way that they want. 
However, contestation is not only reflected in attempts to directly change the organisation.  It 
is also seen in the non-acceptance of others’ authority – or as one Vice-President said, “there's 
still … that mentality of 'no, no, no, I'm still going to make all the decisions regardless of if I'm 
the one with decision rights or not’”.  In part this is seen in the significant limitations upon the 
ability of even top management to mandate decisions.  However, the inability to get decisions 
respected seems to run through GlobeCo as “people use the complicated, kind of, matrix 
structure to say 'well nobody can tell me to do this but my own boss'” and that “if the decision 
is not taken in your … organisational line or lines of reporting, people tend not to accept 
decisions.”  
This suggests that, in part, the complex organisational structure necessary to operate 
interdependently actually creates the space to allow resistance and the non-acceptance of 
decisions.    Decisions need to be enacted by others, and it appears that it is relatively easy for 
those who are not within the direct reporting line to ignore another’s decision rights. 
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Consequently, the ability to make decisions, or have control are not solely about the formal 
organisational responsibilities, but rather about how individuals understand their and others’ 
responsibilities.    This is echoed in a comment from one Director in GBS who was responsible 
for coordinating the implementation of a global Financial Services programme.  This faced 
“significant challenges” because there was the local GlobeCo companies resisted 
“implementing something which they saw as being imposed, that they did not feel was their 
decision”.  Irrespective of the formal decisions that had been made (at very senior levels) to 
implement the programme, managers in the local companies seemed to believe that they had 
a legitimate voice in this decision, and indeed “they felt they had the right to veto” and to stop 
implementation in ‘their’ country. 
 
6.4.3 Contestation of Initiative Content 
While contestation clearly arises around who has authority or responsibility, it is perhaps more 
frequently be seen to arise around what the organisation should be doing.  Yet in resolving 
such issues this can result in the strengthening or weakening of organisational relationships 
and challenge who has authority. 
 
Vignette: Training in the Institutional Business 
Fran Rowling is the HR Director for the Institutional Business in the UK.  Her reporting lines 
are complex: 
“I report directly to the HR VP for UK & Ireland, [smiling] I have a dotted line to the 
global HR director for the Institutional Business, and I suppose you could argue a 
dotted line to the MD of [the UK] Institutional Business … I smiled because the 
reality is that I serve, I serve many different masters.”  
Fran explained an issue she was currently facing where she is stuck between doing what the 
Global Institutional business wants or aligning with her line manager and the rest of the UK 
business. 
“So, with regard to training.  Because [the Institutional Business has] a different 
P&L … the decision's been taken … that the Institutional Business would not 
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participate in a global marketing capability programme, because it wasn't 
relevant …. [but] that was not communicated at a local level.  
What's happened over the last few weeks is that we've got wind of this global 
marketing capability programme and we've gone 'it's brilliant, it already exists, 
it's been advertised more widely in [the total UK] business, do you know what – 
why don't we sort of hook into it, because our talent should be doing the same 
thing as what the rest of the [UK] business is doing?'.  
So, we've made a decision locally that we're just going to go on and do it.  So, we 
communicate that … and it's now been blocked by Global, because Global have 
now said, 'what are you doing?  We've said we're not doing this, you ain't doing 
it!'  So, I'm now … I'll probably have to just escalate it and someone higher up than 
me will have to unblock it.”  
This incident focuses upon the content of an initiative, in which Fran has initially taken the 
decision to follow her functional line manager and adopt the global programme being used 
elsewhere in the UK.  Yet this conflicts with the approach of her ‘dotted line’ manager in the 
Institutional Business.  Yet this has organisational and relational consequences and however 
this issue was resolved, it would likely reinforce the strength of Fran’s relations with one of 
her ‘bosses’, while weakening them with the others. 
 
In the case of the GlobeCo heterarchy, one cause of contestation within the organisation is 
that there a lack of unity of purpose.  As one long-standing VP highlighted: 
“Everyone has different objectives in reality.  Of course, there is always the over-
arching objective of making the total company successful, but in big organisations 
all of that is broken down into individual targets or individual accountabilities.”  
Yet almost inevitably this seems to result in a fragmentation of objectives and priorities.  For 
example, the VP responsible for the global real estate programme highlighted the tension 
between the target of the local operating company to generate profit, with his priority to 
deliver cash for the business which led to contestation of a proposal for the sale and leaseback 
on a property: 
“It's a very strong business case, a strong positive NPV, but then by bringing cash 
into the business … it will increase [the costs in] a local P&L.  And so locally they don't 
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want to do it, even though it makes sense in the bigger picture.  So, every day we 
come across those instances to where objectives at a macro level are aligned, but at 
a micro level they are not – and we've got to try and connect the dots back between 
the two.”  
More generally, if there is no simple way of resolving conflicting priorities then the risk is that 
initiatives that are dependent upon separate parts of the organisation may grind to a halt: 
“People don't see, or regard, an initiative as the same level of priority, that you don't 
get the buy-in, that you don't get the resources, you don't get these initiatives as 
high on their agenda as it is on some other people's agenda.  As simple as that. “’Oh, 
this is not my priority, therefore we won't do it' sort of stuff going on.” 
While this clearly occurs across organisational entities, goals and objectives can also be 
incompatible within organisation units, particularly where there is a split between reporting 
functionally and within the unit.  This was expressed by one VP of IT Services who ended up 
with a formal reporting line into the head of GBS, but a ‘dotted’ line to the Chief IT Officer: 
“When we moved into GBS ... I had a dual reporting line, which was tough, to both 
[the head of GBS] and [the CITO]…  And … that should have been enough to persuade 
me never to get to that situation again.”   
Indeed, this dual reporting relationship caused difficulties throughout the GBS and IT 
organisations with senior managers talking of “the friction between the two sides of the 
organisation” and “the two-headed monster”.  Yet the VP IT reflected upon the situation and 
concluded: 
“I really came away after a period of reflection saying that the only reason that didn't 
work is because those two individuals were absolutely unable to come to an 
alignment on a strategy…  and I've done it before and … a dual reporting line works 
pretty well if you've people who are actually aligned to a common goal.”  
That is, it was not the organisational structure per se that was unworkable, but the 
contestation or lack of ‘alignment’ between key individuals on the content of what was to be 
done. 
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6.5 The Heterarchy and the Transience of Organisational Relations 
This chapter has introduced three characteristics of the heterarchical multinational as an 
organisation – those of organisational ambiguity, organisational flux and organisational 
contestation – and provides a view of the contemporary multinational as fluid and fuzzy.  This 
contrasts sharply with much of the traditional literature that focuses largely on the MNC as 
being composed of a stable set of unitary and univocal national subsidiaries (Pache & Santos, 
2010).  GlobeCo units do not appear to be homogeneous actors, where their organisational 
members have a shared set of goals as part of a single reporting hierarchy – the so called ‘unity 
of command principle’ (Simon, 1946; Astley & Zajac, 1990)  
Rather, the picture that emerges of GlobeCo is one where the individual ‘unit’ is itself a 
network of relationships, with members having multiple linkages elsewhere within the MNC 
and indeed being members of multiple networks.  As such, the unit within the MNC (be that a 
‘headquarters’ or a ‘subsidiary’) is not so much a node in a network, but has itself become a 
network of teams, reporting lines and functional groups within the wider overlapping 
networks of the MNC.  Furthermore, this configuration is not stable.  The boundaries and 
membership of teams/units are shifting and porous, while the responsibilities of teams, units 
and individuals is contested. 
This perspective challenges view of power in the MNC as acting primarily between well-
defined and univocal units such as a legitimately superior ‘headquarters’ and independent 
‘subsidiaries’.  In part, this follows from rejecting that these exist as well-defined entities.  
However, more fundamentally it challenges the univocality of these – both ‘headquarters’ and 
‘subsidiaries’ are composed of multiple actors and groups, with there being many different 
linkages between these.  Consequently, a ‘subsidiary’ does not hear one voice from 
‘headquarters’ – rather the many actors within any unit may each hear different or multiple 
voices.  This is most clear in those situations where individuals have multiple bosses or are 
members of multiple teams.   
This has significant implications for both the concepts of ‘hierarchy’ and ‘legitimate authority’, 
questioning which reporting line or voice such authority  In many cases there is not an effective 
apex at which there is a sole legitimate arbiter for an issue – any single apex (frequently only 
the CEO) is either too distant for legitimacy, or the issue is too remote/unimportant for the 
person at that apex.  Rather, there may be many voices which speak with legitimacy and 
authority – voices which emanate from multiple perspectives, or from those with different 
interests – contributing to the ongoing contestation within the multinational. 
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This analysis also enriches our understanding of the heterarchy.  It confirms Hedlund’s (1986) 
supposition of the asymmetry of the interdependent organisation, with a multiplicity of 
organising dimensions, the lack of effective apices and the limitations of hierarchy.  However, 
Hedlund’s focus remained largely upon units as the building blocks of the heterarchy.  While 
accepting that the words ‘subsidiary’ “sound a bit funny in the context of a heterarchical MNC” 
(Hedlund, 1986, p. 29), he continues to talk of the ‘components’ of the heterarchy as “units” 
(Hedlund, 2005, p. 215-6).  Yet this analysis suggests that the principles of the heterarchy 
extend within units, such that these become both unstable and poorly defined – 
problematising the unit as the basis of analysis of the heterarchical MNC.  
This suggests that rather than trying to understand power and coordination in the 
relationships between units we need to examine them at multiple levels within the MNC 
considering formal and informal teams and individual actors as well as formal units.  How are 
they using their networks and relationships to achieve outcomes and build their power 
relations?  How are groups, teams and ‘units’ established and motivated to deliver 
coordinated outcomes?  The contestation we see highlights that the organisation – as 
reflected in hierarchy, units, reporting lines, authorities, etc. – is neither static nor 
predetermined.  Rather it is the product of the ongoing interaction between individuals.  As 
Morgan (2006, p. 137) reminds us “organizations are in essence socially constructed realities 
that are as much in the minds of their members as they are in concreate structures, rules and 
relations”.  Such a perspective sees the organisational structure is not so much the basis of 
power relations but that it is the outcome of power and politics in the MNC. 
Consequently, this chapter provides an alternative perspective for understanding the context 
of power in the contemporary multinational company.  We cannot understand this just by 
looking at stable hierarchy, HQ and subsidiaries, we cannot understand this in terms of 
legitimate authority or of univocal plans and strategies.  The heterarchical MNC is messy, 
dynamic and complicated, and perhaps we should join with Morgan (2001a, p. 10) “to admit 
a sense of wonder that organization is accomplished”. 
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7.  The Landscape of Power-in-Use in the Contemporary MNC 
In the previous chapter we explored how GlobeCo had evolved not only into a heterarchical 
organisation, but one that is characterised by organisational ambiguity, with high levels of 
contestation around the organisation and frequent organisational change or fluidity.  It was 
highlighted that in such an environment, individuals frequently face an absence of single-point 
accountability such that formal hierarchical authority cannot be relied upon to resolve issues 
or for taking decisions. 
Despite such challenges, coordinated outcomes are achieved daily.  Within GlobeCo this is 
repeatedly referred to as the result of alignment of agendas.  This concept, which has 
difference facets reflects, at a minimum, the need for a shared acceptance of an outcome, and 
the consistency of the initiatives with others within the organisation.  Yet, as a manifestation 
of coordination, such alignment must reflect the workings of power within the organisation, 
both of taken-for-granted assumptions and of episodic action.  Consequently, this chapter 
gives further insight into how actors navigate the organisational structure of the heterarchical 
MNC (research question 1) and in doing so starts to help us understand the power relations 
that affect the coordination of individuals in the heterarchical MNC (research question 2). 
After introducing the concept of alignment, this chapter focuses upon the way that episodic 
power is evident within GlobeCo – as the visible aspect of power this is referred to as power-
in-use (Pettigrew & McNulty, 1998; Kim et al, 2005).  Three modes are identified: bounded 
autonomy where an actor has effective freedom to determine actions, within certain limits; 
that of solution filtering where an actor has an effective veto over all or parts of a possible 
solution; and solution co-creation where solutions are mutually developed by a range of 
actors, with different responsibilities, working together to deliver an outcome.  The overall 
data structure for the chapter is presented in Figure 7.1.   
Finally, this chapter considers how each of these mechanisms can be understood in the 
context of the literature on power.  It identifies that each of the mechanisms is primarily 
associated with different manifestations of episodic power (respectively the power of 
resources, process and meaning), with the boundaries that outline who can exercise what 
episodic power-in-use reflecting the systemic, taken-for-granted basis of power relations.  
Together these comprise a landscape of power relations within which power-in-use is enacted 
and through which individuals navigate the organisation to achieve coordinated outcomes 
within GlobeCo.   
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7.1 Coordination in GlobeCo – Achieving Alignment 
In the previous chapter it became clear that the hierarchy could not be relied upon to achieve 
the cooperation necessary to deliver outcomes in complex organisations such as GlobeCo.  Yet 
the essence of organisation is coordination, allowing the totality of the organisation to achieve 
something that the constituent parts could not achieve on their own (Okhuysen & Bechky, 
2009).  Within GlobeCo this is recognised in the need to achieve alignment of strategies, 
workplans and activity.  
“Everywhere in an organisation that is networked, the nodes have to be aligned.  And 
if they're not... it slows up, it creates rough edges.”  
Alignment can be considered as a state where there is sufficient coherence of, and 
compatibility between, the disparate objectives within the organisation and the action plans 
to achieve them.  One manager described this as “all pushing in the same direction” while 
another emphasised the need for enactment saying: 
“A decision doesn't become reality until you've got a critical mass of consensual 
support for it, unless you convince enough people that it really is a good idea to do 
it.”   
Generally, while respondents seem to struggle to define what alignment is, they are clear what 
the absence of alignment leads to – “ongoing conflicts [and] disagreement”, it “slows things 
up”, “you will make decisions that go in different directions”, while one respondent suggested 
that being aligned is about achieving a state where there is “not a conflict”.   
As such, the concept of alignment less brings to mind the analogy of the multinational as a 
super-tanker, but rather that of a flotilla of ships that need to make progress on a similar 
heading without interfering with each other. 
Within GlobeCo emphasis is put on the need to reconcile the different agendas that exist 
within the broader organisation:   As one former VP explained: 
“Well, it's like in any environment, in any corporate environment.  People, everyone 
has different agendas…  So, even if you understand that what you want to do is for 
the greater good of the total company as a total, you still need to go and talk to all 
the different stakeholders ... who have different objectives.”  
While another described the lack of alignment as being: 
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“That people don't see, or regard, an initiative as the same level of priority, that you 
don't get the buy-in, that you don't get the resources, you don't get these initiatives 
as high on their agenda as it is on some other people's agenda.”  
And as such, the challenge, as seen by GlobeCo managers is to get the differing agendas of 
those around them sufficiently lined up or ‘aligned’ to permit coordinated action even in many 
situations where formal decision rights are in place: 
“You might have somebody with formal decision rights – but you've got to align 
everybody else up around and below them to make sure that they are all aligned.”  
This need for ‘alignment’ stretches in multiple dimensions.  Firstly, it is clear that this is 
required horizontally across organisational teams and units – so that in one key project the 
responsible VP stressed that “it came to aligning a lot of the Finance function, the Controller's 
office, the 'Markets' – in terms of the changes and why [these] are going to be made.”  
Yet alignment is also required within the boundaries of teams and units (which may be made 
more difficult by differing reporting lines).  One respondent talked about a unit leadership 
team that they sat on: 
“There was just a lack of alignment really about what was going on, there was a lot 
going on in the background and not aligning that team.  So, it wasn't a great 
leadership team to be part of.”  
Respondents also stress the importance of ‘vertical’ alignment – particularly in terms of ‘lining 
up’ the senior decision makers who are seen to have legitimate influence on outcomes.  
Interestingly respondents also emphasise the need to align the direct reports/subordinates of 
those senior decision makers as they frequently will not make a decision until their own teams 
are aligned.  One VP said that “if you have a very senior SVP, often you have to align to their 
teams, and sometimes to their teams’ teams before it goes up to them.”  Another respondent 
emphasised that “you've got to go and line up his troops before he's prepared to put his skin 
in the game and say 'yes'”. 
Clearly achieving ‘alignment’ requires work – this is not something that will necessarily occur 
without deliberate effort.  As one VP reported about his time in GBS: 
“A large part of what we do is also a bit of stakeholder management.  It's aligning 
interests and flushing out where there are inconsistencies where people are not 
aligned and dealing with them.  So, a large part of the time is spent doing that.”  
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Another VP provided a feeling of the richness of the activities that might be required: 
“You create alignment also by, first of all, creating excitement around an agenda, 
setting the scene, then – of course – forming also partnerships, alliances inside the 
organisation … to create organisational momentum behind a theme, because that is 
not going to happen by sending an email and saying 'look this is now a priority please 
do so'….  And it's not just one person...  And this is, of course, by explaining it, by 
laying it out in facts and figures, but also through a 'battle cry' to rally the troops to 
get them fully energised.”   
The emphasis here is not about units but about people and their relationships.  Alignment is 
created through managing stakeholders, generating excitement, forming partnerships and 
alliances, providing rational explanation as well as through the ‘battle cry’. 
As one Director summed up: 
“It does come down to people… The processes will take you so far, but multinationals 
do come down to managing people and people relationships, and figuring out how 
to get people on the same side.”  
The literature review in Chapter 4 suggested that power plays a key role in achieving 
coordination.  This raises the question of how power is manifest in GlobeCo to achieve the 
alignment that is seen as being so important.  Here the research identified three different 
mechanisms that make up the landscape of power-in-use. 
 
7.2 Power-in-Use: Bounded Autonomy 
“The Controller … was responsible and would make calls, decisions, as needed 
and provide the support.”  
The previous chapter highlighted the limitations of both hierarchy and legitimate authority 
within an interdependent heterarchy.  However, this does not mean that these are absent and 
play no role.  From the study of GlobeCo there are examples where hierarchical-like behaviour 
is exhibited and where the authority of individuals is respected as the key mechanism to 
achieve coordinated outcomes.  Yet this occurs within clear limits.  Consequently, this first 
type of power-in-use is referred to as bounded autonomy.  This is the situation where 
managers have sufficient autonomy or control to determine outcomes without significant 
interference from others.  This requires that other actors involved in the outcome accept the 
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legitimacy of the primary actor’s bounded autonomy and enact decisions that he/she has 
made – fitting with Brock’s (2003, p. 58) definition of autonomy as “the degree to which one 
may make significant decisions without the consent of others”. 
Supporting quotes for the analysis in this section are shown in Table 7.1. 
 
7.2.1 Making Decisions and Controlling the Agenda 
We have already seen that there are many circumstances within GlobeCo where there is no 
single-point responsibility and where the hierarchy cannot be relied upon to guide 
responsibility for issue resolution.  Yet it is also clear that there are some situations where 
actors are able to make decisions which are enacted by others.     
The case of GlobeCo reveals instances where individuals feel that they have significant 
autonomy over specific issues, or even where they have broad autonomy within their role.  
This was highlighted by one Director reflecting on a previous role:   
“In my old role … I was very much left on my own to make those decisions within my 
own area myself.”  
Similarly, the Director who ran the PMO (the organisation that managed key programmes 
within GBS) said: 
“So, on the [Programme Management Organisation] I actually, almost, have 
complete autonomy… Once it was operating, I had huge autonomy in that space.  
You know, to define what I want to do, how I want to deliver it, all those kind of 
things.”  
These quotes highlight that central to GlobeCo managers’ understanding of ‘autonomy’ is the 
freedom to determine outcomes – for example in the ability to ‘make those decisions’ or to 
‘define what I want to do’.  One, Director described this as “being in control of the agenda”, 
saying: 
“If I look at the agenda, I can control most of it myself – but without being stupid!  
So, what does control mean?  Control means that you drive your solution in a certain 
direction where you see most value for GlobeCo…  I feel that I can be driving the 
agenda and be executive”  
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7.2.2 Hierarchical Control of Team and Resources 
However, if we are considering bounded autonomy in the context of multiple actors, it is 
crucial that the decisions and actions (the ‘agenda’ setting) of the primary actor are enacted 
by others.  Despite its heterarchical nature, in GlobeCo this is still most frequently seen in the 
context of hierarchical control.  As one marketing VP commented: 
“In my previous role I had a team of 90 people, I controlled a budget well in the 
double-digit million [Pound] figure which I could deploy this way or that way.”  
We might even say that it is this this hierarchical ‘control’ of a large team and budget was the 
basis of his ability to act autonomously (that is ‘deploy this way or that way’). 
 
Vignette: Transforming European IT 
As with most activity, IT had been run locally within GlobeCo, but fell functionally under the 
strong SVP Finance in each region. 
In Europe, Alexander, the SVP Finance & IT saw the need to transform local IT into regional 
services.  As one of his team reported: 
“The decision was taken by Alexander to manage IT purely as a [regional] service, 
and there would be no local IT presence in the markets in Europe.  So it meant all 
the support of local systems needed to be moved to regional process and service 
issues, escalations, had to be managed differently…  
It was a tough role because I had to convince some of the Finance VPs that their 
teams were going to disappear, and they'd had these teams on tap for years, and 
they had to follow the global progress to get projects done and service issues 
resolved.”   
This VP, who oversaw the transformation, was then asked if they faced pushback from the 
Finance VPs in the countries: 
“Yeah, most, most!  Around how do I get things done?  ‘What's going to happen 
when that person that I've known for 10 years and runs around and does all my 
stuff for me whether it's fixing my Blackberry or my iPhone, or whatever it might 
be, or finding out why SAP's down, what am I going to do?’  So, we had to paint 
some clear processes around how you would do that, but we almost got thrown 
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out of the French office!  We went there, and we had our presentation ready, the 
local Director was there, and … was very aggressive towards us. 
But, I mean they all accepted it because they all worked for Alexander, and it was 
Alexander’s … cooking, and it was ‘take out cost’, it was cost saving.  They had no 
option.” 
Alexander’s authority from his organisational position (combined, perhaps, with his 
personal experience and credibility) led to the Finance organisation implementing the 
change, even though many of them had significant concerns about how it would work. 
 
Direct ‘line management’ appears to be a crucial part of this – as illustrated in the Vignette 
above, where the country VPs had “no option” to accept the changes and “accepted it because 
they all worked for Alexander”. 
Indeed, respondents repeatedly reported that it was more important to have the people, the 
head-count and the reporting lines than to have budgetary control.  As one Director explained: 
“I think the people with the people have the power.  Because, actually, moving 
financial resource around is actually probably simpler now than moving people 
around, and, you know, actually having a team that you can send off in a different 
direction.”  
Furthermore, another Director explicitly talked about how much more difficult it is to get a 
decision enacted when those that need to act are not within the direct reporting line: 
“I think one of the things about decision making is the person who thinks they're 
taking the decision, the implementation has to stick.  And to make that stick, that 
person has to deliver it through their people.  And if the person wanting a decision 
to be made is not in that line management, you're brokering all the time.”  
Although line-management hierarchy may give the greatest opportunity for managers to act 
autonomously, there are also cases where the authority of someone sitting in a different 
reporting line is accepted, and their decisions become enacted.  Tim, one of the Service Line 
Directors in Workplace said that “people leave me alone… [they] they don't send emails 'you 
must do this' and 'you should have better done this'... I feel empowered.”  Elsewhere he talked 
of the source of his autonomy saying, “at some point it goes back to the trust and the 
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credibility again, they say 'well if Tim thinks this is best, then probably it's best'.”  His authority 
is accepted as legitimate despite the lack of line responsibility. 
 
7.2.3 The Boundaries of Autonomy 
Although some managers see themselves (or others) as having considerable autonomy to 
drive outcomes, the general feeling within GlobeCo is that the autonomy of the individual is 
clearly bounded.  That is there are issues where they can act reasonably autonomously and 
others where this is not possible.   
Frequently, managers expressed the view that had autonomy only in part of their role – that 
is that they believed that there were certain issues where they have autonomy.  This is 
reflected in comments such as “in this role I have some freedom”.  Another commented: 
“Do I have much autonomy there?  Yes and no, and I think I'm still trying to find 
where the line is…  So, like, actually I have, as long as I make the right call I have 
loads of autonomy!  [Laughing.]  Does that make sense?”  
However, the boundaries within which managers are working are neither pre-defined or 
stable.  Rather, they evolve depending upon performance, experience and others 
understanding.  One manager talked of his experience in a role taking responsibility for the 
Programme Management Office (PMO): 
“When you first take over the role and … the PMO was shit....  Did I have a huge 
amount of autonomy?  No not really – I had to check a lot of stuff with [the VP 
Finance] and get stuff done and actually Theo was a real pain in the backside…  But 
when, once it was operating [well], I had huge autonomy in that space.  You know, 
to define what I want to do, how I want to deliver it, all those kind of things…   Now 
to a certain extent that's trust because we've fixed it.”  
While these illustrations reflect boundaries imposed in the relationship between the Director 
and his boss, respondents more broadly reflected upon the multiplicity of constraints that 
provided the ‘framework’ within which they had freedom to act: 
“What is power?  In a way we talk about freedom within a framework.  So I know 
there are certain things which I can't do, so that might be authorisation limits as to 
individual items of spend that I can authorise, that I can't authorise.  Obviously, total 
budget control is an issue.  Staff recruitment, there is a limit to how many people I 
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can recruit in which country.  But on the other hand, it's my choice who I recruit in 
any area.  I don't have anyone else looking immediately over my shoulder.  Choices 
that we make within a framework are mine, and I feel quite comfortable with that.”  
While the ‘boundaries’ that give ‘freedom within a framework’ may be formally defined, they 
may also be much more informal.  The Chief Executive of one high performing subsidiary talked 
about how his team are empowered, and referred to the importance of them knowing the 
boundaries within which they could operate – which he referred to as ‘guard-rails’: 
“A key thing to unleash the power of our organisation is if the people have a feeling 
that what they do matters, and they have the power to … actually end up doing it 
and they actually just execute it… They just did it, because they have the autonomy, 
they know what we want to do, they know what the 'guard-rails' are, and they have 
the autonomy and they feel empowered to actually do it.” 
Furthermore, taken-for-granted cultural understandings provide significant boundaries upon 
managers’ ability to act alone.  Indeed, Tim, the Service Line Director who talked above about 
having ‘control’ went on to say: 
“At the same time in the work I do you cannot ignore the local stakeholder 
management.  If I fit out a new office in X, I can't ignore the Chairman of X and I can't 
ignore the SVP Finance and HR of X because they are key stakeholders”  
Indeed, this sense that others who are affected by your actions have some legitimate right to 
be involved in the process and restrict your autonomy seems all pervasive within GlobeCo.  
Indeed, one VP commented that: 
“Even though we might be inserted in decision rights, it is more to make sure that 
we are coordinating and driving, as opposed to just autonomously making the 
decisions that we think make the most sense, because we always have to align back 
with that business.”  
There may be no formal requirement or rule that restricts this VP in his autonomy, rather it is 
through a shared sense of understanding within GlobeCo that means that his team must 
“align” with the business. 
As such, this section highlights that despite the interdependent nature of GlobeCo, there are 
many situations where individuals believe that they, and others, can act with autonomy – and 
can control outcomes through the deployment of key resources and the enactment of others.  
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However, there are clear boundaries to this – limiting the apparent autonomy to certain issues.  
Such boundaries may be formally expressed through GlobeCo’s processes and structures, but 
as importantly, also seem to be the product of shared understandings of where others need 
to be involved within the decision process. 
 
7.3 Power-in-Use: Solution Filtering 
“As the custodian of the innovation funnel … it was up to me to determine which 
of those actually went forward.” 
The second way in which episodic power is identified as enacting is that of solution filtering.  
This is where an actor has the legitimacy to exercise a block on something happening – that is 
filtering out initiatives that they find unacceptable, and consequently putting constraints upon 
the ability of others to act.  Quotes supporting this analysis can be found in Table 7.2. 
Solution filtering is well described by a Finance VP within a key emerging market economy. 
“As in good companies … it is very much strict to the schedule of authority first of all.  
So, there is a materiality limit there and in various elements.  So, I give you an 
example.  I think I have autonomy in terms of decision making in all areas of 
Finance...   Can I approve everything?  Not everything… For example – so can I set up 
a new factory?  No, I can't, I would need approval also from other elements within 
the organisation.  Can I stop to be built a factory?  Yes, I could, because that power I 
have within the local organisation.”  
That is in the ‘issue space’ of Finance, there are areas where he has the autonomy to approve 
things and make positive decisions – what was referred to above as ‘bounded autonomy’.  
There are other areas, however, where he does not have the ability to unilaterally achieve 
outcomes (where approval is required from other elements within the organisation’) but 
where he, as the Finance VP, has an ability to veto or stop the initiative. 
This ability to stop things, to say ‘no’, seems to be a major issue within GlobeCo, with one long-
standing Vice President reflecting that: 
“In a big corporation, in GlobeCo … you can have a great idea and you have 49 people 
who are supporting of the idea, and you have one who says 'no' and most likely it's 
a no…  But it's the power of 'no' in a big organisation.  And once it has been a 'no' it 
is very difficult to turn this 'no' into a 'yes' again.”  
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Such filtering action needs to be distinguished from the ‘bounded autonomy’ previously 
identified.  Filtering clearly has an element of control within in it, and the actor may have 
autonomy over filtering decisions (such as the Finance VP above, who sees himself as having 
the power to stop a factory being built).  Yet this solution filtering is limited to saying ‘no’ – 
that is negating rather than creating options.    As such, while approval (i.e. non-veto) may be 
necessary for an initiative to be implemented, it is not sufficient.  Even if a proposal is approved 
by one actor, it may be vetoed or blocked by another – what one respondent described as “it 
works by checks and balances, by dividing and conquering”. 
As such, the process of filtering frequently has a both a dynamic and collective nature to it.  
Actor C proposes an action, which Actor B must either then agree with or not (and it may be 
that Actor A, etc., must also agree).   In many cases an actor’s veto rights may apply to only 
part of an initiative (e.g. the launch of a new product X in country Y).  While from their 
perspective they may feel that they have control (of the launch of X in Y), for those people 
managing a global launch of product X this veto may be regarded as little more than 
influencing the launch plan (e.g. they may return to consider country Y at a later stage). 
 
7.3.1 Formal Processes of Solution Filtering 
Solution Filtering appears to be manifest in different ways within GlobeCo.  An ability to veto 
is most obviously linked to the formal processes such as the Schedule of Authority and the 
decision processes around innovations and major investments.  Such a situation was 
highlighted by a marketing VP who previously ran the category innovation process: 
“I basically owned the project funnel, I decided whether a project would pass or not, 
would pass in this form or not.  I could not necessarily decide to say 'look I want to 
have it launched in the following markets', but I could say 'look it's going to be this 
project or it's going to be that project'.  And I drove the agenda in a direction, in a 
number of instances, that I can attribute … to my decision making.”  
As such, while this VP could not ensure that a particular initiative was implemented, but he 
was able to filter out the initiatives that he did not want to see ‘pass’ and through this shape 
the agenda in a particular direction – but without causing them to be launched in any particular 
country. 
Such funnels for innovation or change projects are common within GlobeCo, as well as with 
other multinationals (Reitzig, 2011).  Figure 7.2 illustrates GlobeCo’s innovation funnel, which 
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has explicit stages, or ‘gates’, where projects and initiatives are reviewed and ‘weeded out’.  
Typically, different gate keepers will be involved at different stages – so in the case of a product 
innovation that may be a senior member of the category team at the charter gate stage, 
however supply chain, would need to agree to pass the contract gate, while individual 
countries are involved at the roll-out gate. 
As such, ‘gate keepers’ have considerable power of veto – as highlighted in the quote at the 
beginning of this section. 
Such power of veto is also seen in other formal governance arrangements.  One senior 
executive talked of a governance board that had oversight of a brand he was responsible for, 
explaining that this board “have the power to stop anything that I want to do if they believe it 
goes against the integrity of the brand”, yet the responsibility for the strategy and proactive 
development of the brand remained with the executive and not with the governance board. 
It is also worth recognising that such veto or blocking rights can at times may effectively be 
built into processes to the extent that these can restrict action independent of human agency.  
This is most apparent in the role of the business plan and related financial hurdles that serve 
the role of “keeping people honest”. 
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7.3.2 Informal Veto Rights 
However, the ability to veto does not solely result from formal processes.  In proposing the 
reporting lines for Vår Hage in Europe (see Chapter 6), Karsten Gaarder had discussed the 
proposal with the CEO, Remco Mertens.  Here he was not seeking a mandate, but rather that 
he was “not against.  He's just got to be not against.  On this sort of level, the hierarchy basically 
works with Remco saying 'yes ... do what you've got to do'”.  Thus, he was ensuring that the 
CEO would not veto his proposal. 
Informal veto rights are also illustrated in the following vignette. 
 
Vignette: The Scope of GlobeCo Business Services. 
Following the arrival of a new CEO, Vincent Peeters was appointed to set up a new global 
organisation (GBS) to manage GlobeCo’s business services.  The first question was what 
services fell within the scope of this new organisation, and which remained with the existing 
functions or regions. 
Vincent explained: 
“[The CEO] gave a lot of freedom, so he clearly wanted me to own it, and not give 
direction himself.  So I was allowed to define the scope.”  
Similarly, a key member of Vincent’s team said:  
“But what should be in and what shouldn't be in? … Certainly, the way I felt when 
I came in was that we had quite a lot of rein to work out what the scope was 
really.” 
For some key areas there was never significant debate about them becoming part of GBS: 
“There were some rough ideas about what the scope was – it was definitely going 
to include HR, it was definitely going to include Finance.”  
Yet it was clear that the CEO would not mandate which areas would be within GBS scope, 
giving leaders in other areas an effective veto. 
“And moving in [part of] Order-to-Cash or Supply Chain, [the CEO] would only 
accept if I would convince the Customer Development [SVP] and [the Chief Supply 
Chain Officer].  So, he would never ever say – 'ah that's a great idea, I'll give you 
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the mandate, go to them and take it out' – he said, 'it's a great idea, why don't 
you discuss with [the Chief Supply Chain Officer] and convince him that this is a 
great idea?'” 
And Vincent is clear that in a number of these areas other managers prevented any transfer 
of activity into GBS: 
“I would have loved to bring in much more of the front-office operations but, 
rightly so, Customer Development asked the question 'is it right that you pay you 
invoices 30% on time' – ‘yes’ – '[then] how dare you suggest to even come close to 
my order book?’” 
While another manager commented: 
“I think there was also a pushback, because the Chief Supply Chain Officer … was 
not really keen of course to lose [Procurement] out of the Supply Chain.”  “You 
could have said Procurement resisted and we lost it, damn!” 
Within this vignette key individuals – the Chief Supply Chain Officer and the SVP Customer 
Development – were being given effective vetoes on whether parts of their operations 
transferred into the new GlobeCo unit.  This is not a veto that is embedded within formal 
decision processes or schedules of authority, rather there is an acceptance that change will 
not occur to key responsibilities that affect them without their agreement. 
 
Without there being any explicit statement of who has such rights, it is not surprising that 
disputes and resistance seems to emerge where there is a difference of understanding around 
who has (or should have) such rights.  One Director in GlobeCo Business Services commented 
about one project that the local operating companies “felt that they had the right to veto and 
that caused an enormous amount of frustration, additional work, disruption, and frankly was 
unhelpful at the end.”  
At an extreme, informal veto rights can be exhibited in the form of what is variously referred 
to as ‘abdication’ or ‘passive resistance’ – that is that actors who are supposed to be involved 
in a project just disengage: 
“[They were] more or less walking away from the debate at a certain point in time, 
and not partaking in developing and making the solution work.  Put bluntly it was 
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throwing the ball over the fence and hoping it all went well… abdication is the term 
I would use.”  
Consequently, at a micro level, many actors could obstruct aspects of an initiative through 
non-cooperation and non-participation. 
 
7.3.3 Ceremonial Gatekeeping and Limitations of Filtering 
Although ‘Solution Filtering’ plays an important role within GlobeCo, it also appears that 
sometimes the powers suggested in formal veto rights are more ‘ceremonial’ than real.  
Respondents talk about situations where “the physical sign off may be a formality” or even “a 
rubber stamp”.  In such circumstances, the decision had effectively been made with no real 
prospect that the formal veto rights will ever be exercised. 
This was the case in the European FM Outsourcing project (see Chapter 8).  As a major contract 
commitment this went to the Chief Executive Officer for approval – but only a few days before 
the contract was due to go into effect, and formal approval constituted of “four words for the 
approval on the email!  Or was it two?”.  The CEO had been aware of the project as part of his 
regular discussions with the head of GBS – “he definitely had visibility of it” – so it can be 
assumed that he had some ability to shape the project.  However, the formal authority stage 
itself was legalistic rather than substantive. 
In other situations, it was made clear that the formal gatekeepers were effectively restricted 
in their ability to exercise vetoes.  This was highlighted by the Director that ran the IT portfolio 
tool.   
“So, I [and] my team do all the gatekeeping on the biggest projects GlobeCo has that 
are IT enabled, right.  But actually, my power to say that project now [stops] … is 
totally and utterly over-ridden… I'm here to provide a comfort blanket when audit 
come... that's not true, but do you know what I mean?”  
Although formally this Director formally had the ‘power’ to stop a project, he did not feel that 
this could be effectively exercised saying “I do have a little influence, but the boundaries are 
set on me somewhere else.” 
Consequently, as with ‘bounded autonomy’ the constraints upon individual managers ability 
to act can be significant.  Respondents compare GlobeCo (and other European based 
multinationals) with American firms with their ‘command-and-control’ culture.  Rather, “it's 
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the culture of the company as well … it's not just about the formal governance and the way 
it's set up”, that is the culture of “wanting to listen to everybody”.  Within such an environment 
there is a desire to bring others into the decision-making process.  This leads us to the third 
mode, that of Solution Co-creation. 
 
7.4 Power-in-Use: Solution Co-Creation 
“Others would be more engaged and open to be solving problems 
collaboratively, understanding the issue that was being faced and co-develop, 
co-invent …the solution.” 
It is clear from the study of GlobeCo that there are many circumstances where outcomes are 
not the result of one actor having control of the situation.  Rather, the outcome is dependent 
upon the interaction of multiple actors in a process of solution co-creation.  That is that 
decision-making emerges from group interactions to form a solution that fits to the 
requirements of the group.  Supporting quotes for this section are shown in Table 7.3. 
 
7.4.1 Building the Solution Together 
Throughout the investigation of GlobeCo cases were highlighted where actors felt unable to 
act on their own, and rather the solution was built by individuals working together and 
collaborating. 
“In any organisation these days nobody can do anything independently.  It's always 
a collective and collaborative effort.”  
This is particularly true in the context of larger change initiatives where there is a need for 
multiple participants to collaborate to drive the solution: 
“Bigger programmes, like massive changes in direction, I think, that takes groups to 
really drive – because there should be in those situations a lot of inputs, fact finding, 
discussion, sharing, evolution of the idea, formalisation of the idea, and buy-in from 
the group … there is a key group role in coming to those conclusions, those 
decisions.”  
This is illustrated further in the following vignette. 
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Vignette: The Design of GlobeCo Business Services 
In September 2011, the GlobeCo Executive approved in principle the idea of creating a 
Global Business Services, but there was very little granularity on what this actually meant.  
As one member of the team said: 
“September.  What had been decided?  Well I think it's an interesting question 
because I'm not sure anything had been decided really… So when I joined, I think 
the decision had been taken to create a GBS and that was it, fundamentally.”  
In order to undertake design and feasibility work and to put a formal proposal to the 
GlobeCo Board., Vincent Peeters pulled together a small team of those running existing 
services: 
“What they had done was basically taken those existing global organisations [and] 
pulled them into a leadership team.”  
One of this team recalls his experience of this time as one of collective sensemaking: 
“I was the first service line person to move into the [team]...  It was great, all of 
our initial discussions that we had… To be there in all the workshops, to talk about 
and explore what could it look like, what are others doing, how are we organised 
today, what is it that we can leverage, what do we need to change, what is the 
journey to get there, what does success look like?  So being a part of all those 
conversations from the inception gave me an opportunity to shape, but also evolve 
with, because we were asking questions that we didn't know the answer to.  We 
had to kind of explore what makes the most sense directionally.”  
Others similarly emphasise the way in which the plan was shaped together. 
“And so for me, that was that first piece, bringing lots of different people together 
from lots of different areas, identifying some fantastically crazy stuff. 
I always felt like there was a lot of pent-up energy and excitement because, you 
know, services is a dull area, right.  Services is the back-office of the back-office.  
And people had been treated like the back-office of the back-office and what … 
Vincent and James did was take these people, who were actually pretty clever 
people, … and say for the first time in a long time 'here's some money', and 'here's 
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some space to think'.  And, so in lots of ways there were thousands of different 
ideas that came and went. 
I think, … why did that have an influence wasn't because we had any better ideas, 
I think it was again because we had a very small core team and we worked very 
closely together.  We were part of a project team who challenged each other, who 
were listened to, and were thought of as one team…  We were doing something 
for the good of GlobeCo.”  
Within four months the GlobeCo board approved a formal plan to establish GBS.  This plan 
was the work of numerous individuals pulling together: 
“I remember … Stefan … doing a fundamental piece of thinking about how you run 
shared services … that's a fundamental building block.  I think James for the 
…service culture he brought and his energy... I don't know if we'd have got off the 
ground in the same way without him.  And Vincent, 'cos his energy, his drive, his 
kind of intellect, brilliant!”  
This vignette illustrates how the GBS proposal was not one person’s crafting but is a 
multifaceted process of collective sensemaking (Gioia & Chettipeddi, 1991; Weick, 1995), 
such that there is an evolution of the solution as a shared understanding of what the team 
needs to deliver. 
 
However, such solution co-creation is not limited within the boundary of a team or unit – there 
is also clear indications that this frequently includes a presumption to work with those that 
will be impacted by any initiative – frequently referred to as ‘stakeholders’.  In part this is a 
‘sensegiving’ type behaviour: 
“It was just a lot of, a lot of discussion, a lot of on-boarding, a lot of focus on 
collaborative approach, convincing, explaining to people what the issues were, 
where we were going, why we were doing it.”  
“All of these things you need to put in place, and people need to understand WHY 
you are putting them in place – so a lot of it is about creating the vision, the appetite 
for the vision and the appetite therefore for the change that needs to take place, 
which is essentially about synergising what the company really is.”  
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Yet this selling of the initiative is not purely a one-way flow of meanings and understandings 
aimed at motivating others within the organisation.  There is also a need for listening to the 
stakeholders and adjusting the solution as part of the co-creation.  In the context of GBS a VP 
talked about such two-way dialog: 
“The 'geographies', those that are really at the end of the day the clients of the 
services regardless of what function is delivering it.  And I think, looking back, but I 
think all organisations would say this, how do you get them to be a part of it, so they 
can shape it, but not overly disrupt or interfere with it.  Because they … are the ones 
who are in receipt of the services, they are the ones who are growing the business.  
So, it is, how do you make sure they are involved in the journey, and so they do not 
feel the disruption and are not a disruptor?”  
Key here is that not only are they “part of it”, but the VP is expecting for them to have an 
opportunity to “shape it”, to contribute to the process of creating an appropriate solution. 
 
7.4.2 Debate and ‘Everyone’ Having Their Say 
As has already been highlighted, there is appears to be a deep assumption within GlobeCo 
that many people have the ‘right’ to participate in decision making.  On Director described this 
in terms of the culture of the organisation: 
“A culture of still wanting to listen to everybody, get all the views on board, almost 
be like a judge and jury for an extended court case.”  
Another Director highlighted the impact that this has: 
“Everyone still thinks that everybody is allowed to have a voice in everything… But 
because of that behaviour that is so engrained in GlobeCo people, it is then that need 
to make sure that you are engaging everybody and getting them on board.”  
This need to ‘engage’ seems to be a deep-seated, taken-for-granted assumption in GlobeCo.  
As with the respondent above we could see this as a cultural manifestation of how managers 
within GlobeCo behave.  Yet, it also rooted within the interdependent, network-like and 
heterarchical nature of the organisation.  This is seen in the way that GlobeCo managers refer 
to the need for engagement to resolved different perspectives and priorities.  Different 
individuals and teams are embedded in different organisational and institutional settings 
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which can lead to them having a different understanding and perspective of a particular 
initiative. 
“And so what happens is that you've got someone who's driven to drive a global 
agenda … who goes 'right, well the model has to look like this', and you get someone 
in India going 'you've got to be a nutcase, right, that will never land here!'  And, 
actually, … 'cos it's totally different in China and totally different in Indonesia.  So I 
think there's that kind of local/global piece that drives some of that divergence”. 
Furthermore, as a reaction to the multiple functional, geographic and product areas that the 
MNC works across there is a necessity to respond to “the rational business constraints of other 
conflicting priorities”.  An initiative can conflict directly with the priority of others, or it is just 
not a priority given the workload.  This may be at an organisational level – and particular global 
initiatives land in local organisations that “have, quite frankly, better things to do – they want 
to run a business.  They want to sell.  These transformation projects are a distraction to them.”  
Engagement is consequently necessary to understand the different priorities and 
perspectives, and consequently attempting to try and generate a path that reconciles these 
differences.  As one Director emphasised “we have to find the right solution because it's quid 
pro quo between us – if we're going to do this we have to do it together”.  
Yet, while GlobeCo managers see a process of engaging with others as necessary, there is 
widespread recognition of the problems that this brings.  Apart from that it “impedes and 
limits speed”, it can create considerable frustration, with one respondent who had left 
GlobeCo reflecting: 
“I realised that I was exhausting myself much more in all of this, let's say, effort of 
convincing, rather than doing the stuff.  And I didn't like that, I didn't like that … I felt 
that this was not what I wanted to do in life and I felt that I could potentially be 
happier in an environment where things where decisions would be taken faster, 
where I could decide for myself, and act much faster.”  
This risk of being “too democratic” is also perceived in risk aversion.  This is both in the risk 
averse nature of the outcomes for the organisation, in that the riskier more challenging 
options get negotiated out through “checks and balances”, but also removes risk for the 
individual manager – as one consultant who works with GlobeCo colourfully described: 
“Everybody gets the chance to – excuse my language – cover their arse, and then 
finally a consensus-based decision from which nobody appears to be really on the 
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hook, creating a marvellous opportunity as soon as something goes wrong to turn 
around and point the finger at somebody else.”  
 
7.4.3 Knowing Who to Involve in Co-Creation   
Although the previous section referred to ‘everyone’ having there say – this is clearly a short-
hand exaggeration in an organisation of 100,000 people.  Rather, the challenge appears to be 
for managers to know who it is that should be engaged.  This is about “finding the right person 
to talk to”. 
An experienced VP stresses that this is much more than a result of the formal roles and 
authorities within GlobeCo: 
“It is knowing who are the key drivers in the business – not just a Schedule of 
Authority table, but who are the real drivers of that particular business.”  
For him this seems straightforward as “it becomes a pretty clear blueprint in terms of who you 
want to include” in discussions.  Yet others comment that it is “not always obvious” who needs 
to be involved and that “you go for those people that you think … are the real … stakeholders.  
But maybe they're not, maybe there's one or two others that you haven't thought through”.   
This presents a particular challenge for those new to the organisation, as one senior manager 
explained: 
“Coming into GlobeCo one of the things I found most difficult was identifying all the 
people that you needed to speak to about something.  Because you'd identify the 
very obvious ones, and then think you were done, and then there would be a whole 
other group of people that would just pop up at the last minute and, you know, want 
to be consulted and be able to express a view… That's challenging, because it's not 
written down anywhere, so you have to sort of learn it, and even when you think 
you've learnt it, you know I'm still finding out I'm missing out people every now and 
again.” 
That is, the knowledge about whom to involve in solution construction and decision making is 
tacit knowledge that goes beyond the formal organisational structure or authorities.  It reflects 
not only the influence of key individuals (“that person … has the ear of someone else”) but 
also a shared cultural understanding of who has a legitimate right to be included (“we always 
have to align with the local business”). 
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7.5 Alignment and the Manifestation of Power within GlobeCo 
The previous section identified three modes of power-in-use through which coordinated 
actions, or alignment, are achieved in GlobeCo.  While the implications for understanding 
power relations will be more fully addressed in Chapter 9, I would suggest that the three 
modes of coordination align closely to the first three ‘dimensions’ of power as highlighted by 
Hardy (1996) while representing very different ways in which power is manifest within 
GlobeCo 
 
7.5.1 Modes of Coordination and the Dimensions of Power 
Firstly, the concept of bounded autonomy is about the ability of an actor to achieve outcomes 
without significant interference from others.  In the case of GlobeCo, achieving such outcomes 
in bounded autonomy appears primarily through the control of relevant resources – 
particularly in terms of money and people.  As such, bounded autonomy, reflects to Hardy’s 
(1996, p. S7) power of resources in which “power is exercised by actors to … bring about the 
desired behaviour through the deployment of key resources on which others depend, such as 
information, expertise, … the control of money, rewards and sanctions.”  
Within GlobeCo this manifests as the freedom to deploy budgets as one wishes, as is having 
‘control’ of the human resources, the people, to achieve this.   
This emphasises the importance of the line management relationship (which, as we have seen, 
frequently do not reflect unit boundaries).  Line management brings ‘headcount’ over which 
the manager has the ability to reward or punish.  This is seen through the ability to hire and 
fire – removing or reassigning those who do not perform in the right way (“I changed person 
X”), and bringing the right sort of people into the ‘team’ (with one top executive claiming that 
the most important requirement of a leader was to “surround themselves with people they 
trusted”).  The importance of line management is further underpinned by the GlobeCo reward 
system in which the line manager both sets the Annual Performance Targets and, broadly, 
judges their achievement and hence the level of reward that an individual receives.   As one 
Director stressed “what that system also does is that [it] then puts a huge amount of … value 
on your relationship with your direct boss.”  
Secondly, at the heart of solution filtering appears to be the role of process – that is that there 
exists a formal (or informal) process which gives an actor a right of veto over a particular issue 
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or outcome.  This appears to link closely to Hardy’s (1996) description of the second dimension 
of power as ‘the power of process’ which she characterises as based upon “decision-making 
processes, participants and agendas” (ibid., p. S7).  This emphasis upon both the process and 
who have privileged positions within it are highlighted in a quote from a senior GlobeCo 
executive: 
“In the end, the formal authority rules are not only there for the Audit Committee 
and the governance, but they are also there to make sure that in the end, the 
relevant people have a say in important decisions, full stop!  And, those people that 
are supposed to sign are very much aware of that.”, and even as part of the informal 
context they will signal – 'wait a minute it's all nice and fine what you're doing but 
in the end it needs to be translated into a proposal that will land on my desk'.”  
In contrast, solution co-creation is not about resource control or process, but is about the 
development of a shared understanding of the problem and the solution, and the practices of 
both sensemaking and sensegiving that surrounded this.  This aligns closely upon Hardy’s third 
dimension of the power of meaning (Hardy, 1996).  In this she builds upon Lukes argument 
that “power is often used to shape perceptions, cognitions and preferences” (Hardy, 1996, p. 
S8), such that there is no apparent conflict given the apparent consensus.  Solution co-creation 
is built upon “inputs, fact finding, discussion, sharing, evolution of the idea, formalisation of 
the idea, and buy-in from the group” and developing “a common understanding as to what 
we are doing.”  
 
7.5.2 Control versus Influence 
Apart from broadly paralleling Hardy’s first three dimensions of power, the modes of power-
in-use reflect the need to consider a continuum between control and influence. 
Earlier analysis suggested that bounded autonomy within GlobeCo this is considered as having 
‘control’ of the agenda or outcomes.   
“People loved those jobs... they could control everything, they could deliver results.”  
This is what Morriss (2002) would consider as the ability to effect outcomes.  Bounded 
autonomy is deterministic: the manager decides, and something happens.  To the extent that 
this includes other actors it reflects A’s ability to determine what B does.  
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At the other end of the spectrum, the role of the manager within solution co-creation is 
primarily one of influence.   Respondents indeed talk about their “informal or the influential 
powers” or as “having influence on that and … contributing to that decision-making process”.  
With this sort of power, the individual manager cannot determine an outcome, rather they 
affect outcomes (Morriss, 2002).   
The power-in-use reflected in solution filtering falls somewhere between these extremes.  
Those who hold effective veto rights can, if they exercise those rights, effect the outcome of 
the initiative not happening.  Yet, this power is limited to preventing some action – they have 
the ability to stop, but not to make happen.  This becomes particularly apparent where there 
are multiple layers of decision-making of a filtering form (seen informally in many decisions, 
and formally in processes such as ‘innovation funnels’ which require a succession of 
gatekeeping approvals).  The approval by an actor (that is the non-veto) of an initiative X does 
frequently not mean that X will happen – rather that it is just passed up the chain to another 
actor who has a similar right to veto or not-veto.  Where those who hold apparent veto rights 
can neither directly determine the content of the initiative, nor be confident that non-veto will 
lead to a specific outcome, then the best they can do is to influence such outcome. 
 
7.5.3 Power-in-Use: Episodic Power and Systemic Understanding 
Throughout the previous sections the modes of power-in-use have been regarded as the way 
in which the “direct exercise” (Fleming & Spicer, 2014, p. 240) of episodic power is revealed 
within GlobeCo.  However, there are key aspects of this chapter that inform us about the 
nature of systemic power – that facet of power that works through taken-for-granted 
assumptions about the working of the world and is reflected in the associated cultural 
routines. 
Firstly, the concept of alignment was considered earlier less as a process and more about the 
endpoint.  Yet, I would suggest that at its most extreme, alignment can constitute a set of 
taken-for-granted, shared understandings about the purpose and objectives of the 
organisation and the ways in which it would be achieved.  Perfect alignment is when everyone 
knows what needs to be done and their part in doing this. 
“You get to the stage whereby you've common expectations as to what you are 
trying to do.”  
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At one level it is clear that there are assumptions within GlobeCo that are unquestioned – be 
this in the taken-for-granted capitalist principles of ‘growth’, ‘value’ and profit; or more 
specific assumptions about GlobeCo that it is ‘underperforming’ and needs to act more as 
‘one’, or in recognition of the company’s strong ‘Code of Business Principles”.  Such principles 
become a systemic alignment when they are “fully engrained and embedded in the 
organisation” and sufficiently taken-for granted that others “don't question this anymore, they 
say 'but this is the way we do this, and why'.” 
However, beyond this, it must be recognised that there is something deeply systemic in the 
boundaries of the different modes of power-in-use.  Someone has bounded autonomy, or can 
participate in filtering, or contribute to solution co-creation where there is a widespread 
acceptance of their legitimacy in doing so – that is that there is some systemic understanding 
that becomes taken-for-granted that ‘A’ has autonomy in area X, or that ‘B’ can veto issue Y.  
It is this combination of which actors, can legitimately act through a particular mode of power-
in-use on a specific issue that becomes the landscape of power relations at a particular 
moment of time within GlobeCo.  
This is perhaps best revealed by highlighting the perspective of that of the individual actor.  
Figure 7.3 presents a picture of how an actor’s opportunity for power-in-use changes across 
issue space (building off Langley et al, 1995).   I suggest that for every actor there are some 
issues (however trivial) which fall within each of the different zones.  While each of the first 
three ‘zones’ reflects a different mode of power-in-use, they also have different characteristics 
in terms of how episodic power is revealed within the MNC.  
The ‘zone of autonomy’ reflects those issues (clearly bounded) where the actor has autonomy 
and, largely through the control of resources, is able to control outcomes – or, as Morris (2002) 
would say, the actor can effect outcomes and bring something about.  
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The actors ‘zone of veto’ reflects those issues or outcomes where they have an effective veto 
within solution filtering.  This is both highly episodic (being characterised by discrete actions 
such as agreeing or disagreeing, vetoing or allowing an initiative) and linked to the formal and 
inform processes and procedures.  As an aspect of power this reflects Digeser’s (1992, p. 978) 
view that “power is not solely a matter of getting B to do something that she does not want 
to do, but can also be a matter of preventing B from doing what she wants to.”  Yet in contrast 
with the ‘zone of autonomy’, while the actor can may effect a veto, they can only affect the 
final outcome.  That is, thy have the potential to stop some possible outcomes but are not in 
a position to determine specific outcomes.  Consequently, this zone exhibits aspects of both 
control and influence.  
The ‘zone of influence’ however is unambiguously about affecting rather than effecting 
outcomes.  The actor cannot determine an outcome, but can influence it – primarily through 
shaping understanding (and hence the power of meaning) as part of solution co-creation.  As 
such, this reflects what Allen (1998, p. 35) called power with – “the ability of a collectivity to 
act together for the attainment of an agreed-upon end or series of ends.”   
For the sake of completeness, the model can be extended beyond the three zones of power-
in-use to reflect areas where an actor is unable to influence outcomes.  There are issues where 
an actor has an interest in outcomes, but is powerless to affect them in the face of the ‘power-
over’ of others.  Respondents within the research highlighted this in comments such as: 
“It's not his role and it's not helpful for him to get involved.  So his role is to sit back, 
butt out and trust.”  
Finally, there can be issues in which an actor is disinterested in an issue.  
“It's not that important for Europe, why should Europe care?”  
“The problem was that [the CFO] had really very little interest [in Services] … he had 
no knowledge or no desire to have any knowledge of anything in process and IT area.  
You know he said to me, quite some time before I took the job over, that he'd been 
trying to avoid running anything like that for ages.”   
However, the importance of this model is less the specific content of the issues falling within 
each zone, but rather the benefit of mapping the power relations of an actor in ‘issue space’.  
In particular, this highlights the importance of the boundaries between the zones.  To the 
extent that these boundaries represent a shared understanding of the possibility of an 
individual actor to become engaged in different issues, then they represent the systemic 
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aspect of power within GlobeCo.  Individual A has (bounded) autonomy issue X because this is 
what is accepted within GlobeCo, whereas individual B can participate in solution co-creation 
because this taken-for-granted within the organisation.  As such, as the manifestation of a 
common understanding of actor’s roles and responsibilities they reflect Clegg’s obligatory 
passage points in that they “fix the rules guiding actors’ actions and constrain available 
possibilities” (Oliveira & Clegg, 2015, p. 427).  Consequently, the landscape of power can be 
characterised as in Figure 7.4, where bounded autonomy, solution filtering and solution co-
creation reflect the episodic manifestation of power, but the boundaries between them – 
boundaries that determine who can exercise what power-in-use in any particular situation – 
reflect the systemic, taken-for-granted basis of power relations. 
 
Yet, the question remains as to how these boundaries are established and how they are 
reinforced or challenged.  Consequently, the next chapter investigate this in more detail in the 
context of a specific case.  This shows both that the boundaries of the landscape of power 
relations are not static and that which actors can legitimately exercise bounded autonomy, 
filter solutions or participate in solution co-creation evolves over time.  Furthermore, this gains 
insight into the practices that individual actors use to enact alignment, and through this 
challenge and reconstruct the boundaries of the landscape of power relations. 
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8. Action, Alignment and Power Relations 
The previous chapters have provided an insight into the contemporary multinational, 
highlighting the dynamic and contested nature of the organisation such that power cannot 
solely be considered in terms of stable units.  Within such an interdependent organisation 
traditional hierarchy and legitimate authority, although still apparent at times, have only a 
limited role.  Rather, in order to align around outcomes we identified that individuals engaged 
in two further modes of power-in-use – those of solution filtering and solution co-creation. 
In order to investigate this further and explore the dynamics of power relations to allow 
coordination, this chapter focuses upon one particular case – that of the Facilities 
Management Transformation programme undertaken in the European business in GlobeCo.  
It commences with an extended summary of the case, the temporal unfolding of this and the 
way in which the different modes of power-in-use interact, and the practices used by key 
actors to achieve alignment.  As such it moves from a meso-level view of the organisation, to 
a micro-level perspective of individual’s actions and practices.  As such it primarily contributes 
to the second research question, namely: how should we theorise the dynamic power relations 
that affect the coordination of individuals in the heterarchical MNC? 
This case reveals how a changing cast of actors work to construct the legitimacy of both their 
position and the broader solution; build and embed commitment to the solution; and focus 
upon building shared understanding.  While this led to the co-creation of an aligned outcome, 
more fundamentally these practices resulted in the reconstruction of the underlying structure 
of power relations. 
 
8.1 The FM Case 
The case examines how a relatively small group of middle managers identified the opportunity 
for outsourcing FM services, developed a solution and built sufficient legitimacy and credibility 
to get support for this to be implemented across Europe – resulting in a consistent outsourcing 
of Facilities Management services across 50+ sites to a single supplier.  
 
8.1.1 The Case Context 
Facilities Management (FM) embraces diverse array of site services such as cleaning, security, 
catering and site maintenance.  Unlike most GlobeCo functions, which by 2010 were managed 
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on a regional or global basis, FM was still managed locally.  Even local coordination was 
constrained as different sites within the same country reported into different parts of GlobeCo 
(e.g. offices to the MCO, factories to GESO).  Consequently, there was no consistent approach 
to managing Facilities within GlobeCo Europe.  In places FM services were ‘self-performed’ by 
GlobeCo staff but in others outsourced – with over 600 separate supply contracts for FM 
services in place across Europe.  While this high degree of fragmentation partly reflected 
differences in site requirements, it was also a sign that there was scope for rationalisation.  
However, nobody within GlobeCo was a position to make this evaluation as nobody felt they 
had responsibility for coordination within this area. 
During analysis, it became clear that there are three separate phases to the case.  Each of 
these have a different emphasis in terms of the key actors, the issues and the actions 
undertaken.  Initially, we see a stage of Idea Formulation.  This is a diagnostic phase where 
there is recognition of an issue/opportunity, with the associated challenge as to the whose 
responsibility this is.  The second phase is that of Solution Development in which the project 
team work with stakeholders to develop a solution that is broadly acceptable to the all the key 
parties while building trust in, and legitimacy of the project team’s capabilities.  Finally, the 
third stage is that of Solution Implementation in which the team work with local sites to 
migrate these to the third-party service provider – at times against resistance from local 
management.  These three stages are summarised in Figure 8.1. 
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8.1.2 Formulation of the Idea 
With nobody in GlobeCo having overall responsibility for Facilities nothing was done to review 
whether there were ways to coordinate activity.   However, during the latter 2000s a European 
Procurement Team was formed to oversee all buying activity across the continent.  Kate 
Walters, a Procurement Manager with FM experience was recruited to review the area and to 
identify any scope for savings.  She highlighted the fragmented nature of GlobeCo’s approach 
to FM, and through talking to suppliers and GlobeCo FM managers – along with some “crude 
analysis” – identified opportunities to rationalise FM procurement.  However, Kate struggled 
to get leverage for her ideas as sites did not see this as being a Procurement responsibility.   
In parallel, a new global services organisation was being formed within GlobeCo – GlobeCo 
Business Services (GBS).  GBS assumed responsibilities for ‘back-office’ services in IT, Finance 
and HR, and during the creation of this new group, Vincent Peeters – who became ‘Chief 
Business Services Officer’ – suggested to the CEO that the responsibilities of his group could 
be extended to include aspects of Facilities Management.  The CEO agreed even though 
Vincent said that he “had no clue what that would really mean in practice.”  
While hardly constituting a mandate, this was sufficient to allowed Vincent to create a small 
group within GBS, including Randy Fischer as the Workplace VP and Harry Rankin, an 
experienced FM professional, as his ‘Global Transformation Director’.  Although the details 
were very sketchy, Harry and Randy Fischer proposed ‘Facilities and Building Services’ as one 
of the potential service line strategies for GBS at a ‘Dragon’s Den’ style strategy process held 
in mid-2011.   
During this workshop around 60 senior and middle managers from GBS reviewed potential 
approaches in 40 areas across business services, enabling them to agree and strengthen the 
service line strategies that would be the basis of GBS’s new 2012-2014 Business Plan.  During 
the workshop, the outline strategy for ‘Facilities and Building Services’ received significant 
support from the GBS managers who saw this as potentially ‘virgin territory’ where GBS could 
add value.  As a result, ‘Facility Services’ was included in the pack of ‘Service Line Strategies’ 
sent as briefing to the CEO.   
At this stage there was little detail of how improvement would be delivered.  Rather, the focus 
was upon highlighting and legitimising the issue rather than providing a solution, emphasising 
potential cost saving, simplification and environmental benefits that aligned with GlobeCo’s 
broader strategy. 
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Although providing feedback on the broader strategy, the CEO appears to have made no 
specific comments about the outline plan for FM.  This lack of veto from the CEO, combined 
with the broader enthusiasm within GBS allowed Harry to pull together a small team of junior 
and middle managers from around GlobeCo, including Kate from Procurement to work on the 
issue (hereafter, ‘the team’) – mostly in addition to their day-to-day responsibilities.   
As the team started to look at the data that had been collected by Procurement they quickly 
realised that the initial assumptions of the solution were too limited.  Harry saw that this would 
just result in “nine different countries coming out with nine different solutions, under the guise 
of 'but we have made some improvement.'”  Rather, there could be bolder vision “to flip it on 
its head and actually look at this from a European perspective as opposed to a local-for-local 
perspective.”  
As a result, the team started to envisage the potential for fundamental change through 
outsourcing FM across all of GlobeCo’s sites in Europe to a single Facilities supplier.   
 
8.1.3 Development of the Solution 
While the team had developed an appealing vision of the future of FM, this would require FM 
to be managed in a radically different way.  Having no direct power to impose a solution, this 
would require the team to convince stakeholders that not only was this the best strategy for 
GlobeCo, but that they as a team were the right people to design, negotiate and then run the 
service contract.  This was a considerable challenge, as while some of this team had FM 
experience, and others long tenure in GlobeCo, none of the team had previously managed 
transformational outsourcing.  Furthermore, as a mix of middle and junior managers “we 
[were] quite a small team that wasn't ... high up in the hierarchy.” 
The Creation of a SteerCom 
Accepting that they lacked the authority to unilaterally agree or implement the outsourcing 
approach, Randy explained their approach of established a steering committee (SteerCom) of 
key stakeholders:  
“And so what we had to do was to put together a Steering Committee of the most 
influential influencers – kind of the owners of the different functions like a Supply 
Chain, a Finance, an HR, R&D – the ones that were actually be the key clients that 
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would be the users of service.  To make sure that they were on board and that they 
had vetted out our solutions.”  
Randy was able to use his personal connections with the SVP of HR in Europe to sponsor the 
project and to bring other senior leaders on board. 
While this body had no formal status within GlobeCo, as its membership included senior 
leaders of each of the parts of GlobeCo that would be impacted by the project, it effectively 
became a decision-making body that could approve the proposal. 
The team met with SteerCom roughly monthly over the next year.  While the SteerCom were 
broadly happy with the approach there were differences in the degree of enthusiasm among 
the members.  The representatives of the European Sales and Marketing Division were 
positive.  However, there was significant push-back from some of the other SteerCom 
members. The SVP Supply Chain was particularly concerned about the possible overlap 
between FM responsibilities and those of site engineers and those managing production lines.  
The head of R&D was very concerned about the unique requirements of his business and was 
opposed to having third-party contractors within his laboratories.   
Facing these challenges, the team decided to modify the scope of the project.  The few R&D 
sites were removed from the scope of the proposal.  In the case of factories, the SVP Supply 
Chain’s concerns about the risk of overlap between FM and engineering staff was seen as a 
legitimate concern.  As Tim Visser, who lead the implementation, outlined “[the Supply Chain 
SVP said] 'please do not touch anything within the production line', and we said, ‘yes it makes 
sense’.”  Consequently, it was agreed that Supply Chain staff had responsibilities for all issues 
within the safety zones around equipment, while FM would be responsible outside these 
‘yellow lines’.   
Tender of the FM Contract 
By the Spring of 2012 the team was ready to issue a formal tender to key facilities providers 
who were assessed as being able to offer an integrated service across much of the European 
region.  While based around a single outsourcing deal, it did not strictly limit the shape of the 
final solution.  Suppliers could focus their proposals, with indicative pricing, to specific 
geographies, service types or site types.    
The tender was run as an iterative, relationship building exercise.  Suppliers were taken to visit 
representative GlobeCo sites, while the team visited sites that the prospective suppliers ran 
across Europe.  Ahead of bid submissions the team held informal meetings with each bidder 
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to review their preliminary ideas, answer further questions, and identify areas of 
misunderstanding.  As the bids were received, the team deliberately widened the number of 
people involved by including key FM staff and managers from other key areas act as ‘subject 
matter experts’ to evaluate the suppliers’ written proposals. 
It was clear to team members that it was now necessary for them to make key decisions and 
to recommend a solution to the SteerCom.  This involved multiple meetings and discussion 
among the small core team, culminated in a week where the team “locked ourselves in 
Hughenden”, GlobeCo’s residential training centre, while making key choices around the 
structure of the deal, the preferred supplier and finalising the business case.  
During this there was “good debate” as the solution was “crafted” until there was “pretty good 
alignment”.  There is a sense that through discussion, debate and challenge the members of 
the team developed a shared understanding of the direction that they wished to take FM.  This 
led to an unambiguous decision to recommend a single supplier solution with self-delivery by 
the supplier rather than relying on further sub-contractors.   Where GlobeCo personnel 
currently delivered FM services they should transfer to the selected supplier, except for a 
single manager each country for overseeing FM, where the reporting line would change to 
reporting directly into GBS, with Tim as their line manager. 
Negotiation and Approval 
Following their week in Hughenden, the team planned a key meeting with the SteerCom.  
Ahead of this Harry or Tim held one-to-one meetings with all SteerCom members to explain 
the recommendations and resolve outstanding issues.  Consequently, when it came to the 
formal meeting the SteerCom quickly endorsed the recommended approach.  Given the 
reduced scope in the Supply Chain and R&D, support was forthcoming from all SteerCom 
members for a project which offered an attractive business case. 
Harry: “It was very straightforward… that's the most positive I've ever seen [the SVP 
Finance Europe] and the most simple authority we've ever got through.” 
Following a final round of proposals, the SteerCom agreed to the team’s proposal to negotiate 
a final contract with ServEx as preferred supplier.   
This was followed by three months of contract negotiations between ServEx and a small 
GlobeCo negotiating team comprising Harry, Matthew (the Finance Director) and an in-house 
lawyer.  Apart from dealing with a mass of details around Financial and HR issues, this included 
Power and Coordination in the Multinational Company  Page | 184 
 
key process issues that were critical how the project would be rolled-out and subsequently 
governed.  
By January 2013 negotiations were complete and formal authorisation was given by GlobeCo’s 
CEO, Remco Mertens, without further discussion.  Randy Fischer commented that “at that 
point it is more of a formality and a 'rubber stamp'”.  The team had formal approval for their 
solution and for their governance of it.   
 
8.1.4 Implementation 
Formal approval of the project meant that that the contract with ServEx could be signed and 
the team move on to implementation.  However, this did not make it a formality that all sites 
would migrate FM to ServEx management.  Rather, recognising the heterogeneity of 
GlobeCo’s sites, the team negotiated the contract in such a way that there was no requirement 
for GlobeCo to transfer any specific site where due diligence showed that this would be value 
destructive or where there are other significant material business obstacles. 
During the solution development phase, Fran, the HR manager, had already had preliminary 
discussions with HR leaders in each of the countries and informed the European Works Council 
in broad terms about the project.  However, as the team moved into implementation they 
initiated a comprehensive communication strategy to keep people throughout the 
organisation informed of what the end-state looked like, and the process that would be 
followed to get to this. 
As part of the contract negotiations, the team had also established that it had the 
responsibility to decide upon the order in which the outsourcing would be rolled-out across 
the 50+ sites.  Consequently, they were able to ‘sequence’ the roll-out, that is select the order 
in which sites would go-live in order to avoid early resistance and build some momentum.   
Tim: “So you move into a sequencing where you said, 'these are the easy wins, they 
will move with us because they will like the convenience, they will like the solution – 
it's one party, it makes sense to them', also about mind-set.  And then you move into 
the more difficult parts.”  
Well ahead of each site’s planned migration date, Tim led a comprehensive due diligence 
process at each site, including a week’s visit from ServEx and members of the GBS team in 
order to work with local management to understand “were the services that were going to be 
delivered in the future appropriate or correct for that particular site”.  ServEx would then 
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propose a service solution and budget (within the constraints of the contract), but this could 
be modified in discussion with the local site.  Martin, a young finance manager who had joined 
the implementation team, explained: 
“[It was] then for them [the sites] to make that choice. 'Yes, you know, I want the 
savings instead of the service', or 'no, I want to keep the same level, or a higher level 
of service but for more cost' and it's … giving them the option, giving them that 
choice.”  
The early transfers to ServEx went smoothly.  However, the team quickly ran into resistance 
in several key countries where the roll-out was challenged.  This was exacerbated by the 
idiosyncrasies of each site and country that needed to be understood, particularly around HR 
rules/practices and labour relations, including appropriate consultation with Unions and 
Works Councils.   
Harry: “We talk as Europe as one collective, but as we all know it's a collection of 
countries that all have very different heritages and cultures and individuals in them, 
and they all work in very, very different ways at times.” 
The team had anticipated that they would need to listen to challenges and resistance and that 
this may require adaptation of the solution.   
Harry: “We built the solution that allowed that flexibility, so when we really hit those 
things which this was absolutely brick-wall resistance of we're not going to get this 
through a works' council, we're not going to get that culturally landed, then actually 
we need to adjust the solution to deal with it.”  
Perhaps not surprisingly, resistance came most strongly from unions and works councils who 
objected to the outsourcing.  In Belgium, unions reacted strongly against the transfer of 
GlobeCo employees to ServEx and implementation was delayed for many months by industrial 
action.  Eventually a settlement was agreed that allowed implementation but with enhanced 
benefits for transferring employees.  Similar compromises were made in a number of other 
countries to facilitate the deal execution. 
However, resistance was most notable in Germany.  In this case, local management largely 
sided with Unions and Works Councils, using them to try to avoid an initiative that they saw 
as a distraction to wider restructuring they were undertaking.  This proved to be a major 
obstacle, and which was seen by the team as largely political: 
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Tim: “They could not resist the solution itself because it made commercial sense to 
do so, and also probably people sense to do so, but locally they had an agenda which 
didn't comply with our initiative.  And that for example was Germany, where they 
had different, where Works Council and Unions were very strong, and local 
leadership didn't like the idea because it was giving them hard times in other areas…  
And then it becomes political … if you are a Chairman of a certain country you should 
know that [FM] is not our core business, of course.  So, then you know it's political.”   
The team used their periodic meetings with the SteerCom as a forum to involve more senior 
management from within GBS and the European Regional Management put pressure upon 
German management.  Eventually, Tim was able to find a compromise with local management: 
“It was close to a tactical solution, we went for a hybrid model and what we did...  
There was a bigger restructuring programme in Germany we called 'Plan A', we had 
to fire 200 people, very difficult discussion, and I can tell you that I got a phone call 
on Thursday afternoon … and then the VP for Supply Chain said to me 'Tim, we need 
to do Plan A, they are resisting, we need to give something away, can you agree to 
a hybrid model where we do a manpower agreement with ServEx … with ServEx 
managing the services, still delivering the savings, still managing the operations but 
people employed by GlobeCo, so a sort of secondment'.  And then we took that 
moment... he said, 'if I can give that away we can do Plan A because the Works 
Council can go back to their audience and say that we have achieved something'.  
And that is what we did.  Two hours later we had that agreement in place.”  
With this, ServEx took responsibility for managing FM in the German sites under the 
supervision of the GBS team.   
With momentum behind the initiative, the remaining site sites transferred relatively smoothly 
and the GBS team had managed to take responsibility for managing ServEx and FM services at 
50+ sites across Europe.   
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8.2 Case Analysis – Changing the Structure of Power Relations 
The example of the transformation of FM in Europe provides an interesting case within a 
networked multinational.  It illustrates how an area that is fragmented across multiple 
different organisational actors, that is the focus of no one’s overall attention and has no 
coherent strategy, is totally reshaped.  Not only is a new strategy for FM adopted, but the 
organisational responsibilities for FM are fundamentally shifted.  Prior to the project the 
taken-for-granted assumption within GlobeCo was that FM services were best managed locally 
(and often in-house).  By the end of the project management of the services regionally, via the 
global services division, using a single supplier had become the accepted model.  With the 
changed assumptions on how FM should be run came reified structures of resource allocation 
and processes that reflected fundamental changes in the structural power relations (changes 
in Clegg’s, 1989, ‘obligatory passage points’), as outlined in Figure 8.2.   
As a consequence of this the landscape of power relations was materially altered as the 
boundaries of bounded autonomy, solution filtering and solution co-creation were 
renegotiated.  As a consequence of this, there was an acceptance that actors who had new or 
different roles within the organisational processes.  While the heterogeneity of the pre-project 
landscape makes it difficult to be comprehensive, examples of change include: 
 Before the project, a GlobeCo FM manager had bounded autonomy for day-to-day FM 
issues at a site.  At the end of the project, the ServEx site manager had bounded 
autonomy. 
 Through the project Tim obtained filtering rights for major changes in FM services at 
each site.  Previously the local OpCo Chairman had been in this position – whereas 
now they are (at most) consulted as part of co-creation. 
 Prior to the project the local OpCo had bounded autonomy on all aspects of selecting 
and managing outsourcing partners.  After the project this sat with the GBS team 
(particularly Tim). 
Yet this change in power relations was not the consequence of a single set of decisions and 
actors.  Rather, across the course of the project we see the cast of actors evolving as the issues 
being faced evolve (Table 8.1).  The idea development phase was restricted to a relatively small 
number of actors, within which the focus was firstly upon diagnostic framing (Kaplan, 2008) – 
that is highlighting that there is a problem (and hence opportunity) in FM and legitimising this 
as something worthy of attention within GlobeCo, as well as establishing the legitimacy that 
GBS were the appropriate group to lead any review.   
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In the second stage the cast of actors widened, to include new project team members and key 
(managerial) stakeholders as the focus moved to developing a solution (prognostic framing) 
that was broadly acceptable to stakeholders and that they were committed to.  A necessary 
part of this was not only the details of what the solution, but in building trust and legitimacy 
of the stakeholders with the key individuals within the project team.  At the third and final 
stage, the focus moved on to the implementation team working with key actors from the 
individual sites and national operating companies.  Here the focus was upon both refining the 
broad solution to meet the idiosyncratic characteristics of individual sites, but also upon 
building trust and legitimacy of both the team that would manage FM and of the solution. 
The rest of this chapter attempts to unpick how this change in power relations occurred, 
focusing on the episodic actions and practices that were used by team members and others.  
The outcome from this analysis is summarised in the data structure in Figure 8.3.   
 
8.3 Enacting Alignment: Building Shared Understanding 
The first broad practice identified in the FM case are efforts by repeated partners to build 
shared understanding.  As Tim highlighted: 
“So then you need to create that common understanding.  You start with your 
contact at a cluster level.  So 'this is my plan, this is what I intend to do, do you 
understand, would you agree to these priorities?'”  
Here the concept of ‘shared understanding’ follows from those used in engineering and 
product development, particularly Hoffmann et al (2013, p. 175) who define shared 
understanding as “the ability of multiple agents within a group to coordinate behaviours 
towards common goals or objectives based on mutual knowledge, beliefs and assumptions on 
the task.”  Actors have to understand what they need to do to ensure that the task is 
accomplished.  Within the case we see this coalescing around activities of listening and 
learning, shared envisaging and socialising the solution.  Consequently, this has a strong 
overlap with ideas around sensemaking and sensegiving (Gioia & Chettipeddi, 1991).  
Supporting quotes for this section are provided in Table 8.2. 
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Building Shared Understanding During Idea Formulation 
Throughout this Idea Formulation stage of the project much of the focus of building shared 
understanding was constrained within specific parts of the GlobeCo organisation.  At these 
very early stages there are clear instances of small groups within Procurement and GBS 
working to make sense of the opportunity.  This is largely inward-looking and seems to have 
come through meeting, talking and brainstorming – albeit informed by data collected largely 
from outside GlobeCo about suppliers’ and peers’ activities.   
Yet at this early stage, the Dragon’s Den process provided an opportunity to help the wider 
GBS organisation understand why this new area could be a potential priority.  Furthermore, 
the iterative nature of the exercise seems to have helped the Randy and Harry refine their 
thinking.  Key to the workshop and the subsequent strategy submission to the CEO was a one 
page ‘PowerPoint’ slide for each initiative which “crystallised stuff again in a simple way”.  For 
FM this went through at least nine drafts both before and following the workshop as Randy 
and Harry took on board comments from across GBS, helping them to refine and reposition 
the summary of what they were looking to achieve. 
Building Shared Understanding During Solution Development 
As the project moved into the solution development phase, we see shared understanding 
being built in three different arenas.  Central to this was the project team, but two other 
groups of actors were suppliers (especially ServEx) and the SteerCom. 
Firstly, we see the team members spending time together in meetings to understand key 
aspects of the project.  Specific sessions were devoted to issues such as the business case and 
HR matters.  This concluded with the week-long meeting of the team at the Hughenden 
training centre.  Ginny, one of the junior members on the team outlined her experience: 
“I think as a team going through the tendering process that team was a very open 
team, and I think everybody was listened to and heard.  And I think everybody was 
encouraged to give their views, so I think from that perspective I think everybody 
contributed to coming up with that final solution.”  
The HR member of the team, Fran, similarly reflection on this time: 
“I have to say I was very included in all of the decisions, I … felt like I was a key 
decision maker in those decisions and hopefully an influencer in some of the decisions 
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that were made… Tim and Harry were very open to my suggestions…  So that I was 
able to influence …the decisions that we took.”  
There is a feeling of collective sensemaking as the team developed, challenged and shaped 
ideas together.  Kate refers to the team “crafting” the solution together while Tim refers to it 
as “good debate” without there being serious disagreements.  Indeed, looking back, the team 
members view the ideas around the project evolved rather than changing revolutionarily.  
“They matured.  I don't think it fundamentally changed” was Harry’s opinion, while Fran 
concluded “it just evolved as we became more understanding of the activities … but I don't 
think the over-arching vision or strategy changed”. 
However, this internal sensemaking to the team did not happen in isolation – on one side there 
was continual input from and to the suppliers.  This was seen, for example, in the working 
sessions which sought an alignment in the understanding of the bidders with the GlobeCo 
team, giving suppliers the chance to seek clarification and “do a sense check”, while the 
GlobeCo team could avoid “surprises and glaring issues”.  
This sense of two-way flow is emphasised by one of the ServEx bid team.  He highlighted the 
role of “the workshop in Munich … where we went through and identified what was it that 
really mattered to GlobeCo”, but also in “ServEx needing to explain what was necessary to 
make it work for us as an organisation”.   
Thirdly, the team needed to build shared understanding with the SteerCom – which involved 
both a sensegiving role of explaining the project, the process steps and the implications, but 
also listening to the SteerCom’s concerns and reflecting these into the project – if necessary 
changing key aspects such as the scope in R&D and the Supply Chain.  This two-way dialog was 
highlight by Tim: 
“In any transformation if you come with an Excel sheet and PowerPoints from 
London sent by email saying this is what we're going to do, and by the way if you 
don't like it take it anyway, that will fail in the end… But with complex transformation 
you need to create that visibility and that people can do 'OK, yes, I've been able to 
input, I've been able to have my word, I've received the answers to the questions I've 
raised, I may not like all the answers, but at least they answered my questions', and 
then you have those relationships also built on that level.”  
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Building Shared Understanding During Solution Implementation 
It seems clear that much of the work of the team during the solution implementation phase 
was of building a shared understanding.  This involved both clarity of the process, but perhaps 
more importantly of helping the local companies and sites to understand the solution.  As 
Harry commented:  
“The resistance you're getting, or the politics you're getting, is generally coming from 
just not quite understanding or people feeling that you've not grasped a point that 
is very important to them.  That's easy to deal with, once you've got visibility of it.  
And then when people, when you and they go through that curve and come out of 
the end of it and go 'great, fine', that's great.”  
This required meetings, roadshows, visits, face-to-face conversations and a great deal of 
talking.  Critically, this quote again emphasises the two-way nature of this.  It is not only about 
sharing information with others (sensegiving) but listening and reacting to avoid “people 
feeling that you’ve not grasped a point that is very important to them”.  This required the team 
to learn from what they were hearing and, where necessary, accept compromise and 
adjustment (such as in Germany), rather than trying to impose their own version of the 
solution. 
Key to the roll-out of the FM project was that the team members were sensitive of the need 
to build local support and were aware that there would be local specifics which would require 
adaptations to the solution that were specific to key sites.   
This was largely achieved by the design of a roll-out and due diligence process to allow the 
interaction between team, ServEx and site management in order to identify issues, and solve 
these in a way that was acceptable to all parties.  As Harry was very clear on the need for such 
a process, and was also lead negotiator for GlobeCo, it was relatively straight-forward for the 
process to be embedded into the contract with ServEx.  Effectively Harry was able to use the 
GlobeCo-ServEx contract to impose a process upon GlobeCo which would allow for the 
interactions required to build shared understanding. 
Conclusions – Building Shared Understanding 
It is clear from the case of FM that participants from all sides needed to work to share 
understanding.  This involved both a two-way flow of information – both ‘sensegiving’ and 
listening – and required considerable time and opportunity for actors to ponder ideas together 
to collectively craft the solution.  Without such shared understanding it would have been 
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impossible for the project to be implemented – key actors just would not have known what to 
do, or would have acted in uncoordinated ways. 
However, the objects upon which this shared understanding focused changed materially over 
the course of the project from understanding the prognosis and developing a shared 
understanding of roles and responsibility, through refining the solution with the SteerCom 
(diagnosis), and then optimising this on a site-by-site basis. 
This required deliberate work and actions.  This did not follow from sending instructions 
(“Excel sheets and PowerPoints”) but by devoting time to talking, listening and developing 
relationships.  As Fran stressed: “I quickly learnt that the key was building relationships, so I 
really tried to keep people updated even if there's nothing to tell” – understanding that 
nothing had changed was also important. 
 
8.4 Enacting Alignment: Constructing Diagnostic and Prognostic Legitimacy 
The second broad practice identified in the FM case are efforts by repeated partners to build 
legitimacy.  The concept of legitimacy used here broadly follows Suchman (1995, p. 574) who 
described this as ‘‘a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs, and deﬁnitions’’.   That is, it is not enough for others just to understand a problem or 
solution.  Additionally, we see the individuals acting to build the perception that there is an 
issue that requires resolution and that the solution (including outsourcing, the form of this 
outsourcing, and the GBS oversight of this) is desirable, proper and appropriate for GlobeCo.  
Supporting quotes are provided in Table 8.3. 
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Constructing Legitimacy During Idea Formulation 
At the early stage in the evolution attempts at legitimation primarily focused upon justifying 
FM as an issue worthy of attention – Kaplan’s (2008) diagnostic framing.  This was largely built 
upon a discourse-based strategy that positioned the transformation of FM as something that 
contributed to the wider aims of GlobeCo – supported by referencing the understanding 
obtained from suppliers and peers.  That is, the issue of FM was linked into the wider narratives 
within GlobeCo.  However, it is also clear that prior to the formation of the European 
Procurement Group (and more especially GBS) the issue was almost literally ‘unthinkable’ – 
there was nobody who had could frame the issue of FM in terms of a region wide perspective.  
That is, legitimising the diagnosis of the issue required actors who had legitimacy to frame the 
problem in such as way.  Even the Procurement Group fails to have achieved this (“why are 
you looking at this”).  As such the creation of GBS could be seen to represent a step change in 
giving a group legitimacy to consider issues such as the regionalisation of FM. 
However, this does not mean that GBS immediately had legitimacy for the oversight of FM.  As 
the case shows the Procurement organisation believed that they had neither the “weight or 
leverage” to lead the project.  The creation of GBS as a shared service unit gave Vincent Peeters 
the opportunity to exploit the ambiguity around the new group’s role to argue that this could 
extend to Workplace Services.  Little legitimation of this claim was needed as the CEO 
acquiesced quickly (probably based upon his experience of Shared Service Organisations in 
other companies).  There is no significant sign of resistance to this at this preliminary stage – 
and at the corporate level this is effectively a non-debate.  Perhaps this should not be 
surprising given the ambiguity of what GBS’s ‘responsibility’ entailed, that there was neither 
consultation nor significant implementation action that affected the wider business. 
Constructing Legitimacy During Solution Development  
As we move into the Solution Development phase the focus of legitimation differed 
significantly from that previously seen. 
The first challenge for the team was in recognising that they lacked the legitimacy to force 
through any solution.  Despite the initial support from the CEO, they knew that they could not 
go directly to him to approve any initiative without building support more widely in the 
organisation: 
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Randy: “We knew if we went right to the CEO and CFO without aligning their teams 
and their teams' teams, it's just going to lead to question after question and it's not 
going to go anywhere and it will probably get stopped.”  
Furthermore, nobody believed that they had a mandate within the GlobeCo business to take 
responsibility for FM and force a solution upon local management:  
“So, you've got the [CEO] saying you have legitimate power, but no one in the 
business outside the [CEO] believes it.  So Randy has to talk to the chairman of a 
country who says 'I don't care about you [the CEO] is sitting a far away so I can ignore 
him'.”  
In the case of FM this was exacerbated by its perceived local nature.  As Randy said, “at the 
end of the day, what's more local than a physical brick-and-mortar building, land and 
building?”.  Consequently, the team required a way to achieve legitimacy both for their 
ownership of FM and for the solution that they were proposing. 
The establishment of the SteerCom can be seen as one way to address both these issues.  
Bringing these senior stakeholders together brought a number of key advantages.  At one level 
these were “the ones that [would] actually be the key clients that would be the users of 
service” and could provide useful feedback on what was required and what was either 
acceptable or unacceptable.  Yet such feedback could have been obtained without the 
creation of the SteerCom as a body.  Rather, by creating the SteerCom, the team effectively 
created a decision-making body to fill the void between the CEO and the individual sites.  By 
leveraging the existing organisational legitimacy of these senior leaders in concert, then their 
approval could itself be a basis for legitimacy of both the initiative and the team.   
Such legitimacy from the endorsement of the SteerCom would potentially advance the project 
in two ways, as Randy highlighted.  Firstly, “they could sell it to their teams that we would have 
to interact with and drive it” – that is providing ‘covering fire’ in projecting the legitimacy 
downward into the organisation to the people with whom the project team would need to 
interact at a later stage.  As Harry said: 
“[A key role of the SteerCom] was to ensure alignment to the decision, it was to 
therefore to stand as a reference point for us to go back to when there were 
challenges, so that we could say 'no, no, at a senior level we've got buy-in to this 
programme and therefore we've got credibility for it'.”  
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Yet the SteerCom also could be leveraged to provide upward legitimacy for the team and the 
solution, where they could “bless the business case and the decision” which “would be the 
conduit for us to ultimately get the CEO and the CFO's approval”.  That is, it was believed 
(correctly) that the CEO and CFO would raise no objections to the proposal if it had the support 
and backing of the key stakeholders. 
However, this still required the SteerCom to accept the legitimacy of the plan itself.  In part 
this came from continuing to position the project within the broader GlobeCo strategic 
narratives focused upon raising performance, the need to act as one, and sharing/outsourcing 
non-consumer facing activity.  For example, at an early stage following the creation of the 
SteerCom, during a presentation to R&D member of the SteerCom and his team, the project 
team framed the benefits of the project as including “cost savings with the right FM service 
delivery at the right cost...”, “standardised FM service delivery” (highlighting GlobeCo’s 600 
current FM suppliers) and  “outsourced or in-sourced FM service delivery based on commercial 
rationale and supplier capability to meet GlobeCo’s business needs” [emphasis in original]. 
At the same time, the team ensured that they did not ignore the importance of local issues 
within FM, respecting the heritage of localism within GlobeCo.  The final proposal highlighting 
that while the team had indicated a desire to migrate all sites to ServEx, this would not be 
done where due diligence showed this would be value destructive or where there were other 
significant material business reasons not to transfer FM services in a particular location. 
Above all, the team were able to negotiate a contract that offered very attractive savings such 
that “the business case spoke for itself” which clearly motivated the SVP Finance as a key 
member of the SteerCom, as “I know we make [physical products] but we are a Finance 
company, it's all about the numbers – as is any business”. 
Constructing Legitimacy During Solution Implementation 
Although the project had been agreed with the SteerCom, formally approved by the CEO, and 
the contract signed with ServEx, this was insufficient to guarantee that country operations and 
individual sites would accept the legitimacy of either the project team or the solution they 
were suggesting.  
As at earlier stages in the project, the team attempted to legitimise the project in terms of its 
financial benefits and linkages to the broader GlobeCo strategy.  However, when dealing with 
the local businesses and sites this provide insufficient.  The people that they were dealing with 
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in the countries and sites knew the specifics of the local situation better than the project team 
– and the project often had personal implications for them or the people they knew. 
However, it is clear that the Harry and the team were well aware of this: 
Harry: “The way that we put the deal together … it wasn't trying to do it in a 
'command and control' big-brother way, it was trying to do it in a value-add way of, 
the framework is all there, but we still go and discover the value locally and we still 
drive to that value, and we still get that local engagement as well.  It still allowed 
local engagement under the main approval.”  
That is, a bespoke process was developed allowing the sites to engage with team to shape the 
solution to fit their local needs – as well as those more broadly of GlobeCo.  As Martin, who 
worked on the finances of each site due diligence interpreted it: 
“The beauty about the programme was, we were giving them the power, the leaders 
of the sites, to choose whether they did this or not.  They had the go/no-go decision, 
and … instead of imposing it on them and saying you've got to do this, it's ‘is this 
right for your site: yes/no’.”  
Consequently, the legitimacy of the process that the team followed seems to contribute to 
acceptance, it engaged those ‘on the ground’ and gave them the opportunity to be involved 
in co-creating the local solution.  Harry emphasises that “it was through those sorts of 
conversations that got people engaged” while Tim added, “if you can add value to the local 
businesses, why would they not want to work with you?”.   
The second approach that the team could take to building the legitimacy of the solution was 
to demonstrate that the project could succeed, and this was where the team had the benefit 
of being able to sequence the roll-out: 
Kate: “I think what became increasingly obvious for us to … deliver it in the sites 
where there's low handing fruit, prove the savings…  [and] then take that story and 
testimonial to sites that were being a more resistant and go 'look, we're going to 
do... here's what we've delivered, we're going to deliver this here now'.”  
As a consequence, “by going live on a handful of big sites delivering a large chunk of the money 
… you already saw some savings flowing in.”  Such sites where the transformation gave the 
biggest impact became a demonstration of benefits of the strategy, adding legitimacy to the 
project and reducing resistance. 
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Conclusions – Constructing Diagnostic and Prognostic Legitimacy 
Throughout the project we see active attempts to build legitimacy for the project.  However, 
the focus of this evolved in terms of the audience and whether it is problem, the solution or 
the ownership of the solution that is being legitimised.  Different strategies were adopted – 
linking the initiative to the wider discourse; establishing new process and bodies that 
themselves helped legitimise the solution; exploiting referential support – both upwards and 
as ‘covering fire’; and ultimately in sequencing the roll-out to reinforce the performative 
credibility of the solution and the GBS team. 
 
8.5 Enacting Alignment: Building and Embedding Commitment 
The FM case suggests that it is not enough simplify for actors to understand their role in an 
initiative and accept that it is legitimate.  Additionally, there is a need for commitment to be 
built and embedded.  Here, the definition of commitment follows Korsgaard et al, (1995, p. 
61) in being “the extent to which team members accept the strategic decision reached and 
intend to cooperate in carrying it out”.  That is, the test is that actors intend to cooperate in 
achieving the outcome. 
Within this a number of types of actions are identified.  In part these are about generating self-
interest of the actors in the solution, closely linked to this being adapting the solution to 
remove barriers to others’ commitment – that is, making compromises.  However, the case 
also shows that commitment can be built also through more psychological ways both through 
building and exploiting personal relationships and in creating a sense of inevitability. 
Supporting quotes for this section are presented in Table 8.4. 
Building Commitment During Idea Formulation 
At this early stage of the project there is little indication of actors attempting to build 
commitment.  This is perhaps hardly surprising as the shape of the solution is yet to be 
developed while the CEO had no resistance to GBS exploring the potential within FM. 
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However, there was need to get commitment within GBS for pursuing the FM initiative, where 
the project would be in competition for resources (time, money and people) with initiatives in 
the well-established service lines.  Here, Randy and Harry were able to leverage the process 
of the Dragons’ Den to give visibility to Workplace as “the new kid on the block”.  Not only did 
this highlight to the rest of GBS that this was an area where GBS could generate a new stream 
of savings, but helped create excitement giving “a bit of a buzz around what we were doing 
and a real alignment … as to what we were trying to do.” 
Building Commitment During Solution Development 
However, as the project moved into the solution development phase the need for 
commitment among the key stakeholders led to a series of concerted actions. 
In part this came from a rationalistic explanation of the benefits in terms of savings.  But this 
was not sufficient in itself to generate commitment from some of the SteerCom members who 
saw the project as a distraction or creating organisational overlaps.  At this stage, we see in 
key instances that rather than fight resistance, the team were prepared to compromise and 
adapt the shape of the solution to make it acceptable to others.  As Vincent explains: 
“It was stakeholder management – who are the key decision makers, how do we 
bring them on board?  Not by blackmail or forcing them on board, but by making 
sure that we understood their concerns, that we came up with strategies that were 
fitting, that were acceptable to them.”  
Tim explained the benefit of this in terms of ‘credibility’  
“They understood what was going to be done, they were able to provide feedback – 
on the scope for example, so 'please do not touch anything within the production 
line', and we said yes it makes sense.  And if you listen and you understand, and you 
agree to certain changes because it does make sense, then you also create that 
credibility.”  
Thus, it seems that by building off the processes of building shared understanding, the team 
could modify the content of the initiative in a way that would build commitment from 
members (or at worst, at least avoid them vetoing the initiative). 
However, the case suggests that there is far more to achieving personal commitment of others 
than in refining the solution to avoid resistance.  Personal relationships played a key role in 
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developing the solution.  This is most clearly seen in the creation of the SteerCom and the role 
that relationships played in this:  
Tim: “It goes back to relationship management again.  I think one of the key 
advantages we had in Europe is that we had a very good relationship between our 
VP for Workplace at the time, Randy Fischer, and the SVP of HR for Europe.  And [the 
SVP HR] bought-in to the project, and by doing so she also made sure that the others 
in that cluster – the SVP Supply Chain and SVP Finance – joined.”  
Randy already had previously worked closely with the SVP HR (having succeeded her in an 
earlier role).  Because of her apparent trust in in Randy she ‘bought-in’ to the project and was 
prepared to leverage her own relationships in order to bring others into the project. 
The project team were then able to exploit their personal working relationships with different 
members of the SteerCom – as Harry reported: 
“We had really good connectivity with those individuals [the SteerCom], and we had 
credibility with them.”  
Indeed, both Tim and Matthew (the project FD) had previously worked for the SVP Finance, 
and both had strong personal relationships with the European President.  Fran, the HR 
manager – was as a rising star within HR.  Harry, having previously ran the key sites in the UK 
was well known to SteerCom, as well as more broadly within the Finance and HR communities. 
Yet these relationships were not static, through the process of meeting, discussing and 
collective sensemaking the team were able to further build these relationships.  Tim went on 
to explain the importance of these relationships in allowing others to trust the actions of the 
team: 
“Credibility you need to demonstrate … by delivering what needs to be delivered.  But 
it's also what you have built over the last years.  So, I'm 23/24 years in GlobeCo, I 
know a lot of people, I've got probably a credible name ... and the door is open when 
I try and land a certain solution…  So, the credibility which you are able to build over 
time does [help] to land certain change and transformation…  At some point it goes 
back to the trust and the credibility again, they say 'well if Tim thinks this is best, 
then probably it's best.'” 
Even though the SteerCom were well engaged with the team and had frequent discussions, it 
is clear that these senior stakeholders who were devoting one or two hours per month to the 
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project could never understand all the details and scrutinise every action of the team.  Trust 
can be seen as an alternative to control (see Maguire et al, 2001), as suggested by a key 
member of the SteerCom: 
“I think that the trust was about having a team that you think can actually do this … 
it's very hard as a sponsoring team to actually influence what the project team is 
going to do.”  
That is the personal relationship with key team members allowed the SteerCom to trust that 
the work was being properly done without them having to become further involved.   
Building Commitment During Solution Implementation 
In moving into the third stage of solution implementation the need to build commitment 
shifted from the SteerCom to focus upon the individual sites and the national operations that 
were currently responsible for many of them. 
In part, the team were able to build commitment through generating self-interest of the sites 
involved by highlighting the opportunity to make savings.  Yet, this alone seems to have been 
insufficient, particularly early in the roll-out.  Why should individuals at sites trust this when it 
could affect how the site operated and could have personal implications for the individuals 
concerned? 
While existing personal relationships were still important in some cases, the breadth of the 
project (affecting 50+ different sites) meant that there were many sites where the team had 
no prior connection with the actors involved.  However, the way that the team had 
constructed the contract to allow the implementation to be refined at a site level and for the 
site to have the formal ‘go/no-go’ decision.  This had two key benefits. 
Firstly, it meant that the team spent time with key actors at the sites, building relationships, 
as Tim said: 
Tim: “I could make a key difference in how I landed the mobilisation in Europe, by 
doing it in that specific way … making [myself] available, building relationships, 
getting to know your face.  I always told the team 'show your face because that 
makes the connection so much easier going forward'.”  
Secondly, this personal contact was reinforced by the message that was being given which was 
about building the solution that was right for the individual site: 
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Harry: “You started a conversation over 'what's in it for you', rather than a 
conversation of 'you've got to do this and it's mandated'.”  
The role-out process allowed both relationships to develop and for the solution to be adapted 
(i.e. compromise) in order to build local commitment.  The transformation was not something 
being done to them, but something of which they were a part and of which, ultimately, they 
were involved in making the decision about. 
Finally, the team could use the sequencing of roll-out to generate commitment.  As the success 
of the strategy was demonstrated other sites “are more willing to take that step and join in”.  
Team members talk about the momentum that gets created, to the point at which “you have 
created so much momentum … that you could say to the others 'I've done 80%, it makes sense 
to 80% of Europe why wouldn't it make sense to you?'”.  Thus, a sense of inevitability is created 
around the project.  As Martin described: 
“They get to a point where the feeling is this is not going to go away.  There are so 
many people now on board, that if I don't get on board … they'll get somebody in 
who will make this happen – so I think that's part of the mental philosophy, at that 
point you've crossed over to get that engagement.”  
That is, it reached a stage where those responsible for the later sites to be implemented did 
not wish to be seen to be blocking and accepted that the outsourcing transformation had 
become the way in which GlobeCo managed FM in Europe.  
Conclusions – Building and Embedding Commitment 
From the solution phase onwards, we see active attempts to build commitment, although the 
focus of this changed as it moved from getting the commitment of the SteerCom through to 
getting the commitment of the sites. 
A number of different practices were seen around generating other actors’ self-interest, as 
well as solution-adaptation (or compromise) and in creating a sense of inevitability to reduce 
resistance.  However, critical within these stages were the way that the team built and 
exploited personal relationships.  These were the basis of trust which was critical in others 
becoming committed to the project and therefore actively participating in achieving the 
outcome. 
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8.6 Summary: Power, Action and Alignment 
The FM case is notable because it resulted in a fundamental shift in the way that part of 
GlobeCo’s business was managed.  In place of the taken-for-granted assumption that FM was 
dominated by local concerns and was best managed locally, a solution emerged where FM was 
run under a regional outsourcing contract under the auspices of GBS, with the remaining 
GlobeCo staff in FM moving to report into GBS.  Control of the key resources (budgets, people 
and outsourcing contracts) shifted from local actors to GBS and Tim as the regional FM 
Director, reflecting a fundamental change in the landscape of power relations.  Yet this change 
did not occur due to a top-down decision or strategy, rather emerging from the work of a 
group of middle managers. 
 
8.6.1 Multiple and Interacting Modes of Power-in-Use 
Throughout the project we see an interaction of the different forms of power-in-use (see Table 
8.5).  ‘Solution co-creation’ may appear to dominate – with the myriad occurrences of 
sensemaking and compromise between different individuals and groups.  Yet it is also clear 
that there are multiple occasions where the project (or key aspects of it) could have been 
vetoed – at the early stage by the CEO or Vincent as head of GBS; by the SteerCom or its 
members for different business areas (as actually occurred in the case of GBS); during formal 
approval by the CEO or CFO; and ultimately at the level of the individual sites. 
Some of these potential vetoes are essentially informal while others were formalised within 
either the GBS Schedule of Authority, or through the outsourcing contract with ServEx.  Yet, 
some of these formal authorities that proved to be more ceremonial in nature: it was 
extremely unlikely that the CEO would not ratify something agreed by all other parties; while 
the sites would have found it very difficult to veto a proposal once proven, contracted savings 
had been offered to them. 
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Indeed, it is the mode of bounded autonomy that is perhaps least apparent during the case.  
Yet this is seen in that the small negotiating team had considerable autonomy to structure the 
deal in the way that suited them – as one participant in those negotiations said: “the 
individuals in the room had the autonomy to be able to make the decisions.”  This was key as 
it allowed Harry to structure the implementation process in a way that created credibility and 
commitment – through the GlobeCo team being able to select the sequencing of roll-out, and 
in embedding the interaction process with sites and in giving them the formal ‘go/no-go’ 
decision. 
Similar autonomy was also seen during the implementation phase where the implementation 
team led by Tim had considerable freedom to agree the solution for individual sites (with 
ServEx and the site) without reference to higher authority within GlobeCo.  Martin described 
this as “we were just left to get on with it with the governance framework that we had in 
place.”   
 
8.6.2 Interaction of Practices 
Yet what is clear that it is insufficient to consider only the types of power-in-use.  Rather, it is 
necessary to look at the individual agency of key actors and the practices that allowed them 
to build a legitimate voice and gain a position of influence.   
As such, the case highlights the interaction between the three practices of building shared 
understanding, constructing legitimacy and building/embedding commitment.  The meetings, 
conversations and sensemaking activity of the team members was integral to building 
relationships which in turn contributed to legitimacy and commitment.  As Tim highlighted 
about the SteerCom “they trusted the process and the facts presented to them because they 
were part of it”, while Harry emphasised: “engagement with them gave credibility, and 
therefore reduced the … dissent and other views.”  Yet this does not mean that the process of 
developing shared understanding was sufficient – without the processes of sequencing to 
demonstrate performance and giving sites vetoes, without creating a SteerCom as a decision-
making body, without being able to generate tangible benefits for the sites – without multiple 
actions to build legitimacy and commitment, the transformation would not have happened.  
Consequently, these practices were not solely discursive, but included constructing processes 
and temporary structures, and through demonstrating the ability of the team to deliver. 
These practices had two distinct effects.  Firstly, it meant that vetoes were avoided, and a 
solution was co-created around which there was alignment, and which could be successfully 
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implemented within GlobeCo.   Yet at a fundamentally deeper level the team members, 
through the use of these practices, had reshaped the landscape of power relations within 
GlobeCo.  The boundaries of bounded autonomy, filtering and co-creation were all altered.  As 
a result of their work, different actors were accepted as holding significantly different roles in 
the reconstitution of a new array of power relations. 
The next chapter will move on to explore more theoretically the linkages between these 
episodic practices, the multiple modes of power-in-use and coordination (or ‘alignment’).  In 
particular, it will suggest that these practices play a key role in reinforcing or reconstructing 
power relations that are continually being challenged due to the inherent ambiguity and 
contestation in the heterarchical MNC. 
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9. The Dynamics of Power Relations and Coordination in the 
Heterarchical MNC 
The previous three chapters have considered different aspects of power and coordination in 
GlobeCo, a heterarchical MNC.  Firstly, this considered how the organisational characteristics 
of the heterarchical multinational and the consequences of this as a context for power 
relations.  In highlighting the ambiguity, instability and contestation of organisational units this 
challenging whether units are the appropriate focus for understanding power relations within 
the MNC, rather focusing attention upon individuals within the organisation.  Secondly, the 
mechanisms through which power is enacted to enable coordinated outcomes, or ‘alignment’ 
were considered, showing that while there remained a role for a bounded autonomy, the 
interdependent nature of the MNC was also reflected in the modes of solution filtering and 
solution co-creation.  Thirdly, through examining the case of Facilities Management, the 
practices through which individuals worked to reinforce or reconstitute power relations in the 
heterarchical MNC were revealed.  This not only highlighted the interaction of the different 
coordination modes but revealed how the structures of power relations are changed through 
building shared understanding, constructing diagnostic and prognostic legitimacy, and 
building and embedding commitment. 
As such, this empirical analysis is presented as a series of second-order themes (repeated in 
Figure 9.1).  The first part of the chapter focuses upon these constructs in order to make sense 
of the interaction between individuals’ agency, coordination and the changing power relations 
within GlobeCo.  Building upon the linkages between these constructs highlighted in earlier 
chapters, this provides an empirical model of the cyclical workings of power relations within 
the organisation.  
The remainder of the chapter then focuses upon how we understand these concepts and 
model and the theoretical contributions that this perspective makes to the wider literatures 
on the MNC and power.  Firstly, this suggests that organisations such as GlobeCo reflect a 
‘post-heterarchical’ form of the MNC that requires us to move beyond the narrow 
HQ/subsidiary perspective embracing individuals and groups as well as more formal 
organisational units.  This, in turn, has considerable implications for the debates both around 
HQ-subsidiary relations and how we should conceptualise the impact of geography and 
institutions within the MNC.  Secondly this highlights the necessity for including multiple 
dimensions in understanding power relations in the MNC, in particular emphasising the 
dynamic nature of power relations and shedding light on the interaction between episodic and 
systemic forms of power.  
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9.1 Towards a Model of Alignment and the Transience of Power Relations  
The previous three chapters have provided three distinct analyses on the workings of the 
heterarchical MNC from the perspective of the individual, considering the macro-level context 
of the organisation, a meso-level view of the ways in which episodic power are revealed, and 
a micro-level study of changing power relations within a particular case.  However, throughout 
this there is evidence of linkages and interactions between the different themes.  Considering 
this, an inductively derived model is developed that illuminates the transience of power 
relations within the MNC: how these are manifest; how they dissolve through the inescapable 
ambiguities and contestation of the heterarchy; and how they are reinforced or reconstituted 
through the everyday practices that actors use to achieve alignment (Figure 9.2). 
The Initial Landscape of Power Relations (Box 1) 
Chapter 7 sets out a picture of the landscape of power relations.  This sees power relations 
manifest in the different modes of power-in-use, that is the different means by which episodic 
power is revealed within the organisation.  Within the heterarchy this is not limited to 
hierarchical control (reflected in bounded autonomy), but extends to actors’ capability to veto 
particular options or outcomes (solution filtering) and/or their accepted role in the co-creation 
of solutions.  Furthermore, as previously highlighted these three modes broadly align with the 
first three of Hardy’s (1996) dimensions of power – those of resources, process and meaning.  
Each of these modes coexists within the heterarchy. 
Yet, Chapter 7 also highlighted that the boundaries between these different modes reflect the 
systemic facet of power.  That is, it reflects shared understanding and taken-for-granted 
assumptions about which actors are able to exercise which modes of power-in-use in a 
particular circumstance.  ‘A’ may hold a veto in issue ‘X’ not because it is inevitable or 
predestined that this is so, but because it has become accepted within the organisation that 
this is.   
Consequently, the starting point for the model is this initial landscape of power relations.  This 
provides the basis through which, if accepted by other members of the organisation, 
individuals can effect or affect coordinated outcomes.  Yet this represents only a snap-shot of 
the power relations at a moment in time.  The model thereafter explores the pressures that 
challenge stability and the practices that are used to rebuild them.    
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Instability and The Dissolution of Power Relations (Box 2) 
While the power relations within the organisation can be characterised as the landscape of 
power-in-use, the thesis repeatedly illustrates that this should not be interpreted as meaning 
that this is stable or constant.  As highlighted above, the boundaries reflect socially 
constructed and taken-for-granted understanding that can change as meanings and 
understandings develop. 
Chapter 6 presented a picture of the heterarchical MNC where organisational and power 
relations are unstable.  Because of the high levels of interdependency and the limitations of 
hierarchical control that are integral to heterarchies, this leads inevitably to situations of 
organisational ambiguity and, in turn, contestation.  It is partly in response to this, that we see 
the need for multiple modes of power-in-use to be utilised.   
Yet while the multiple modes of power-in-use simultaneously occur, and although their 
boundaries may be temporarily stabilised, it is clear from the research that relatively small 
events can either bring underlying ambiguity back to the surface or directly lead to 
contestation.  The research has presented numerous examples.  This may be externally 
generated such as when the mimetic pressure (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) of competitive 
created pressures for GlobeCo to act on indirects or explore outsourcing, albeit that these 
were strongly contested by some.  Alternatively, any internal change might become the 
catalyst for new ambiguities and resistance – for example as the creation of GBS permitted 
consideration of the debate on regionalising FM.   
Consequently, the emergence of new ambiguities and contestation appear inevitable within 
the heterarchical organisation.  This creates pressures for the dissolution of the existing 
landscape of power relations through either direct challenge to organisational responsibilities 
or indirectly through the challenge to the content of initiative.  
Practices to Enact Alignment/Coordination (Box 3) 
However, while there seems to be an inherent tendency towards the dissolution of power 
relations within the heterarchical MNC, Chapter 8 reveals that actors are active, on an ongoing 
basis, in practices to enact alignment through building shared understanding; constructing 
diagnostic and prognostic legitimacy; and in building and embedding commitment. 
Furthermore, these practices cannot themselves stand apart from power relation, for these 
practices are themselves underpinned by the extant landscape of power relations.  For 
example, without recognition that an actor has some legitimacy for their voice to be heard 
Power and Coordination in the Multinational Company  Page | 220 
 
their ability to build understanding, legitimacy and commitment may be limited.  Alternatively 
(as in the case of FM) access to, and relationships with, actors that are already well positioned 
may provide the opportunity to engage to reshape the power relations. 
Interplay of Power-in-Use and Enactment Practices (4) 
While it would be comforting to see a clear sequential process of dissolution followed by a 
reconstitution of power relations, the case presented in Chapter 8 suggests that the reality is 
rather more muddled.  In a complex multi-dimensional issue, what we see is an ongoing 
interplay of many actors both leveraging the different modes of power-in-use and using 
practices to enact alignment at all of the different stages of the issue resolution (idea 
formation, solution development and solution implementation) with respect to different 
aspects of the issue.   
Consequently, in the case of FM we saw the impact of the bounded autonomy of the head of 
R&D to exclude his sites from the project, the potential for solution filtering via the SteerCom, 
the President of Europe and ultimately the CEO, and the co-creation of a solution to meet the 
requirements of both GBS and the German business.  However, we cannot say that a solution 
was found and the boundaries of responsibilities and the shape of the landscape of power 
relations changed solely through these modes of power-in-action.  Rather we see that 
simultaneously the practices or work of key individuals in building and embedding 
commitment, constructing diagnostic and prognostic legitimacy, and building shared 
understanding.  In FM these activities were key to shaping the proposal, building support and 
preventing the vetoing of the idea. Through these practices the shape of the solution was not 
only constructed, but became accepted, embedded and enacted within GlobeCo. 
Accordingly, we see outcomes – both in terms of the tangible outcomes of the organisation 
and in terms of the power relations within the organisation – as emerging from an interplay 
of the existing boundaries of power-in-use along with the practices that serve to reinforce or 
reshape the boundaries of accepted responsibilities.  From this, aligned outcomes emerge, 
along with either a reinforcement or reconstruction of the boundaries of power-in-use. 
Reconstruction of Power Relations (5) 
Critically we see that the practices to enact alignment working to counteract the pressures 
that are challenging the extant power structures.  As highlighted in Chapter 8, the practices 
being used to enact alignment can be seen to mitigate the different aspects of organisational 
instability.  Actions building shared understanding are reducing the level of organisational 
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ambiguity while both actions to build and embed commitment and construct diagnostic and 
prognostic legitimacy serve to moderate the level of organisational contestation.  
Consequently, we can see the practices to enact alignment as directly countering the pressures 
that dissolve power relations. 
While there are clearly opportunities to use these practices to reinforce extant power 
relations, to the extent that these lead to a change in the accepted ‘rules of the game’ (e.g. 
the acceptance that FM is best managed through outsourcing), this becomes the basis for 
reconstituting new, temporarily stable power relations (box 6). 
The Cyclical Nature of the Transience of Power Relations 
The reconstitution of power-relations may appear to be an end of the journey – so in the case 
of FM key team members had gained key capabilities to deploy episodic power, while others 
in operating companies had seen their responsibilities shrink.  Yet, as we saw earlier, any 
change is likely to trigger new instabilities within the organisation – creating ambiguity that 
leads to contestation (7).  In the case of FM, senior management deemed the project so 
successful in Europe, that immediately suggestions were made that it should be extended to 
other regions – which, for example, created new ambiguity as to whether responsibility for 
FM in North America should remain with the US business or should be absorbed by GBS. 
Consequently, we see a cyclical process whereby the reconfiguration of power relations can 
provide the impetus for a new round of contestation leading to further dissolution of power 
relations.  The inevitable ambiguities resulting from the interdependencies within the 
heterarchical MNC creates a dynamic but unstable environment where power relations are 
constantly being contested, dissolved and reconstructed. 
Coordination as Transient Intersubjective Alignment 
It is clear from Chapters 6-8 that actors within GlobeCo manage to achieve coordination – 
coordination to enable them to perform their everyday activities, as well as coordinated action 
that permits the organisation to embark on one-off projects and major change.  Yet this model 
highlights three particular aspects of such coordination.  
Firstly, it does not appear necessarily to achieve full agreement on actions.  Rather it is to have 
sufficient alignment such that activities are not fundamentally contradictory – that is a state 
where there is sufficient acceptance, coherence and compatibility between the many 
disparate objectives within the organisation and the action plans to achieve them.  Secondly, 
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this alignment is intersubjective, in that it critically depends upon meanings and 
understandings that are shared (Seale, 2004), and in some ways ‘lies between’ (Malpas, 2000) 
individuals within the organisation, and reflecting the dynamics of relations where 
intersubjectivity “is not a fixed state but an interactional achievement” (Reich, 2010, p. 55).  
Combined with the concept of alignment this fits well with Maitlis & Christianson’s (2014, pp. 
66-67) perspective that ’intersubjective’ “need not indicate a completely overlapping, agreed-
upon understanding, but rather understandings that are close enough, or equivalent, in ways 
that allow coordinated action.”  Yet, thirdly, it is clear that there is may be no permanence to 
this shared alignment, they are based upon situational context, power relationships and 
understandings that are inevitably transient.  While some understandings and power relations 
may persist for a period, others are fleeting as individuals, knowledge and circumstances 
change.   Consequently, coordination is not something to be achieved once – it requires 
constant work to build and maintain. 
  
9.2 Contributions to our Understanding of the Post-Heterarchical MNC 
Although the previous section focused upon an empirical model of the dynamics of power 
relations, this – along with analysis in the three preceding chapters – has broader implications 
for how we understand the MNC.  In particular, it reinforces the need to consider the MNC as 
a community of individuals.  It is at the individual level that the characteristics of heterarchy 
are experienced, and at which the challenges of multiple geographies and institutional 
pressures must be faced.  Rather than envisaging this organisation as a heterarchy of units, I 
suggest organisations such as GlobeCo should be consider as a post-heterarchical MNC 
comprising a heterarchy of individuals and their relationships.  
 
9.2.1 Moving from a Focus upon Units to a Focus upon Individuals 
The examination of GlobeCo takes our understanding of the heterarchical MNC forward in one 
key way that has wider implications for those studying the MNC.  While Hedlund (1986, 2005) 
maintained a focus on the heterarchy as comprising discrete units, this study has repeatedly 
seen that the traditional organising unit (such as ‘headquarters’ or ‘subsidiary’) are both 
unstable and poorly defined.  Units do not necessarily have a ‘unity of command’ (Simon, 
1946), there are multiple reporting lines out of units and membership of units overlap as 
individual managers see themselves as belonging to multiple units.  As such, this problematises 
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the organisational unit as the key building block and unit of analysis that dominates 
conceptualisation of the MNC (Ciabuschi, Dellestrand & Holm, 2012; Geppert et al, 2016).  
In particular, the study introduces the concepts of organisational ambiguity and 
organisational contestation as contributions.  Organisational ambiguity within the MNC 
suggests both an incoherence to boundaries, and that there may be different understanding 
of, and meanings attached to, the organisational structure.  While similar concepts can be 
found within the literature they are largely presented as an undesirable outcome (e.g. Hamel 
& Prahalad, 1983, who see ‘organizational ambiguity’ as the product of lack of ‘strategic 
clarity’) or are considered as a trigger for sensemaking (Jacobs & Heracleous, 2006)14.  
However, the concept here reflects an ongoing state – “more or less continual” (Alvesson & 
Sveningsson, 2011, p. 351) – of ambiguity that exists due to the inherent contradictions and 
interdependencies within the heterarchy.  Accordingly, this is a specific example of the type of 
ambiguity referred to by McCabe (2010, p. 152) where “ambiguity infuses the exercise of 
power in both intentional and unintentional ways. It highlights that ambiguity does not merely 
serve management … but poses limits to managerial control.”  
Here the consequence of organisational ambiguity is organisational contestation – that is 
contestation of roles, responsibilities, reporting lines and unit boundaries – either directly, or 
through the challenge to initiative content.  Contestation, in turn, results in an organisational 
fluidity, in which entirely new organisational units are born (such as GBS and FM Europe) while 
others are dismantled.   
Consequently, it is not possible to continue to see the organisational unit as the sole unit of 
analysis of the MNC.  This thesis has shown how the boundaries of organisational entities are 
both ‘fluid’ and ‘fuzzy’ and can be regarded as negotiated constructions, the result of 
interaction between key actors within the MNC.  Yet at the same time, the organisational 
structures within the MNC reflect aspects of a shared understanding of roles and authorities. 
This suggests an iterative relationship between organisational structure and the individual 
manager (Figure 9.3).  While the actions of managers are constrained and shaped by an 
organisational structure that comprises both formal and informal entities, rules and 
hierarchies, these structural aspects are not deterministic given the interdependencies and 
ambiguity within the heterarchical MNC.  Rather, managers have significant agency, and 
                                                          
14 Ambiguity is also a key theme within the capability-based view of the firm, although focusing upon 
ambiguity around the link between firm resources and sustained competitive advantage (King & 
Zeithaml, 2001; Barney, 1991). 
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through their actions they either stabilise and reproduce the organisational structure, or they 
act in ways that destabilise and transform them. 
Such a model is not novel as it has strong echoes of Giddens’ (1984) structuration theory in 
which activities within the ‘action realm’ are both shaped by, and simultaneously shape, the 
‘institutional realm’.  Through every action and interaction individuals either enable the 
persistence of existing institutions or cause them to be modified (Orlikowski, 1996).  Similarly, 
there are close parallel’s with Clegg’s (1989) ‘Circuits of Power’ in recognising the existence 
and interaction between an agentic/episodic circuit and structural circuits. 
Consequently, this thesis contributes to the MNC literature by problematising the use of units 
as the fundamental building block of analysis of the MNC.   This is, of course, not entirely new 
as an idea – with Morgan’s (2001a) view of the MNC as ‘transnational social space’ and Kostova 
et al (2016, p. 182) commenting that “just as the modern MNC is becoming more and more a 
network organisation … so its critical employees seem to be acting as loosely defined 
communities or networks of individuals”.  Yet the implications of this perspective have largely 
not been investigated and the focus of understanding the MNC has remained upon the 
organisational unit as the key unit of analysis. 
This does not mean that there cannot be MNCs where units are stable and well-defined, but 
this does challenge the unquestioned use of this as an assumption.  This has importance 
beyond the literature on the heterarchy, as the HQ/subsidiary model is retained as a central 
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assumption in much of the literature of the MNC (for recent examples consider: Lauring et al, 
2017; Hansen & Mattes, 2017; Beugelsdijk & Jindra, 2018; and even Glenn Morgan’s (2018) 
recent chapter on power relations within multinational corporations).  While it may be 
convenient to envisage the MNC as a structure of units, the analysis of GlobeCo suggests that 
this can be a gross over-simplification.   
 
9.2.2 Understanding the MNC as a Post-Heterarchical Organisation 
This focus upon the individuals rather than units as the key building blocks suggests that 
GlobeCo can be envisaged as a different type of organisational form – what I would call a post-
heterarchical organisation.  While such an organisation shares many of the characteristics of 
Hedlund’s (1986) vision of a heterarchical organisation (for example in interdependence, being 
managed along multiple dimensions, lacking clear apex of decision making, limitations to 
hierarchy), it is emphasised in the post-heterarchical MNC that it is individual managers, rather 
than collective units, that are the level at which the challenges of coping in a heterarchical 
environment is experienced.  Consequently, we see managers as members of multiple teams 
along multiple dimensions (e.g. regional, functional); that managers are unable to get issues 
resolved because they do not fall within a single hierarchy with a clear apex – for example 
frequently perceiving that they have multiple ‘bosses’; that managers simultaneously face 
multiple organising modes – hierarchical in one dimension, but collaborative with social 
control in others; and managers may have roles that are both central/corporate and 
operational.  Indeed, units are fluid and temporary, with both formal and informal groupings 
forming, evolving and dissolving. 
Consequently, it is the focus upon the individual and their relationships that differentiates the 
post-heterarchy and the heterarchy.  Hedlund repeatedly talks about units as the building 
blocks of the heterarchy (emphases added) – saying “a further characteristic of a heterarchy 
concerns the degree of coupling between organizational units” (1986, p. 23), “the range of 
types of relationships between units in the company” (1986, p. 24), “critical interdependencies 
between units” (ibid), and “any unit is both a coordinating and directing center and a 
subordinated part” (2005, p. 211).  Although in his 1994 paper on the ‘N-form’ Corporation, 
Hedlund did start to consider implications beyond tight organisational boundaries, reflecting 
on “temporary constellations of people and units rather than permanent structures” (1994, p. 
82, emphasis in original).   
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The contrasts between the Heterarchical and the post-Heterarchical perspectives of the MNC 
are summarised in Table 9.1. 
 
This perspective, of seeing the MNC as a post-heterarchical organisation, with a focus upon 
the varied relationships at an individual rather than unit level, is itself novel.  However, it also 
raises implications for a number of the key ongoing debates in the MNC literature – 
particularly around HQ-subsidiary relations and upon the way in which we understand the 
influence of geography and institutions. 
 
Table 9.1:  Characteristics of Heterarchy and Post-Heterarchy 




reflects multiple organising 
principles, with none 
superordinate to the rest.  
Non-transitive, may be 
circular. 
Individuals simultaneously face 
multiple organising principles.  
Where emerging, autonomy 
and control are temporary and 
both issue and individual 
specific, with managers having 
a series of non-transitive 
relationships.  
Shape of the 
Organisation 
Non-symmetrical, network of 
units, at the extreme no visible 
apex.  Flexible. 
Non-symmetrical.  A network 
of formal and informal 
relationships, partly 
manifested in temporary units 
and teams. 
‘Headquarters’ and 
the Location of 
Thinking 
A multitude of ‘centres’, 
holographic – the ‘firm as a 
brain’ model. 
Blurring of what is centre and 
periphery.  Individuals have 
both HQ and operating 
responsibilities and influence. 
The Subsidiary May have a strategic role for 
the whole MNE.   
Tasks are complex, unstable 
and intricately related to the 
tasks of other units 
Both ‘fuzzy’ and ‘fluid’.  
Reflects the (temporary) 
negotiated outcome of 
agreeing responsibilities.  
Membership overlaps that of 
other teams and units. 
Nature of Control Control primarily through 
normative control. 
Focus is upon horizontal 
relationships. 
Multiple forms of control 
revealed.  Focus is upon 
individual relationships in all 
directions. 
(Heterarchy column based on Hedlund 1986, 2005) 
Power and Coordination in the Multinational Company  Page | 227 
 
9.2.3 Implications for the Debate on HQ-Subsidiary Relations in the MNC 
Dereifying the unit as the key building block of the MNC presents a significant challenge for a 
debate that problematises relations within the MNC in terms of these units.  Yet this does not 
mean that this is a completely irrelevant debate.  Firstly, the post-heterarchical organisation 
is only one possible form of the MNC and there is no claim for universality.  Understanding 
many MNCs in terms of a structure of units may continue to be both appropriate insightful.  
Furthermore, a characteristic of the post-hetearchical MNC is that there are multiple 
organising forms present within the one organisation – consequently, even within 
organisations such as GlobeCo there may be parts of the organisation (or periods of time) 
where consideration in terms of units is fruitful. 
Need to Go Beyond the HQ-Subsidiary Dyad 
The MNC debate has largely taken the perspective that the dyadic relationship between HQ 
and subsidiary is the key relationship within the MNC.  Through this relationship knowledge 
must pass and, coordination achieved, and consequently it becomes the focus for conflict.  
However, the post-heterarchical perspective neither HQ or subsidiary unit (to the extent that 
they can be delimited) is univocal – as units comprise of multiple individuals with differing 
understandings and interests.  As has been repeatedly shown in this thesis, conflict occurs 
within the apparent boundaries of ‘units’ and there are multiple voices speaking and being 
heard in and from these ‘units’.  The relationships within the post-heterarchical MNC are 
therefore largely polyadic, rather than dyadic.   
However, this heterogeneity within the building blocks of the MNC poses challenges to key 
theoretical approaches.  From the agency perspective it questions the appropriateness of 
considering relationships within the MNC as a simple dyad of HQ (as principle) and subsidiary 
(as agent), as the many of different relationships between individuals in an HQ and a subsidiary 
may comprise a multitude of agency relationships with multiple layers and multiple principles 
(where individuals believe they have two or more reporting lines).  As Hoenen & Kostova 
(2015, p. 109) stress – albeit for networks of units rather than individuals – this requires the 
understanding and design of the “system of relationships for the entire set of principal-agent 
relations”. 
Similarly, by challenging the integrity of subsidiary boundaries, the ‘subsidiary initiatives’ 
debate (Birkinshaw, 1997) can be recast to consider how initiatives arise as the product of 
individuals within the wider MNC organisation – possibly involving a mix of actors regarded as 
part of HQ as well as those from subsidiaries, and consequently falling between Burgelman’s 
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(1991, 2002) ‘induced’ and ‘autonomous’ strategies.  Indeed, the case in Chapter 8 reveals a 
case of how a change developed between and across units, involving individuals who might be 
considered as from HQ, global operations and subsidiary.  Furthermore, this reveals that the 
line of causation is not just one of from unit to initiative, but also highlights how the 
development and shaping of initiatives itself determines the understanding of units or what 
Strutzelberger & Ambos (2014, p. 328) refer to as “how individual action translates into 
organizational behaviour”.   
Additionally, moving from a unit-based perspective of relationships to one based on 
individuals introduces additional factors that are regularly ignored.  Michailova & Paul (2014) 
recently suggested that “to orchestrate MNC intra-firm relationship, one needs to understand 
them” (p. 377) but went on to argue that because “the relationship structure of subunits can 
be considered more transactional in nature … integrating concepts of trust and shared value 
is omitted from our discussion” (p. 386).  Yet ignoring these important aspects of human 
relations suggests a very partial view of the MNC.  The multidimensional nature of power 
relations highlights the key role of meaning and, in this context, Chapter 8 highlighted the work 
done to build understanding, commitment and legitimacy.  Such concepts are difficult to 
incorporate into an impersonal unit focused perspective, rather they require understanding 
of the motives, actions and relationships of individuals.  By restricting analysis to the unit level 
key aspects of power relations are inevitably excluded, restricting our understanding of the 
way in which the MNC works. 
Insight into the Creation of Units 
Taking the perspective of the individual enables us to better consider how new organisational 
entities (including units and teams) are born or come into being.  The analysis within this thesis 
reveals a dynamic process in which individuals from both HQ and operations interact to 
discuss, challenge and ultimately come to an understanding of the appropriate organisational 
form for particular parts of GlobeCo.  As such this challenges the extant literature that is largely 
restricted to a static set of organisational units – or implicitly adopts the assumption that new 
units appear at the will of head office.  As such what we see is far more than the reassignment 
of, or conflict over, subsidiary ‘charters’ (Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998).  Rather it emphasises the 
dynamic nature of the post-heterarchical MNC and the danger of viewing the MNC as some 
sort of fixed array.   This echoes Cynthia Hardy’s (2001, p. 43) more general concerns when 
she stressed that “the influence of postmodernist thought on the field of organization and 
management theory has long emphasized the dangers of reifying phenomena like 
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‘organizations’ and argued that we need to treat them as fluid, unfinished, fragile 
relationships.”  Indeed, rather than units being the fundamental units-of-analysis, this thesis 
has shown that they are the by-product, or epiphenomenon, of organising at the individual 
level. 
  
9.2.4 Implications for the Debate on the MNC, Geography and Institutions 
The key characteristic that distinguishes the MNC from other complex organisations is its 
multinationality (Roth & Kostova, 2003) – the need to operate across geography and in 
different institutional and cultural environments.  However, this has generally been 
considered within the context of the dyadic relationship between units that are assumed to 
be largely homogeneous and bounded within a particular institutional field (or geography).  
Yet this thesis challenges whether either of these assumptions are appropriate.   
Beyond Geographically Bounded Units 
Firstly, we have seen that organisational units need not be geographically bounded, spreading 
across cultural, institutional and geographic boundaries.  In particular, with both the 
regionalisation and globalisation of operations there have emerged teams and units that can 
be considered as ‘born global’ (Rennie, 1993; Knight & Cavusgil, 1996), or at least ‘born 
regional’.  There are clear examples within the empirical chapters, be that of the GlobeCo 
European Supply Organisation, or of GlobeCo Business Services and its key service centres 
around the world.  These ‘units’ had newly created elements as well as incorporating parts of 
units already based within disparate geographies, and provide services across geographic and 
cultural frontiers and face the inevitable challenge of working across distinct regulatory 
environments.  For such units, the concepts of home and host country may be meaningless – 
yet internally they face the challenge of dealing with the conflicts and pressures of the multiple 
regulatory and cultural environments across which they work and including managers within 
their boundaries who are ‘carriers’ of different normative and socio-cultural perspectives.   
Secondly, this thesis makes clear that the boundaries of units are ‘fuzzy’, with individual 
managers having multiple reporting lines and being members of multiple teams in which they 
have relationships with a myriad of other individuals of diverse nationality and background.  
Consequently, this refocuses our attention upon the impact of institutional and cultural 
differences at the individual level.  How do individuals respond to the diversity of relationships 
within the post-heterarchical and the corresponding challenges of institutional duality?   This 
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challenge can be illustrated with the example of one of the respondents, a German who was 
functional VP in Russia, an organisation with an Indian CEO, but line reporting to a Dutch 
functional SVP.  This individual has to deal with the consequences of her own understanding, 
the different cultural/geographic frames of her multiple bosses, as well as the cultural and 
institutional environment within which she and her team operate.  It is at this individual level 
that this is faced, and where the individual manager needs to confront the “schizophrenic, 
'Janus' challenge” of operating while looking in multiple directions. 
Consequently, while Kostova & Roth (2002, p. 216) saw institutional duality as the situation 
where a “foreign subsidiary is confronted with two distinct sets of isomorphic pressures and a 
need to maintain legitimacy within both the host country and the MNC”, this research 
illustrates that this is perhaps an oversimplification.  Rather, in the post-heterarchical MNC we 
see that this challenge is focused at the level of the individual and is multi-dimensional rather 
than dyadic – the individual needs to maintain legitimacy with multiple bosses, with teams in 
their local or host ‘unit’, with others in the wider function that they work, and perhaps more 
widely in the locations that they work beyond the MNC boundaries.  Consequently, we could 
perhaps best describe the situation faced by the individual manager as one of cultural and 
institutional polyality. 
Managers Anticipate Geographic Differences 
This thesis recognises that issues of geographic, cultural and institutional diversity are key 
issues within the post-heterarchical MNC.  However, what appears key is not just there are 
such differences, which present constraints that individuals within the MNC must find ways to 
work around, but that there are different understandings within the organisation, including 
the understanding of such constraints.  At the extreme these distinct understandings may be 
so deeply engrained within individuals to appear as different rationalities – to the extent that 
they can be “distorting, denying, projecting or in other ways falsifying to ourselves what may 
be going on around us” (Schein, 2004, p. 32). 
The literature highlights the possibility of actors using national/institutional factors as a 
political ‘resource’ for their own ends (see Ferner et al, 2012; Ailon-Souday & Kunda, 2003) – 
and there are examples that could reflect this in the research – including the example of the 
resistance to the FM outsourcing in Germany.  Yet, it is neither easy nor necessary to identify 
whether institutional and geographical differences that are raised by actors are genuinely 
being perceived as a constraint, or whether there is a deliberate, or sub-conscious 
construction of such constraints in order to advance some particular goal.  Similarly, such 
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differences in perceptions may result from bounded rationality (ignorance of key facts), 
differences in rationality, or irrationality, on the part of one or other actor.  Yet, the thesis 
highlights that whatever the underlying driver of perception differences (even if these can be 
identified), the key is that such differences in understanding need be sufficiently resolved to 
align on a path of action.  Although managers within GlobeCo generally accepted that 
resistance was normally motivated by a genuinely different understanding of the situation, 
even where this was not the case, any political resistance needed to be “dealt with … as a 
reality”. 
Clearly such differences in perspective/frame are a key cause of contestation (see Section 
6.4.1) within the MNC.  But it is also apparent that such differences come as no surprise to 
individuals within GlobeCo.  It is anticipated that others will have different perspectives and 
institutional constraints, and actors take deliberate action to seek these out (a key part of 
building shared understanding).  In the case of the FM outsourcing key the team both designed 
a process that incorporated the opportunity to learn about local requirements, but also made 
it clear that they had retained the necessary flexibility in the operating model to adapt to 
geographic, institutional and other differences.  Indeed, I would argue that it is this shared 
understanding that other individuals have different perspectives and that there are differing 
institutional requirements that leads to solution co-creation being adopted so frequently as 
the dominant manifestation of power-in-use in the post-heterarchical environment.  
Individuals accept that their own understanding and cognition is bounded, and consequently 
accept the limitations upon their own autonomy and inadequacies of hierarchical authority as 
the way to resolve issues within the post-heterarchical MNC.  Indeed, respondents see 
GlobeCo as having “culture of still wanting to listen to everybody” and that this is “so 
engrained in GlobeCo people … that need to make sure that you are engaging everybody and 
getting them on board.”  An interpretation of this is that such a taken-for-granted shared 
understanding has developed within GlobeCo as a response to cope with the institutional and 
cultural heterogeneity that its managers face on a daily basis. 
Geography is Only One of the Causes of Perception Differences 
Although geographic heterogeneity may be the defining characteristic of the MNC, it is critical 
to recognise that multinationality is not the only source of diversity of perspectives/frames.  
As highlighted in Section 6.4.1 perceptions differ between managers for a wide variety of 
reasons that extend well beyond geographic/institutional framing.  For example, we also see 
an expectation that perspectives will differ based upon the organisational role of the individual 
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– while the HQ/’subsidiary’ dichotomy is one reflection of this, it is also seen from differences 
expected due to the functional perspective of the manager (e.g. HR versus Finance), the scope 
of their focus (customer, national, regional, global) or some other characteristic of 
organisational ‘silos’.  This is shown clearly in the vignette from the Institutional Business in 
the UK which opened this thesis – with the clash between a ‘oneness’ agenda in the UK 
business and the desire of the Institutional Business to maintain independence and a separate 
identity.  Such organisational differences are further reinforced by the different targets that 
individuals face for reward purposes.  Finally, there is a recognition that others have different 
experiences and interests, including what could be regarded as personal or political agendas.   
As such, we should regard cultural, geographic and institutional differences as only a sub-set 
of a broader set of perceptual differences that are experienced by managers and that can be 
a cause of conflict within the MNC.  Furthermore, it is not obvious that the 
cultural/institutional perspective differences that result from geography are different in kind 
to those which come from organisation/function, individual history and experiences or from 
personal agendas.  Such differences need to be understood and overcome, irrespective of 
their origin.  This, in turn, suggests that the challenges faced in the post-heterarchical MNC 
may be similar to those faced in other complex, networked organisations, even if the latter 
are geographically bounded.  This echoes Regnér & Zander (2011) view that the MNC can be 
considered the general case, of which national organisations are the ‘special case’ (i.e. lacking 
the additional complexity of multiple geographies). 
 
9.3 Contributions to our Understanding of Power Relations in the Heterarchical MNC 
The first part of this chapter presented an empirical model highlighting key aspects of power 
relations and how these are seen to dissolve and be reconstituted through social processes, 
at the same time providing the alignment required to allow coordinated action and outcomes.  
This section now considers the implications of this mode for our understanding of power 
relations within complex organisations with reference to the key literatures.  In particular, this 
highlights that the workings of power relations within GlobeCo has illustrated how this is both 
multifaceted and dynamic.  It is insufficient just to look at one sort of power, as outcomes are 
seen as coming from the interaction of the different dimensions of power, with the impact of 
both the impersonal and personal relationships, embracing the episodic and systemic, and 
that while focusing upon individual actors is impacted by the organisational structure. 
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9.3.1 Power in the Heterarchy Require Focus upon Individual Actors, Groups and Units 
The key conclusion of the previous section is that it is no longer possible to consider the post-
heterarchical MNC solely as a collection of units.  Rather it is necessary to look at the actors 
within those units and their divergent frames and interests. 
This perspective has specific consequences for the study of power relations within the MNC.  
If different actors within a unit have different preferences and objectives then the unit is itself 
a ‘conflict system’ (March, 1962), embedded within the wider conflict system of the MNC.  
March’s analysis highlights that if the unit is not homogeneous, then it is dangerous to consider 
the organisational unit as the basic unit of analysis.  Rather than solely considering power and 
issue resolution in the context of the relationship between units it becomes necessary to 
consider the simultaneity of the way that power and politics are revealed both across and 
within units as issues are resolved within the MNC.  Consequently, this thesis reinforces the 
perspective that the organisation structure is constructed through the interactions between 
actors, and is a product of, and not just the source of, their relations and power. 
Consequently, this analysis shows that it is insufficient to consider just units or individuals 
when considering power relations within the heterarchical MNC.  We need to understand the 
agency of individuals; as well as their collective working, cooperation and coordination as 
groups; within the context the organisational structure, its units, rules and processes. 
The earlier chapters of this thesis highlighted the need to move beyond the dominant focus 
upon organisational units (the HQ and subsidiary) as the unit of analysis in considering power 
in the contemporary multination.  Consequently, this model of the dynamics of power 
relations was generated by focusing upon the role of individual actors.  However, it is clear 
that given the interdependencies of the heterarchical MNC, the resolution of complex issues 
can rarely be achieved by individuals and requires the cooperation of collections of individuals 
– be these informal groups or teams, or more formalised organisational units. 
Individuals and Their Relationships 
This investigation highlights the role played by the individual in understanding power relations 
within the MNC.  To a significant extent this should not be a surprise, as definitions of power 
largely focus upon the relationships between actors – such as in Lawrence et al’s (2012, p. 105) 
definition of power as “the dimension of relationships through which the behaviours, 
attitudes, or opportunities of an actor are affected by another actor, system or technology”.   
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In part this is a consequence of the emphasis of the MNC literature upon collective units.  Yet, 
Fleming & Spicer (2014) argue that, much of the literature on organisational power is 
impersonal.  Because power is seen as operating through people rather than as a property of 
an individual, this has led to a tendency to abstract power from the particular individual.  
Consequently, power has become “curiously disembodied” focusing upon how power plays 
out through “relatively abstract categories and positions” (p. 278).   
Yet this model repeatedly highlights the agency of the individual actor – as well as its limits.  It 
reveals individuals use of episodic power-in-use through (bounded) autonomy, solution 
filtering and participating in co-creation.  At a practice level, it shows the work to build shared 
understanding, construct prognostic/diagnostic legitimacy and build/embed commitment.  
This is done by individuals through such everyday activities as listening and learning, linking 
discourses, demonstrating credibility, compromising, and leveraging personal relationships.   
Consequently, this analysis contributes in responding to Fleming & Spicer’s (2014, p. 278) call 
to “bring concrete individuals back into the research”.  In doing so it shows that the agency of 
the individual actor, while also revealing the importance role of personal relations.  Power 
relations are not just a factor of the resources an actor controls, their participation in 
processes, or their ability to shape meaning.  Rather power relations are dependent upon the 
individuals involved in those relationships and influenced by their feelings, friendships and 
histories.  Consequently, there is a need to also focus upon “the kind of personal relationships 
that people have developed with each other through a history of interactions” (Nahapiet & 
Ghoshal, 1998, p. 244) – what Nahapiet & Ghoshal refer to as relational embeddedness.  In the 
example of the FM case this is illustrated in importance of the personal relationships between 
key actors within the project.  Because members of the SteerCom had previous positive 
working relationship with project team members there was an acceptance of the project 
team’s perspective, and confidence that the project team could deliver a desirable outcome.  
Repeatedly it appears that relationships played a key role in supporting the legitimacy and 
commitment required for a successful project outcome, and for the resulting reconstitution of 
power relations within GlobeCo.  Trust, respect and friendship all play a role – a role that can 
only be understood by considering individuals rather than collective actors. 
Groups 
Yet this model further highlights that power relations in the heterarchical MNC is not just 
about individuals.  The modes of power-in-use all require multiple actors working together: be 
that in recognising the bounded autonomy of another, in processes of filtering, and – most 
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obviously – in the co-creation of solutions.  Furthermore, the key practices highlighted are 
about bringing groups of individuals together to achieve alignment around which they can 
collectively work to achieve an outcome – reminiscent of Weick’s (2006) ‘emerging 
collectivity’.  Yet such groups are neither solely the product of top-down hierarchical decisions, 
nor do they arise solely from existing units, such as subsidiaries.  Rather we see that key actors 
are members of multiple groupings – while some of these are formalised within the 
organisation, others are of a more informal nature, allowing actors to work across 
organisational boundaries. 
This empirical observation becomes theoretically important in considering power within the 
MNC.  Morriss (2002) discussed at some length the power of groups.  He defined a group as 
having the ‘non-epistemic ability’ (or theoretical power) to do a task if there was a possible set 
of actions among the members of the group that will achieve that outcome.  Yet what becomes 
critical is whether the actions of the group can be coordinated into an ‘epistemic ability’ (or 
effective power). 
Most notably, although the total MNC may have the ‘non-epistemic ability’ to achieve an 
outcome, this only becomes effective if an appropriate set of actors (both individual and 
collective) can be coordinated.   Yet, as we have seen that many different actors are accepted 
as having autonomy or veto rights, then the set of tasks/outcomes for which the MNC has 
epistemic ability may be much smaller than the set of non-epistemic abilities.  That is there 
are many potential courses of actions that the MNC could take but are constrained by the 
inability to ‘coordinate’ these.   
Consequently, this puts emphasis upon how multiple actors can work together, and whether 
they can form some group or coalition (March, 1962; Dutton & Ashford, 1993; King et al, 2010) 
which, given the interdependence within the heterarchy, requires going beyond the boundary 
of units.  As we saw in the case of the FM project this could be seen by the combined 
membership of the project team, the SteerCom, and the wider organisation (e.g. with sites 
during the implementation phase) in changing informal groups.  Together this set of actors 
comprised a group with the ability, the ‘effective power’ to deliver a particular outcome. 
This suggests that one way of interpreting the ‘practices to enact alignment’ is in seeing these 
as the actions of actors to build groups (coalitions) that have the ‘epistemic ability’ to deliver 
on an outcome.  Not only does this emphasise the role of informal groups and coalitions, but 
this suggests that sets of possible outcomes (epistemic abilities) are a function of the sets of 
the possible groups or coalitions and outcomes among which they could become aligned.   
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9.3.2 Need to Recognise Multiple Dimensions of Power 
The literature on power tells us that the concept of power is multifaceted (Haugaard & Clegg, 
2009).  Modern syntheses of organisational power recognise four ‘dimensions’ in which power 
can operate (Fleming & Spicer, 2007, 2014; Hardy, 1996).  However, we have seen that most 
of the literature on power within the MNC focuses narrowly upon specific manifestations of 
power (Geppert et al, 2016) – either centring on resources through focus upon the micro-
political aspects of behaviour (Becker-Ritterspach & Dörrenbächer, 2011), or upon the shaping 
of meaning within the discursive perspective (Rouleau & Balogun, 2011). 
However, this model of the dynamics of power within the heterarchical MNC highlights that it 
is insufficient to focus upon one manifestation of power – such as the primacy of resource 
control and dependency, or the role of discourse.  Rather all the different dimensions of power 
are revealed to be working simultaneously within the heterarchy.  It is necessary to understand 
the range of these different dimensions and in their interaction to understand power relations 
within the MNC. 
All Four Dimensions of Power 
This study makes clear that actors leverage multiple dimensions of episodic power.  The three 
modes of power-in-use highlighted in Chapter 7 broadly reflect Hardy’s (1996) three 
dimensions of episodic power (resources, process and meaning) and each of these are seen 
operating simultaneously within the heterarchical multinational.  Specifically, in the case of 
the FM outsourcing it is clear that we cannot understand the achievement of the key actors in 
the team solely through the resources they controlled – indeed from a resource perspective 
they could be considered ‘low-powered actors’ (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008a).   Yet it is also 
not possible just to consider this a discursive game, as it is clear that they also constructed 
processes to create legitimacy (e.g. establishing the SteerCom) and credibility (sequencing the 
roll-out to allow the demonstration of a performative credibility) that go well beyond the focus 
upon language seen in the discursive framework. 
Furthermore, it is also clear from the model that power relations within the post-heterarchical 
MNC cannot be understood just by considering the episodic dimensions – and includes the 
systemic perspective that requires to be better understood in the study of the MNC (Geppert 
et al, 2016).  Firstly, from a perspective of the context of power relations, Chapter 7 highlighted 
that the boundaries of the modes of power-in-use reflect systemic assumptions of who has 
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the ability or legitimacy to leverage power in what way – be that through the control of 
bounded autonomy, vetoing in solution filtering, or shaping understanding in solution co-
creation.  Yet also, the ‘alignment’ that is sought and achieved can be the basis of systemic 
power relations when it becomes reflected in taken-for-granted, shared understandings about 
the purpose and objectives of the organisation and the ways in which it would be achieved.   
In the case of GlobeCo, examples of this could be seen in the increasingly taken-for-granted 
narratives focused upon raising performance, the need to act as one, and sharing/outsourcing 
non-consumer facing activity.  Consequently, this highlights the need to understand the 
systemic taken-for-granted assumptions within which episodic power is deployed. 
Insufficiency of Hardy’s Four Dimensions 
While the analysis presented here argues that each of Hardy’s four dimensions are seen within 
the ways that power relations are manifest within GlobeCo, it can also be suggested that her 
model may be insufficient.  Along with other studies of power, Hardy’s model can still be seen 
as relatively impersonal and disembodied (Fleming & Spicer, 2014), relying upon “relatively 
abstract categories and positions” (ibid, p. 278).   
However, as suggested above, aspects of relational embeddedness appear to be important in 
both determining outcomes and in the reconstitution of power relations within GlobeCo.  This 
represents a specific aspect of power relations that gives some actors the ability to influence 
others that is not explicit within the existing four-dimensional perspective of power such as 
used by Hardy (1996)15.   
Indeed, the importance of such relational embeddedness may well be particularly high in 
interdependent, heterarchical organisations.  In the case of GlobeCo, solution filtering is a key 
way in which power is manifest, with multiple actors having power of veto.  Yet it may be that 
aspects of “relational embeddedness” – such as trust, friendship and credibility – may be key 
to avoiding the non-veto of initiatives, or in allowing access to the co-creation process, thereby 
allowing other actors to achieve or influence outcomes.   
Consequently, this suggests that in the dimension of relational embeddedness there is scope 
to fundamentally add to our understanding of power.  Through looking at power-relations at 
the level of the individual, then it becomes critical to understand the social relations between 
                                                          
15 This deficiency runs across much of the literature on power.  For example, ‘trust’ is absent as an index 
entry in both Clegg’s (1989) ‘Frameworks of Power’, and Morriss’ (2002) ‘Power: A Philosophical 
Analysis, but see Hardy et al (1998). 
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actors, and the ways in which this can be leveraged to shape outcomes, and ultimately 
reconstitute power relations. 
Power is Influence as well as Control 
In moving beyond (bounded) autonomy, the thesis also emphasises that power relations are 
not just about effecting outcomes (i.e. bringing something about) but about affecting 
outcomes (influencing what comes about).  Respondents frequently regarded their power as 
that of influence.  This contrasts sharply with Morriss’ (2002) separation of the concepts.  More 
broadly, this challenges definitions of power that rely upon the effecting of outcomes such as 
Dahl’s (1957, pp. 202-3) “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something 
that B would not otherwise do”.  Even where such definitions are moderated by the inclusion 
of words such as “to the extent” or “probability” (Weber, 1922/1978, p. 53) of this occurring, 
power is still conceptualised in terms of the determination of outcome. 
Rather, from the perspective of the respondents, the view of influence as power supports a 
wider definition being adopted – for example following Lawrence et al (2012, p. 105, emphasis 
added) in seeing power as “the dimension of relationships through which the behaviours, 
attitudes, or opportunities of an actor are affected by another actor, system or technology”. 
To affect is to influence.  Adopting this wider definition brings focus upon the way that actors 
influence outcomes (e.g. through vetoes, or co-creation) that go beyond controlling or 
dominating (Fleming & Spicer, 2007) the outcome. 
 
9.3.3 Interaction between Systemic and Episodic Power 
This thesis further contributes to the understanding of power relations in the MNC by 
highlighting and explaining the interaction between episodic and systemic aspects of power.  
Although this is emphasised within the wider social sciences literature it receives scant 
attention in the literature on the MNC.  While included by both Hardy (1996) and Fleming & 
Spicer (2007, 2014) as a key dimension/face of power, the interaction between the two is only 
hinted at with Hardy (1996, pp. S8-S9) indicating that “it is against this [systemic] dimension 
of power that managers must employ the other three [episodic] dimensions if they are to bring 
about strategic action”.  Indeed, this study provides greater clarity of the interaction between 
the episodic and systemic nature of power relations.  In providing such a dynamic perspective 
of power, the thesis contributes to a literature that has “tended to regard power as static and 
reified” (Clegg et al, 2018, p. 747). 
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The Systemic Basis of Episodic Power 
As is clear above, actors have an epistemic ability to shape outcomes through the bounded 
autonomy (resources), solution filtering (process), and co-creation (meaning) – yet to a large 
extent we see that this lies in a shared acceptance of who can, or cannot, legitimately act 
within any particular area, as reflected within the boundaries of power-in-use.  Such shared 
understanding consequently presents a systemic underpinning of the way in which power can 
be deployed.   
The analysis in earlier chapters highlight that there can be many factors lying behind such 
shared understandings.  While there are clear shared cultural meanings that are specific to the 
MNC, they also emerge from the different institutional environments within which the MNC 
operates.   
The formal organisational structure, rules and processes are themselves play a role within the 
systemic aspect of power relations.  More directly these may determine the abilities of 
particular actors to deploy bounded autonomy (particularly where there are aspects of 
hierarchy exist) or in determining the right of veto (for example through the formal Schedule 
of Authorities).   
Indeed, as part of this the concept of ‘units’ may play a role in determining the shared 
understanding of the MNC its rules of the game.  Concepts from the literature on power give 
us a language to understand this.  In particular, this suggests that concepts such as HQ and 
subsidiary (or any other unit) are important when those within the MNC regard them as 
meaningful.  This is a specific example of King et al’s (2010 p. 292) more general point that 
“organizations are actors because society, not only legally but also practically and linguistically, 
grants them that status”.   If managers see the ‘rules of the game’ (Clegg, 1989) as being played 
between HQ and subsidiary, then these units have been ‘granted’ a status and have become 
objectified as the key players in a ‘game’ to be played between units.  In such a case focus 
upon the power relations is entirely justified.  This was perhaps the case in GlobeCo in its 
‘polycentric’ past, when managers identified much more unambiguously with the unit of which 
they were a part, and when it was perhaps much more relevant to focus upon power relations 
at the inter-unit level.  However, even at that stage, GlobeCo comprised hundreds of different 
subsidiaries, many of which existed for purely legal or tax reasons, and which were never 
considered as having been granted a status in the HQ/subsidiary game.  Yet even within the 
post-heterarchical MNC, understanding of units and their roles may still have consequences – 
notably in the FM case we see GBS being ‘granted’ a status within GlobeCo that changed the 
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rules of the game, as, for the first time, this that allowed the existing way in which FM was 
managed to be challenged. 
One way of interpreting this is to consider that in some instances understanding power 
relations in an MNC in terms of units becomes an aspect of Clegg’s (1989) obligatory passage 
points.  Consequently, the concepts of HQ and subsidiary can be used as devices for 
“channelling and framing the ‘conduct of conduct’” (Clegg et al, 2018, p. 753) that “fix the 
rules guiding actors’ actions and constrain available possibilities” (Oliveira & Clegg, 2015, p. 
427).   Yet, as Clegg stresses, OPPs are not permanently fixed, rather they give a “temporary 
and partial” stabilisation that are “permanently challengeable as actors continuously deploy 
their strategies of and for power” (Clegg et al, 2018, p. 753).   
Consequently, this emphasises the danger of focusing solely upon power relations between 
extant units.  For in doing so a particular set of ‘rules of the game’ are being assumed without 
considering or challenging how such rules come to be fixed or altered (Geppert and 
Dörrenbächer, 2014).  The consequence of this is to put focus upon the episodic characteristics 
of power, while taking for granted those facets that deal with the systemic nature of power 
within the MNC.   
Episodic Work to Reconstitute Systemic Power Relation 
We also see that within the post-heterarchical multinational this systemic understanding is 
fragile.  Given the interdependencies within the organisation and the inevitability of different 
perspectives and priorities, the systemic understandings can breakdown.  Yet this analysis has 
highlighted that through specific episodic activity actors can work to strengthen their power 
relations through acts of building and embedding commitment, constructing legitimacy and 
building shared understanding.  The findings here complement the recent work of Balogun et 
al (2019) on legitimising strategies.  However, this thesis adds significantly to the literature.  
Firstly, it shows that such practices are not limited to HQ actors.  Secondly, it emphasises that 
this is much more than just a discursive act, but involves construction of processes that both 
provide legitimacy and allow for performative credibility to be shown.  Thirdly, the thesis 
extends analyses that have focused primarily on solution implementation16, to show that the 
same practices are revealed to be at work during idea formulation and solution development.  
Fourthly, the thesis demonstrates how through these practices systemic aspects of power 
                                                          
16 e.g. Balogun et al, 2019; Alfoldi et al, 2017; Balogun et al, 2011; and Whittle et al, 2016 all start at the 
stage of ‘solution implementation’, after a ‘decision’ has already been made. 
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relations can be reshaped – either reinforcing the position of those actors and, potentially, 
reconstructing power relations.  While the actions that constitute these practices appear 
mundane – and, at times, almost trivial – they are central to reinforcing a systemic acceptance 
of who is responsible for what as well as how things get done.  Consequently, this contributes 
to our understanding in the largely neglected area of the role of managerial agency in power 
in the MNC (Geppert & Dörrenbäcker, 2011).   
Consequently, as was seen in Figure 9.2, we see an iterative process in which the systemic 
understanding shapes the possibilities of episodic power-in-action, but that episodic action in 
turn shapes the systemic understanding of power relations.  While this largely echoes the type 
of interaction between the systemic and episodic seen in Clegg’s (1989) ‘circuits of power’, 
this model goes further in highlighting both the forces driving for the dissolution of power 
relations, as well as the specific practices that actors within GlobeCo are pursuing to 
reconstruct power relations.  Through their episodic practices (building legitimacy, 
commitment and understanding) actors that can transform the Cleggian rules that fix relations 
of meaning and membership in the ‘circuit of social integration’.  As a result, existing obligatory 
passage points are contested, and new ones become established (Chapter 8) – and in so doing 
reconstructs the systemic power relations within the organisation.  As such, the thesis not only 
brings a thinking based on the circuits of power to the MNC – at least partly addressing the 
gap identified by both Blazejewski & Becker-Ritterspach (2016) and Clegg et al (2018) – but 
also helps us understand the workings of the ‘circuits of power’.   
In so doing, the analysis of the changing of power relations seen in GlobeCo highlight that the 
concepts within the model can help to understand the dynamics of power, instead of using 
the ‘circuits of power’ model primarily as an explanation of stability (Silva & Fulk, 2012). 
Rather, we see a clear picture of how individuals are able to reproduce or transform the 
systemic aspects of power relations, reinforcing or reconstructing the shared and accepted 
boundaries of responsibilities that comprise the systemic aspects of power-relations within 
the heterarchical MNC. 
 
9.4 Summary of Contribution 
As highlighted above, this thesis is positioned at the intersection of two literatures on the MNC 
and on organisational power.  In examining the dynamics of power relations within the MNC 
it can make contributions to both. 
Power and Coordination in the Multinational Company  Page | 242 
 
For the MNC literature, the primary contribution of the thesis is to suggest the emergence of 
the post-heterarchical organisation, which focuses upon the individual and challenges the 
taken-for-granted assumption of the organisational unit as the primary building block of the 
MNC.  In showing that units are ambiguous and unstable this requires a refocusing upon the 
actions of individuals and (informal) groups within and across formal organisational 
boundaries in the MNC.  In particular, this directly challenges the focus upon the HQ-subsidiary 
dyad and highlights the need to understand how initiatives emerge from individuals’ 
relationships between, across and within organisational entities.  Furthermore, this refocusing 
impacts the debate on multinationality, culture and institutions in MNCs, repositioning the 
pressures from diverse geographies as a challenge or constraint for the individual.  Yet while 
the importance of geography is recognised by actors, this is considered as but one of the 
multiple differences in perception that they encounter, and where they must act to build 
shared understanding and overcome differences. 
Insights from the thesis contributes empirical and theoretical richness in understanding the 
linkages between systemic and episodic aspects of power relations.  In particular, it highlights 
that it is insufficient to focus upon particular aspects of power (be that micro-politics or 
discourse, or specific dimensions of power).  Rather, power relations within the MNC are 
complex and multifaceted, embracing multiple dimensions of power, and embracing both 
individual and collective actors – revealed in the three modes of power-in-use and how the 
boundaries of these reflect systemic understanding and taken-for-granted assumptions within 
the MNC.  This thesis additionally contributes to understanding the dynamics of power 
relations.  In particular, this highlights the inherent characteristics of the heterarchy that lead 
to the dissolution of power relations, as well as the work being done by actors to reconstruct 
power relations.  In so doing, they achieve a temporary stability or transitory intersubjective 
alignment in which coordination is achieved in a complex and interdependent organisation of 
individuals with disparate perspectives and interests. 
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10. Summary and Conclusions 
This thesis provides a case study of GlobeCo, a European MNC that has developed into a 
heterarchy – that is an organisation with high levels of interdependence and limitations to the 
workings of hierarchy.  Through the experiences of managers within the organisation we get 
a picture of their perception of ‘how things get done’ within GlobeCo with implications for our 
understanding of both coordination and power relations in the MNC.  By following the 
unfolding of a specific example of organisational change, the dynamics of the evolving power 
relations can be seen. 
This concluding chapter builds upon the Chapter 9 by summarising the key findings of the 
thesis, and reflecting upon the limitations of this study, and the implications that this has for 
future research. 
 
10.1 Summary of the Thesis 
This thesis is distinctive in that it attempts to refocus attention of theorising in the MNC from 
the organisational unit to the individual manager.  As such, it directly responds to Piekkari & 
Welch’s (2010) call to reconceptualise the MNC to incorporate the ‘human dimension’.  
Through using concepts of power as the theoretical lens this also contributes to our 
understanding of power in the multinational corporation – an area in which Geppert & 
Dörrenbächer’s (2014, p. 226) complained that “it is notable that power relations in 
multinational corporations … have not gained enhance attention in the academic community”.  
Through applying ideas from the wider social sciences literature to the MNC this picks up the 
challenge from Geppert et al (2013, p. 429) that “despite the rich variety of politics and power 
perspectives in current OS literature, these concepts are rarely applied to the study of MNCs.”   
The thesis addresses two specific research questions: 
1. How do actors navigate the organisational structure of the heterarchical MNC, and what are 
the implications for our conceptualisation of the MNC? 
This thesis shows that the organisational characteristics of the heterarchical MNC are both 
dynamic and unstable.  The interdependencies within the organisation, the differing 
perspectives of managers, and the responses to try and manage these, create conditions of 
organisational ambiguity for managers with a lack of clarity of responsibilities; ambiguity of 
membership due to multiple reporting lines and membership of multiple teams; limits to single 
point accountability and limitations to hierarchy.  This results in ongoing organisational 
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contestation – both in the form of the direct contestation by individuals of responsibilities, and 
in the indirect challenge of organisational structures and responsibilities through challenging 
the content of initiatives.  This in turn creates pressure for ongoing organisational flux – 
reflected in the transfer of responsibilities between units, teams and individuals, but also 
through the creation of entirely new organisational entities (units and teams) coalescing while 
others are dissolved. 
Consequently, this case of GlobeCo challenges many of the taken-for-granted structural 
assumptions around the MNC.  The coherence of units is challenged with ambiguity around 
their boundaries, responsibilities and membership.  Teams or units are both contested and 
unstable.  Individual managers find themselves with multiple reporting lines and members of 
multiple teams, struggling with multiple ‘authorities’ each claiming some form of legitimacy.   
As such this problematises the dominant focus of the MNC literature in considering relations 
between coherent and relatively homogeneous units – particularly HQ and subsidiary.  Rather 
it suggests that we should consider GlobeCo as a post-heterarchical form of MNC in which the 
characteristics and challenges of the heterarchy are experienced at the level of the individual.   
In particular, it is at the level of the individual that differences in perception and understanding 
need to be identified and resolved in order to allow coordination.  Consequently, pressures of 
different contexts, institutions and cultures from the multinational nature of the MNC are 
pervasive factors in personal relations both across and within formal organisational 
boundaries.  Yet it is also clear, that differences in perceptions and understanding also arise 
for non-geographical reasons – for example due individual’s function, role and personal 
history.  Critically it is clear that within this particular post-heterarchical MNC managers expect 
others to have different understandings and perceptions – and that they both seek out others’ 
views, frequently relying on non-hierarchical modes of behaviour allowing multiple voices to 
be incorporated into determining outcomes.  
By moving the focus of study of the MNC beyond units to the level of the individual, we see 
the post-heterarchical MNC as a context in of interdependence and ambiguity of the 
organisation.  In order to navigate this, we have seen that individuals cannot rely solely upon 
the formal hierarchy and rules, but need find other mechanisms through which they can work 
collaboratively and coordinate their actions.  Inevitably, this requires us to consider broader 
aspects of the power relations between individuals, and to reflect upon the way that they act 
to achieve coordination. 
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2. How should we theorise the dynamic power relations that affect the coordination of 
individuals in the heterarchical MNC. 
In considering the first research question it became apparent that managers are unable to rely 
upon the organisational hierarchy to resolve conflicts within the post-heterarchical 
multination.  Yet despite the challenges of interdependence, and heterogeneous perspectives 
and interests, coordinated outcomes are achieved daily with the alignment of agendas.  While 
aspects of hierarchy are seen, this is only as one of three different modes of, what I call, 
episodic ‘power-in-use’. 
Firstly, this is seen in instances of bounded autonomy where an actor has effective freedom to 
determine actions, but within accepted limits.  This mode of episodic power echoes classical 
perspectives of legitimate authority, it is ‘causal power’ (Clegg, 1989), and closely reflects 
Hardy’s (1986) first dimension of power, the power of resources. 
Secondly, episodic power-in-use is revealed in solution filtering where an actor has an effective 
veto over all or parts of a possible solution.  Closely related to Hardy’s ‘power of process’, this 
highlights how actors can prevent particular options being realised, but is also limited in that 
the actors cannot determine or effect particular outcomes 
Thirdly, episodic power-in-use is seen in solution co-creation where solutions are 
collaboratively developed by a range of actors, with different responsibilities, working 
together to deliver an outcome.  This can be associated with Hardy’s ‘power of meaning’ in 
that this is about shaping “perceptions, cognitions and preferences” (Hardy, 1996 p. S8), such 
that there is no apparent conflict and apparent consensus. 
Yet in each of these cases there remains key boundary issues around who has the right to veto, 
whose voice is heard during co-creation, or over what aspects of which issues an actor has 
autonomy.  These boundaries are illustrated in issue space, reflecting the systemic, taken-for-
granted basis of power relations.  It is this combination of the modes of episodic power-in-use, 
along with the systemic understandings of the boundaries of its application that comprise the 
landscape of power relations within the heterarchy.  Consequently, coordination is not 
something fixed within the organisation but is the consequences of a transient intersubjective 
alignment where there is sufficient agreement and compatibility between individuals and their 
actions to permit coordinated outcomes to result. 
The extended case study of organisational change in Facilities Management (FM) within the 
thesis further reveals how power relations are reinforced and reconstructed.  Through this 
case, the landscape of power relations is fundamentally altered, with significant changes to 
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which actors have bounded autonomy or filtering rights, and who can participate on what 
issues in solution co-creation.  This reflects fundamental changes in the ‘obligatory passage 
points’ (Clegg, 1989) that lie of the heart of power relations.  In particular, Chapter 8 reveals 
that driving these changes are apparently rather mundane, every-day actions as key actors 
work on constructing legitimacy, building commitment and building shared understanding.   
Through focusing upon the relationships between actors, we can see that they are able to 
strengthen or reconstitute the boundaries of ‘power-in-action’, redefining their abilities to act 
within the MNC. 
Consequently, the total thesis presents a picture of power relations working in a multifaceted 
and dynamic way within the heterarchical multinational that embraces multiple dimensions 
of episodic power and their relationship with the systemic underpinning of power relations.   
Incorporating the key constructs from Chapters 6-8, an inductively derived model is developed 
that illuminates the transience the relations that permit alignment within the MNC: how these 
are manifest; how they dissolve through the inescapable ambiguities and contestation of the 
heterarchy; and how they are reinforced or reconstituted through the everyday practices that 
actors use to achieve coordination.   
Furthermore, this thesis shifts the perspective of power relations in the heterarchy from one 
of statics to one of fluidity. Power relations are not predefined, but result from the history of 
relationships and understandings within the organisation, as well as the ongoing work of key 
actors to reconstruct and reinforce their positions. 
 
10.2 Limitations of the Study 
For some, the key limitation of this study is its qualitative nature, relying on interpretations of 
a single case in order to generate theoretical insights.  As reflected on in Chapter 5, there can 
be no unique interpretation that can be privileged over other interpretations, and so there can 
be no aim for ‘reliability’, for example in the ability of another researcher to repeat the study 
and get the same results (Matthews & Ross 2010).  Indeed, repetition would be difficult given 
the nature of this case in which I was partly involved, and in which I had established 
relationships with a number of the respondents. 
Furthermore, this is clearly a study of a single MNC (albeit of numerous ‘cases’ within it).  
Clearly, being based upon a single organisation, this cannot be empirically generalisable.  
However, as Flyvberg (2006) argues, such studies are about achieving a depth of 
understanding allowing researchers to recognise similar features in their own studies. 
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Consequently, no claim is being made of either empirical replicability or generalisability.  There 
can be no statistics and t-tests.  Rather this research must be judged by Guba & Lincoln’s (2006) 
criteria of trustworthiness and authenticity.  Through providing rich data, cross-sectional 
analysis, vignettes and a detailed case study I can only hope that readers both hear the voices 
of the respondents.  Through the explanation of the process of interviewing, transcribing, 
analysing and reflecting, I hope you are able to recognise – and trust – the path by which the 
interpretations were constructed.  Ultimately, if this research helps your thinking about how 
you can understand similar situations then the research will have succeeded in its aim. 
However, there are a number of specific limitations that I would highlight – particularly as 
these provide impetus towards further research. 
Firstly, the study of GlobeCo considered only one sort of MNC, a traditional well-established 
manufacturing company.  As Zander & Matthews (2010) remind us that other forms of 
‘hypermodern’ MNC exist.  The research findings could have been very different in a services 
company (especially those ‘born global’ in the internet age), or in a ‘pipeline’ MNC 
coordinating a global network of suppliers.  Within such organisations it is possible to envisage 
that power relations between individuals could work in a very different ways because of the 
nature of the business, and the path dependency of power relations. 
Secondly, GlobeCo originated in a particular set of institutional environments in Western 
Europe.  Both in its geographic origin, and in combining elements from the two slightly 
different ‘varieties of capitalism’ seen in the UK and Continental Europe, may distinguish 
GlobeCo as a context from other MNCs with different institutional backgrounds.  Here, with 
their wide experience of other firms, the respondents could not agree.  Many stressed the 
similarity of GlobeCo with other nationalities saying “the GlobeCo story is a very typical … you 
see it everywhere” and the “GlobeCo culture [is] … not completely dissimilar to other large 
multinationals”, yet at the same time others reflected that there was something different 
particularly in the culture of American MNCs finding them “much more decision made 
centrally” and “much faster”.   
Indeed, it is possible that the focus on the implementation of a project in Europe gave only a 
partial picture of GlobeCo – as one US based respondent said: 
“I love working in America rather than in Europe.  Because in Europe the decision is 
the beginning of the debate.  In America when you make a decision, you might 
disagree or not disagree, but if you darn-well don't implement in the next 30 minutes 
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you may leave the building and not come back.  That discipline is hugely lacking in 
GlobeCo Europe.” 
As such a key opportunity for future research is to consider how individuals understand and 
navigate the organisational structure and how power relations operate in interdependent 
multinationals in a non-European context. 
 
10.3 Possible Future Research 
In future it is possible to consider extending this research in three directions – extending the 
context to include different companies/geographies; extending the methodologies to 
embrace other research tools; and in focusing upon specific additional research questions.  
As the previous section highlighted, this thesis focused upon one multinational with a 
European background, with much of the research focusing upon projects executed within 
Europe.  Consequently, there are clear opportunities to extend the research to other 
heterarchical multinationals, particularly those from different institutional backgrounds (e.g. 
North America, Japan).  Firstly, this could consider whether individuals in MNCs from a non-
European background handle the heterogeneity of individual perceptions and understandings 
in a different way from that we see in GlobeCo.  Secondly, this would provide opportunity to 
compare the dynamics of power relations within those contexts.  This could help understand 
whether differences are of degree or of kind: do we still see the same three modes of power-
in-use, but just to a different extent? Or are other modes apparent? 
Similar insight might be generated from extending the study to focus upon GlobeCo 
interdependencies in other regions.  This would give a potential advantage of standardising 
within one MNC institutional environment but considering the impact of being based in a 
different cultural setting.  Not only may this reveal additional aspects on power but could 
further help understanding on the impact of institutional duality (Kostova & Roth, 2002) faced 
by managers in an MNC. 
In terms of methodology, this research has used retrospective case study as a research 
strategy.  While bringing key advantages (see Chapter 5), this approach does risk losing 
visibility of aspects of micro-level behaviour (Pache & Santos, 2010) that could be particularly 
important as a component of power relations.  Consequently, there is potential for 
undertaking an ethnographic study of a heterarchical MNC, including observation of meetings 
and conversations with examination of the actual words used and the use of non-verbal cues, 
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etc., as well as giving, identification of who is involved at any moment in time.  While access 
and time issues for such an approach are significant, this could give additional richness and 
insight into the micro-practices that are used to build commitment, legitimacy and shared 
understanding.   
A potential additional area of research suggested by this thesis is the role of personal 
relationships within power relations.  This thesis made use of Nahapiet & Ghoshal’s (1998) 
concept of relational embeddedness which originates from the wider literature on social 
capital (Bordieu, 1986), albeit being only one of the forms of social capital they identified.  
Given that Adler & Kwon (2002, p. 23, emphasis added) stress that the effects of social capital 
“flow from the information, influence, and solidarity it makes available to the actor” there is a 
case for considering power relations through a social capital lens.  This could build on the initial 
observations in this thesis on the role of personal relationships, and consider how different 
forms of social capital are manifest in different forms of power relations. 
Additionally, this research has focused primarily upon how outcomes and alignment are 
achieved within GlobeCo.  Yet Foucault (1978, p. 95) reminds us that “where there is power, 
there is resistance.”  While key instances of resistance were highlighted, time and word count 
has not allowed for these to be examined in depth.  I have suggested that there is evidence 
that equivalent practices are used in resistance as those identified as used for building 
alignment.  There are clear with examples quoted for how actors try to undermine shared 
understanding – “let me shoot holes in whatever is happening and make a lot of noise about 
it across the organisation and to senior stakeholders” and “the 'water cooler' chat type of 
resistance”.  Similarly, there are signs of actors attempting delegitimise initiatives/others or 
acting act to reduce their credibility – “my God the amount of criticism … we got”, “X taking 
the piss out of Y”.  Yet the methodology does not make it easy to identify the various ways in 
which this is done, for example through the cynicism and irony (Fleming & Spicer, 2003).   
Consequently, there is scope for the resistance to initiatives and individuals to be examined in 
in further depth, considering cases where coordination is not achieved.  This might highlight 
practices of resistance for which there is no equivalent seen in those seeking alignment, 
thereby enriching the findings of this thesis. 
 
10.4 Concluding Thoughts 
Earlier in this thesis I described how this PhD became a cathartic process of sensemaking about 
the world in which I lived for so long.  Through my philosophical journey, the empirical findings 
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and their theoretical interpretation, I have come to understand GlobeCo – and perhaps the 
world more generally – in a very different way.  This is less about either individuals or an 
organisation striving unquestioningly to do what was ‘best’, or ‘right’.  Rather, it is about the 
interactions between individuals trying to identify and then legitimise possible paths of action.  
While these individuals each have a unique perspective, they are simultaneously constrained 
by a network of taken-for-granted – and frequently shared – ‘truths’, habits and assumptions.  
Power is about the way that these actors try to navigate themselves, their position and the 
wider organisation within this web of understandings.  As such, this is a richer, but far more 
complicated view of the world than the quasi-mechanical view of the economist and profit 
maximisation. 
While I perhaps expected to be challenged by the content of the thesis, I have perhaps been 
surprised by the impact of the process of undertaking a PhD that has both challenged me and 
changed me.  Maybe I was naïve, but I had not anticipated the extent of the self-doubt, stress 
and loneliness that comes with more than four years of study on a doctorate.  A PhD takes 
over your life, it is all embracing, and you cannot escape it.  Your waking hours are dominated 
by thinking about your research, and your sleeping hours are all too often interrupted by it as 
well.    
As I wrote in Chapter 5, this thesis presents a snapshot of my thinking at this moment in time, 
and undoubtably concepts and ideas within it will develop.  Yet it does mark the end of my 
journey of ‘doing a PhD’ – the end of a journey that I face with a little sadness, and considerable 
relief. 
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